

America and the New World-State

Norman Angell



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Some Opinions of
The Great Illusion
By Norman Angell

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Who will "win" in the present war? Who will "lose"? And just what will they win and lose? Will Germany be "destroyed"? Will England be "wiped out"? Will any of the countries "lose their colonies"? And if so, how much actual loss will it involve?

"These questions were all answered about four years ago in a way that made the answerer, Norman Angell, immediately famous. To-day, by virtue of those answers, he is, in the minds of thousands of very keen thinkers, a towering figure in international affairs."—*The World*, New York, September 13, 1914.

"Among the masses of printed books, there are a few that may be counted as acts, not books. The *Contrat Social* was indisputably one; and I venture to suggest to you that a book published in late years, *The Great Illusion*, by Norman Angell, is another. . . . The thesis of Galileo was not more diametrically opposed to current ideas than that of Norman Angell. Yet it had in the end a certain measure of success. . . . It is impossible to resist the conviction that this young thinker has opened a new chapter for us in the history of our modern world."—VISCOUNT ESHER in a Lecture at the Sorbonne, Paris, March 27, 1914.

"M. Norman Angell a exprimé dans son livre si bien raisonné des pensées sur lesquelles on ne saurait assez réfléchir."—M. ANATOLE FRANCE, *English Review*.

"The book, being read, does not simply satisfy curiosity; it disturbs and amazes. It is not, as one would expect, a striking expression of some familiar objections to war. It is instead—it appears to be—a new contribution to thought, a revolutionary work of the first importance, a complete shattering of conventional ideas about international politics; something corresponding to the epoch-making *Origin of Species* in the realm of biology."—*The Evening Post*, Chicago (Mr. Floyd Dell), February 17, 1911.

"Mr. Angell has a mind like an edged blade, but he uses it like a scientist, and not like a crusader. He is not a propagandist, he is an elucidator. His book is not a plea, it is a demonstration."—*Everybody's Magazine*.

"An inquiry into the nature and history of the forces that have shaped and are shaping our social development that throws more light upon the meaning and the probable outcome of the so-called 'war upon war' than all that has been written and published upon both sides put together. The incontrovertible service that Mr. Angell has rendered us in *The Great Illusion* is to have introduced intellectual order into an emotional chaos."—*Life* (New York).

"The conception is undoubtedly based on sound economic premises, and should be brought home to the minds of our generation. . . . The author's logical dissection of Chauvinism, its absurdities and contradictions, is merciless. . . . It demonstrates the author to be an extraordinarily competent sociologist and economist."—*Der Tag* (Berlin).

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America and The New World-State

A Plea for American Leadership in
International Organization

By

Norman Angell

Author of "The Great Illusion," "Arms and Industry," etc.



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PREFACE

THIS book is published in the hope that it may contribute, in however small measure, to forming on the part of the American people that "Will" (without which no "way" can be devised) to take the leadership in the civilization of Christendom, for which its situation and the happy circumstances of its history furnish so good an opportunity.

The leadership here contemplated is of a new kind: it is not military, it is not imposed upon unwilling peoples, but it would be leadership none the less; and if the American people can but achieve the inspiration and form this Will, it would mark a chapter in the history of human society as important as the invention of printing, the Reformation, or the discoveries of Columbus.

I trust that this earnest of what I am hoping for America may protect me from any possibility of the reader's misunderstanding two chapters: "A Retrospect of American Patriotism," and "Anglophobia and other Aberrations." For if this mission of America is to be fulfilled, American patriotism must be purged of some of the qualities which have marked the militarist, medieval,

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political, patriotism of the Old World. If the reader hopes to find in this book some familiar restatement of the plea that the inhabitants of this corner of the Western continent alone of all the men who have ever lived upon this planet have no need to watch their conduct and their temper, then he had better put the book down, as he will not find it. These two chapters, for instance, (reprinted the one from nearly twenty years back, and the other from some decade back,) recall certain of our political aberrations of the past. It is necessary so to recall them if in the mission that I hope lies before us we are to avoid certain dangers which might irretrievably wreck it. The sane and human, to say nothing of the wise and noble attitude, is the determination that in the fulfilment of the great task to which we may shortly set our hands, we shall avoid those errors into which we, in common with all peoples, have fallen in the past by realizing to the full in what they consist.

Throughout I have written as an American. At a very early age I acquired American citizenship and though by necessarily prolonged absences in Europe I have reverted to British citizenship, I always claim the right in dealing with American problems, to speak as an American, because in those cases I feel as one. It is as an American that I envisage the problems here dealt with: and so I write.

NORMAN ANGELL.

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PART I
THE NEW WORLD-STATE

The three chapters forming Part I of this book originally appeared in the form of articles in the *New York Times*, and are reprinted by courtesy of the proprietors of that paper.

CHAPTER I

THE END OF THE ERA OF ISOLATION

The old axioms as to international relations—America supposed to be unaffected by European politics—The idea of nations as isolated and rival units—Necessity of examining the truth of these assumptions—The fundamental fallacies which underlie them—The real nature of international trade—The interdependence of civilized nations—Reaction of events in Europe on America—Our losses through the war in Europe—How we pay part of the war indemnities—Military effects of the war on America—Effect of increased militarism in Europe on our social development—Intellectual and moral interdependence—Immense increase of interdependence in modern times—American civilization reflects developments in Europe—Necessity for America to face these facts in order to ensure her own security.

IN the discussion of America's relation to the rest of the world we have always assumed almost as an axiom that America has nothing to do with Europe, is only in the faintest degree concerned with its politics and developments, that by happy circumstance of geography and history we are isolated and self-sufficing, able to look with calm detachment upon the antics of the distant Europeans. When a European landed on these shores we were pretty certain that he left Europe behind

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him; only quite recently indeed have we realized that we were affected by what he brought with him in the way of morals and traditions, and only now are we beginning dimly to realize that what goes on on the other side of the world can be any affair of ours. The famous query of a certain American statesman: "What has America to do with abroad?" probably represented at bottom the feelings of most of us.

In so far as we established commercial relations with Europe at all, we felt and still feel, probably, that they were relations of hostility, that we were one commercial unit, Europe another, and that the two were in competition. In thinking thus, of course, we merely accepted the view of international politics common in Europe itself, the view, namely, that nations are necessarily trade rivals—the commercial rivalry of Britain and Germany is presumed to be one of the factors explaining the outbreak of the present war. The idea that nations do thus compete together for the world's trade is one of the axioms of all discussion in the field of international politics.

Well, both these assumptions, in the form in which we make them, involve very grave fallacies, the realization of which will shortly become essential to the wise direction of this country's policy. If our policy, in other words, is to be shrewd and enlightened, we must realize just how both the views of international relationship that I have indicated are wrong.

I will take first the more special one—that of the assumed necessary rivalry of nations in trade—as its clearer understanding will help in what is for us the larger problem of the general relationship of this country to other civilized Powers. I will therefore try and establish first this proposition: that nations are not and cannot be trade rivals in the sense usually accepted; that, in other words, there is a fundamental misconception in the prevailing picture of nations as trading units—one might as well talk of red-haired people being the trade rivals of black-haired people. And I will then try and establish a second proposition, namely, that we are intimately concerned with the condition of Europe and are daily becoming more so, owing to processes which have become an integral part of our fight against Nature, of the feeding and clothing of the world; that we cannot much longer ignore the effects of those tendencies which bind us to our neighbours; that the elementary consideration of self-protection will sooner or later compel us to accept the facts and recognize our part and lot in the struggles of Christendom; and that if we are wise, we shall not take our part therein reluctantly, dragged at the heels of forces we cannot resist, but will do so consciously, anticipating events. In other words, we shall take advantage of such measure of detachment as we do possess, to take the lead in a saner organization of Western civilization; we shall become the pivot and centre of a new world-state.

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There is not the faintest hope of America taking this lead unless a push or impetus is given to her action by a widespread public feeling, based on the recognition of the fallacy of the two assumptions with which I began this article. For if America really is independent of the rest of the world, little concerned with what goes on therein, if she is in a position to build a sort of Chinese wall about herself and, secure in her own strength, to develop a civilization and future of her own, still more if the weakness and disintegration of foreign nations, however unfortunate for them, is for America an opportunity of expanding trade and opportunities, why then of course it would be the height of folly for the United States to incur all the risks and uncertainties of an adventure into the sea of foreign politics.

What as a matter of simple fact is the real nature of trade between nations? If we are to have any clear notion at all as to just what truth there is in the notion of the necessary commercial rivalry of states, we must have some fairly clear notion of how the commercial relationship of nations works. And that can best be illustrated by a supposititious example. At the present time we are talking, for instance, of "capturing" German or British or French trade.

Now when we talk thus of "German" trade in the international field, what do we mean? Here is the ironmaster in Essen making locomotives for a light railway in an Argentine province (the

capital for which has been subscribed in Paris)—which has become necessary because of the export of wool to Bradford, where the trade has developed owing to sales in the United States, due to high prices produced by the destruction of sheep runs, owing to the agricultural development of the West. But for the money found in Paris (due, perhaps, to good crops in wine and olives, sold mainly in London and New York), and the wool needed by the Bradford manufacturer (who has found a market for blankets among miners in Montana, who are smelting copper for a cable to China, which is needed because the encouragement given to education by the Chinese Republic has caused Chinese newspapers to print cable news from Europe)—but for such factors as these, and a whole chain of equally interdependent ones throughout the world, the ironmaster in Essen would not have been able to sell his locomotives. How, therefore, can you describe it as part of the trade of "Germany" which is in competition with the trade of "Britain" or "France" or "America"? But for the British, French, and American trade, it could not have existed at all. You may say that if the Essen ironmaster could have been prevented from selling his locomotives the order would have gone to an American one. But, this community of German workmen, called into existence by the Argentine trade, maintains by its consumption of coffee a plantation in Brazil, which buys its machinery in Chicago. The

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destruction, therefore, of the Essen trade, while it might have given business to the American locomotive maker, would have taken it from, say, an American agricultural implement maker. The economic interests involved sort themselves, irrespective of the national groupings. I have summarized the whole process as follows, and the need for getting some of these simple things straight is my excuse for quoting myself:

Co-operation between nations has become essential for the very life of their peoples. But that co-operation does not take place as between States at all. A trading corporation, "Britain," does not buy cotton from another corporation, "America." A manufacturer in Manchester strikes a bargain with a merchant in Louisiana in order to keep a bargain with a dyer in Germany, and three or a much larger number of parties enter into virtual, or perhaps actual, contract, and form a mutually dependent economic community (numbering, it may be, with the work people in the group of industries involved, some millions of individuals)—an economic entity so far as one can exist which does not include all organized society. The special interests of such a community may become hostile to those of another community, but it will almost certainly not be a "national" one, but one of a like nature, say a shipping ring or groups of international bankers or Stock Exchange speculators. The frontiers of such communities do not coincide with the areas in which operate the functions of the State. How could a State, say Britain, act on behalf of an economic entity such as that just indi-

cated? By pressure against America or Germany? But the community against which the British manufacturer in this case wants pressure exercised is not "America" or "Germany"—both Americans and Germans are his partners in the matter. He wants it exercised against the shipping ring or the speculators or the bankers who are in part British. . . .

This establishes two things, therefore: the fact that the political and economic units do not coincide, and the fact which follows as a consequence: that action by political authorities designed to control economic activities which take no account of the limits of political jurisdiction is necessarily irrelevant and ineffective.¹

The fallacy of the idea that the groups we call nations must be in conflict because they struggle together for bread and the means of sustenance is demonstrated immediately when we recall the simple facts of historical development. When, in the British Islands, the men of Wessex were fighting with the men of Sussex, far more frequently and bitterly than to-day the men of Germany fight with those of France, or either with those of Russia, the separate states which formed the island were struggling with one another for sustenance, just as the tribes which inhabited the North American continent at the time of our arrival there were struggling with one another for the

¹ *Arms and Industry. A Study of the Foundations of International Polity*, p. xviii. Putnams, New York.

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game and hunting grounds. It was in both cases ultimately a "struggle for bread." At that time, when Britain was composed of several separate states that struggled thus with one another for land and food, it supported with great difficulty anything between one and two million inhabitants, just as the vast spaces now occupied by the United States supported about a hundred thousand, often subject to famine, frequently suffering great shortage of food, able to secure just the barest existence of the simplest kind. To-day, although Britain supports anything from twenty to forty times, and North America something like a thousand times, as large a population in much greater comfort, with no period of famine, with the whole population living much more largely and deriving much more from the soil than did the men of the Heptarchy or the Red Indians, the "struggle for bread" does not now take the form of struggle between groups of the population. The more they fought, the less efficiently did they support themselves; the less they fought one another, the more efficiently did they all support themselves.

This simple illustration is at least proof of this, that the struggle for material things did not involve any necessary struggle between the separate groups or states; for those material things are given in infinitely greater abundance when the states cease to struggle. Whatever, therefore, was the origin of those conflicts, that origin was not any inevitable conflict in the exploitation of

the earth. If those conflicts were concerned with material things at all, they arose from a mistake about the best means of obtaining them, exploiting the earth, and ceased when those concerned realized the mistake.

Just as Britain supported its population better when Englishmen gave up fighting themselves, so the world as a whole could support its population better if it gave up fighting.

Moreover we have passed out of the stage when we could massacre a conquered population to make room for us. When we conquer an inferior people like the Filipinos we don't exterminate them; we give them an added chance of life. The weakest don't go to the wall.

But at this point parenthetically I want to enter a warning. You may say, if this notion of the rivalry of nations is false, how do you account for the fact of its playing so large a part in the present war?

Well, that is easily explained: men are not guided necessarily by their interest even in their soberest moments but by what they believe to be their interest. Men do not judge from the facts but from what they believe to be the facts. War is the "failure of human understanding." The religious wars were due to the belief that two religions could not exist side by side. It was not true, but the false belief provoked the wars. Our notions as to the relation of political power to a nation's prosperity are just as false, and this

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fallacy, like the older one, plays its part in the causation of war.

Now let us for a moment apply the very general rule thus revealed to the particular case of the United States at this present juncture.

American merchants may in certain cases, if they are shrewd and able, do a very considerably increased trade, though it is just as certain that other merchants will be losing trade, and I think there is pretty general agreement that as a matter of simple fact the losses of the war so far have for America very considerably and very obviously over-balanced the gains. The loss has been felt so tangibly by the United States Government, for instance, that a special loan had to be voted in order to stop some of the gaps. Whole States, whose interests are bound up with staples like cotton, were for a considerable time threatened with something resembling commercial paralysis. While we may admit advances and gains in certain isolated directions, the extra burden is felt in all directions of commerce and industry. And that extra burden is visible through finance—the increased cost of money, the scarcity of capital, the lower negotiability of securities, the greater uncertainty concerning the future. It is by means of the financial reaction that America as a whole has felt the adverse effects of this war. There is not a considerable village, much less a considerable city, not a merchant, nor a captain of industry in the United States that has not so felt it. It

is plainly evident that by the progressive dearness of money, the lower standard of living that will result in Europe, the effect on immigration, and other processes which I will touch upon at greater length later, any temporary stimulus which a trade here and there may receive will be more than offset by the difficulties due to financial as apart from industrial or commercial reactions.

This war will come near to depriving America for a decade or two of its normal share of the accumulated capital of the older peoples, whether that capital be used in paying war-indemnities, or in paying off the cost of the war or in repairing its ravages. In all cases it will make capital much dearer, and many enterprises which with more abundant capital might have been born and might have stimulated American industry will not be born. For the best part of a generation, perhaps, the available capital of Europe will be used to repair the ravages of war there, to pay off the debts created by war, and to start life normally once more. We shall suffer in two ways.

In a recent report issued by the Agricultural Department at Washington is a paragraph to the effect that one of the main factors which have operated against the development of the American farm is the difficulty that the farmer has found in securing abundant capital and the high price that he has to pay for it when he can secure it. It will in the future be of still higher price and still less abundant because, of course, the capital of the

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world is a common reservoir; if it is dearer in one part, it is dearer to some extent in all parts. So that if for many years the American farmhouse is not so well built as it might be, the farm not so well worked, rural life in America not so attractive as it might be, the farmer's wife burdened with a little more labour than she might otherwise have, and if she grows old earlier than she might otherwise, it will be in part because we are paying our share of the war indemnities and the war costs. But this scarcity of capital operates in another way. One of the most promising fields for American enterprise is, of course, in the undeveloped lands to the south of us, but in the development of those lands we have looked and must look for the co-operation of European capital. Millions of French and British money have poured into South America, building docks and railroads and opening up the country, and that development of South America has been to our advantage, because quite frequently these enterprises were under the actual management of Americans, using to the common advantage the savings of the thrifty Frenchman and the capital of the wealthy Englishman. For, of course, as between the older and the newer worlds there has gone on this very beneficial division of labour; the Old World, having developed its soil, built its cities, made its roads, has more capital available for outside employment than has the population of newer countries that have so much of this work before them. And

now this possibility of fruitful co-operation is, for the time being and it may be for many years, suspended. I say nothing of the loss of markets in the older countries which will be occasioned by sheer loss of population and the lower standard of living. That is one of the more obvious but not perhaps the most important of the ways in which the war affects us commercially.

Speaking purely in terms of commercial advantage—and these, I know, do not tell the whole story; I am not for a moment pretending they do—the losses that we shall suffer through this war are probably very much more considerable than those we should suffer by the loss of the Philippines in the event, say, of their being seized by some hostile Power; and we suffer these losses although not a single foreign soldier lands upon our soil. It is literally and precisely true to say that there is not one person from Hudson's Bay to Cape Horn that will not be affected in some degree by what is now going on in Europe. And it is at least conceivable that our children and children's children will feel its effects more deeply still.

Nor is America escaping the military, any more than she has escaped the commercial and financial effects of this war. She may never be drawn into active military co-operation with other nations, but she is affected none the less. Indeed the military effects of this war are already revealing themselves in a demand for a naval programme, immensely larger than any American could have

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anticipated a year ago, by plans for an enormously enlarged army. All this is the most natural result.

Just consider, for instance, the ultimate effect of a quite possible outcome of the present conflict—Germany victorious and the Prussian effort next directed at, say, the conquest of India. Imagine India Prussianized by Germany, so that with the marvellous efficiency in military organization, which she has shown, she is able to draw on an Asiatic population of something approaching four hundred millions. Whether the situation then created would really constitute a menace for us or not, this much would be certain: that the more timid and timorous amongst us would believe it to be a menace, and it would furnish an irresistible plea for a very greatly enlarged naval and military establishment. We too in that case would probably be led to organize our nation on the lines on which the European military nations have organized theirs, with compulsory military service and so forth. Indeed, even if Germany is not victorious, the future contains possibilities of a like result; imagine, what is quite possible, that Russia becomes the dominant factor in Europe after this war and places herself at the head of a great Slav confederacy of two hundred millions, with her power extending incidentally to the Pacific coast of Asia and, it may be the day after to-morrow, over one or two hundred millions of Asiatics. We should thus have a militarized power of two or

three or four hundred million souls, autocratically governed, endowed with Western technical knowledge in the manipulation of the instruments of war, occupying the Pacific coast line directly facing our Pacific coast line. It is quite conceivable, therefore, that as the outcome of either of the two possible results of this war we may find ourselves embarked upon a great era of militarization.

Our impregnability does not protect us from militarism. It is quite true that this country, like Russia, cannot be permanently invaded; it is quite true that hostile navies need not necessarily be resisted by navies of our own so far as the protection of our coasts is concerned. But there is no such thing as absolute certainty in these matters. While personally I believe that no country in the world will ever challenge the United States, that the chances are a hundred to one against it, it is on just that one chance that the militarist bases his plea for armaments and secures them. But, unfortunately, we are already committed to a good deal more than just mere defence of American territory; problems arising out of the Philippines and the Panama Canal and the Monroe Doctrine have already committed us to a measure of intervention in the political affairs of the outside world. In brief, if the other nations of the world have great armies and navies,—and to-morrow those other nations will include a reorganized China as they already include a Westernized Japan,—if there is all that weight of military

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material which might be used against us, then in the absence of those other guarantees which I shall suggest, we shall be drawn into piling up a corresponding weight of material as against that of the outside world.

And, of course, just as we cannot escape the economic and the military reaction of European development, neither can we escape the moral. If European thought and morality did, by some fatality, really develop in the direction of a Nietzschean idealization of military force, we might well get in the coming years a practical submergence of that morality which we believe to be distinctively American, and get throughout the older hemisphere a type of society based upon authority, reproducing, it may be, some features of past civilizations, Mongol, Asiatic, or Byzantine. If that were to happen, if Europe were really to become a mere glorified form of, say, certain Asiatic conceptions that we all thought had had their day, why then of course America could not escape a like transformation of outlook, ideals, and morals.

For there is no such thing as one nation standing out and maintaining indefinitely a social spirit, an attitude towards life and society absolutely distinct and different from that of the surrounding world. The character of a society is determined by the character of its ideas, and neither tariffs nor coastal defences are really efficient in preventing the invasion of ideas, good or bad. The

difference between the kind of society which exists in Illinois to-day and that which existed there five hundred years ago is not a difference of physical vigour or of the raw materials of nature; the Indian was as good a man physically as the modern Chicagoan and possessed the same soil. What makes the differences between the two is accumulated knowledge, the mind. And there never was yet on this planet a change of idea which did not sooner or later affect the whole planet.

The "nations" that inhabited this continent, a couple of thousand years ago were apparently quite unconcerned with what went on in Europe or Asia, say, in the domain of mathematical and astronomical knowledge. But the ultimate effect of that knowledge on navigation and discovery was destined to affect them—and us—profoundly. But the reaction of European thought upon this continent, which originally required twenty or for that matter two hundred or two thousand years to show itself, now shows itself, in the industrial, and commercial field, for instance, through our banking and stock exchanges, in as many hours, or for that matter, minutes.

It is difficult, of course, for us to realize the extent to which each nation owes its civilization to others, how we have all lived by taking in each other's washing. As Americans, for instance, we have to make a definite effort properly to realize that our institutions, the sanctity of our homes, and all the other things upon which we pride

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ourselves, are the result of anything but the unaided efforts of a generation or two of Americans, perhaps owing a little to certain of the traditions that we may have taken from Britain. One has to stop and uproot impressions that are almost instinctive, to remember that our forefathers reached these shores by virtue of knowledge which they owed to the astronomical researches of Egyptians and Chaldeans, who inspired the astronomers of Greece, who inspired those of the Renaissance in Italy, Spain, and Germany, keeping alive and developing not merely the art of measuring space and time, but also that conception of order in external nature without which the growth of organized knowledge, which we call science, enabling men to carry on their exploitation of the world, would have been impossible; that our very alphabet comes from Rome, who owed it to others; that the mathematical foundation of our modern mechanical science—without which neither Newton, nor Watt, nor Stevenson, nor Ericsson, nor Faraday, nor Edison could have been—is the work of Arabs, strengthened by Greeks, protected and enlarged by Italians; that our conception of political organization, which has so largely shaped our political science, comes mainly from the Scandinavian colonists of a French province; that British intellect, to which perhaps we owe the major part of our political impulses, has been nurtured mainly by Greek philosophy; that our Anglo-Saxon law is principally Roman, and our religion

almost entirely Asiatic in its origins; that for those things which we deem to be the most important in our lives, our spiritual and religious aspirations, we go to a Jewish book interpreted by a Church, Roman in origin, reformed mainly by the efforts of Swiss and German theologians.

And this interaction of the respective elements of the various nations, the influence of foreigners in other words and of foreign ideas, is going to be far more powerful in the future than it has been in the past. Morally as well as materially we are a part of Europe. The influence which one group exercises on another need not operate through political means at all; indeed the strongest influences are non-political. American life and civilization may be transformed by European developments though the governments of Europe may leave us severely alone. Luther and Calvin had certainly a greater effect in England than Louis XIV or Napoleon. Gutenberg created in Europe a revolution more powerful than all the military revolutions of the last ten centuries. Greece and Palestine did not transform the world by their political power. Yet these simple and outstanding truths are persistently ignored by our political and historical philosophers and theorists. By the most part our history is written with a more sublime disregard of the simple facts of the world than is shown perhaps in any other department of human thought and inquiry. You may to-day read histories of Europe written by men of world-

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wide and pre-eminent reputation, professing to tell the story of the development of human society, in which whole volumes will be devoted to the effect of a particular campaign or military alliance on influencing the destinies of a people like the French or the German. But in those histories you will find no word as to the effect of such trifles as the invention of the steam-engine, the coming of the railroad, the introduction of the telegraph, and cheap newspapers and literature, on the destiny of those people; volumes as to the influence which Britain may have had upon the history of France or Germany by the campaigns of Marlborough, but absolutely not one word as to the influence which Britain had upon the destinies of those people by the work of Watt and Stevenson. A great historian philosopher, laying it down that the "influence" of England was repelled or offset by this or that military alliance, seriously stated that "England" was losing her influence on the Continent at a time when her influence was transforming the whole lives of continental people to a greater degree than they had been transformed since the days of the Romans.

I have gone into this at some length to show mainly two things: first, that neither morally nor materially, neither in our trade nor in our finance, nor in our industry, nor in all those intangible things that give value to life, can there be such a thing as isolation from the rest of Christendom.

If European civilization takes a "wrong turning"—and it has done that more than once in the past—we can by no means escape the effects of that catastrophe. We are deeply concerned, if only because we may have to defend ourselves against it and in so doing necessarily transform in some degree our society and so ourselves. And I wanted to show, secondly, that not only as a simple matter of fact as things stand, are we in a very real sense dependent upon Europe, that we want European capital and European trade, and that if we are to do the best for American prosperity we must increase that dependence, but that if we are effectively to protect those things that go deeper even than trade and prosperity, we must co-operate with Europe intellectually and morally. It is not for us a question of choice. For good or evil, we are part of the world, affected by what the rest of the world becomes and affected by what it does. And I shall show in the next chapter that only by frankly facing the fact (which we cannot deny) that we are a part of the civilized world and must play our part in it, shall we achieve real security for our material and moral possessions and do the best that we know for the general betterment of American life.

CHAPTER II

AMERICA'S FUTURE —THE ALTERNATIVES

America an integral part of Western civilization—Can she affect the course of events in Europe?—A suggested line of action—The reasons for adopting it—The arguments against it considered—How isolation will lead to militarization of America—The internationalization of war—Can security be obtained by armaments?—War a matter of at least two parties—Absurdity of ignoring the other party except when the guns go off—Fallacies of security by armaments and of the Balance of Power—How societies are formed and the place of force therein—Common interests the basis of every community—The future society of nations—America can lead it if she will—The sanctions of that society hinted at.

IN the preceding chapter I attempted to show how deeply must America feel, sooner or later, and for good or evil, the moral and material results of the upheavals in Europe and the new tendencies that will be generated by them. The shells may not hit us, yet there is hardly a farmhouse in our country that will not, however unconsciously, be affected by these far-off events. We may not witness the trains of weary refugees trailing over the roads, but (if we could but see the picture) there will be an endless procession of our own farmers' wives with a hardened and shortened life

and their children with less ample opportunities. We have seen also that our ideals of the future will in some measure be twisted by the moral and material bankruptcy of Europe. Those who consider at all carefully the facts already hinted at will realize that the "isolation" of America is an illusion of the map, and is becoming more so every day; that she is an integral part of Occidental civilization whether she wishes it or not, and that if civilization in Europe takes the wrong turn we Americans will suffer less directly but not less vitally than France or Britain or Germany.

All this, of course, is no argument for departing from our traditional isolation. Our entrance into the welter might not change things or it might change them for the worse, or the disadvantages might be such as to outweigh the advantages. The sensible question for America is this: "Can we affect the general course of events in Europe—in the world, that is—to our advantage by entering in; and will the advantage of so doing be of such extent as to offset the risks and costs?"

Before answering that question I want to indicate, by very definite proposals or propositions, a course of action and a basis for estimating the effect. I will put the proposal with reference to America's future attitude to Europe in the form of a definite proposition thus:

That America shall use her influence to secure the abandonment by the Powers of Christen-

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dom of rival group alliances and the creation instead of an alliance of all the civilized Powers having as its aim some common action—not necessarily military—which will constitute a collective guarantee of each against aggression.

Thus when Germany, asked by the Allies at the prospective peace to remove the menace of her militarism by reducing her armaments, replies, "What of my protection against Russia?" Christendom should, with America's help, be in a position to reply: "We will all protect you against Russia, just as we would all protect Russia against you."

The considerations which support such a policy on America's part are mainly these: (1) That if America does not lend the assistance of her detachment from European quarrels to such an arrangement, Europe of herself may not prove capable of it. (2) That if Europe does not come to some such arrangement the resulting unrest, militarism, moral and material degeneration, for the reasons above indicated and for others to be indicated presently, will most unfavourably affect the development of America, and expose her to dangers internal and external much greater than those which she would incur by intervention. (3) That if America's influence is in the manner indicated made the deciding factor in the establishment of a new form of world society, she would virtually take the leadership of Western civilization and her capital become the centre of the

political organization of the new world-state. While "world domination" by military means has always proven a dangerous diet for all nations that have eaten of it heretofore, the American form of that ambition would have this great difference from earlier forms: that it would be welcomed instead of being resisted by the dominated. America would have given a new meaning to the term and found a means of satisfying national pride, certainly more beneficial than that which comes of military glory. I envisage the whole problem, however, first and last in this discussion on the basis of America's interest; and the test which I would apply to the alternatives now presenting themselves is simply this: What one balance is most advantageous, in the broadest and largest sense of the term, in its moral as well as its material sense, to American interest?

Now I know full well that there is much to be said against the step which I think America should initiate. I suppose the weight of the reasons against it would be in some such order as the following: (1) That it is a violation of the ancient tradition of American statecraft and of the rule laid down by Washington concerning the avoidance of entangling alliances. (2) That it may have the effect which he feared of dragging this country into war on matters in which it has no concern. (3) That it will militarize the country and so (4) lead to the neglect of those domestic problems upon which the progress of our nation depends.

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I will take the minor points first and will deal with the major consideration presently.

First I would remind the reader that there is no such thing as being unaffected by the military policies of Europe; and there never has been. At this present moment a campaign for greatly increased armaments is being waged on the strength of what is taking place in the Old World, and our armaments are directly and categorically dictated by what foreign nations do in the matter. So that it is not a question in practice of being independent of the policies of other nations; we are not independent of their policies. We may refuse to co-operate with them, to have anything to do with them. Even then our military policy will be guided by theirs, and it is at least conceivable that in certain circumstances we should become thoroughly militarized by the need for preparing against what our people would regard as the menace of European military ambitions. This tendency, if it became sufficiently acute, would cause neglect of domestic problems hardly less mischievous than that occasioned by war. In the preceding chapter I touched upon a quite possible turn of the alliance groupings in Europe: the growing influence of Russia, the extension of that influence to the Asiatic populations on her borders (Japan and Russia are already in alliance) so that within the quite measurable future we may be confronted by a military community drawing on a population of five hundred million souls, auto-

ocratically governed and endowed with all the machinery of destruction which modern science has given to the world. A Russo-Chino-Japanese alliance might, on behalf of the interest or dignity of one of the members of such a group, challenge this country in some form or another, and a western Europe with whom we had refused to co-operate for a common protection might, as a consequence, remain an indifferent spectator of the conflict. Such a situation would certainly not relieve us from the burdens of militarism merely because we declined to enter into any arrangement with the European Powers. As a matter of fact of course this present war destroyed the nationalist basis of militarism itself. The militarist may continue to talk about international agreement between nations being impossible as a means of ensuring a nation's safety, and a nation having no security but the strength of its own arms, but when it actually comes to the point even he is obliged to trust to agreement with other nations and to admit that even in war a nation can no longer depend merely upon the strength of its arms; it has to depend upon co-operation, which means an agreement of some kind with other nations, as well.

Just as the nations have by forces stronger than their own volition been brought into industrial and commercial co-operation, so, strangely enough, have they been brought by those same forces into military co-operation. While the warrior and

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militarist have been talking the old jargon of nationalism and holding international co-operation up to derision as a dream, they have themselves been brought to depend upon foreigners. War itself has become internationalist.

There is something of sardonic humour in the fact that it is the greatest war of history, which is illustrating the fact that even the most powerful of the European nations must co-operate with foreigners for its security. For no one of the nine or ten combatants of the present war could have maintained its position or defended itself alone. There is not one nation involved that would not believe itself in danger of destruction but for the help of foreigners; there is not one whose national safety does not depend upon some compact or arrangement with foreign nations. France would have been helpless but for the help of Britain and of Russia. Russia herself could not have imposed her will upon Germany if Germany could have thrown all her forces on the eastern frontier. Austria could certainly not have withstood the Russian flood single-handed. Quite obviously the lesser nations, Servia, Belgium, and the rest would be helpless victims but for the support of their neighbours.

And it should be noted that this international co-operation is not by any means always with similar and racially allied nations. Republican France finds itself, and has been for a generation, the ally of autocratic Russia. Australia, who much

more than any other country has been obsessed by the Yellow Peril and the danger from Japan, finds herself to-day fighting side by side with the Japanese. And as to the ineradicable hostility of races preventing international co-operation, there are fighting together on the soil of France, as I write, Flemish, Walloons, and negroes from Sengal, Turcos from Northern Africa, Gurkhas from India, co-operating with the advance on the other frontier of Cossacks, and Russians of all descriptions. This military and political co-operation has brought together Mohammedan and Christian, Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox, negro, white, and yellow, African, Indian, and European, monarchist, republican, socialist, reactionary—there seems hardly a racial, religious, or political difference that has stood in the way of rapid and effective co-operation in the common need.

Thus the soldier himself, while defending the old nationalist and exclusive conceptions, is helping to shrink the spaces of the world, and break down old isolations and show how interests at the uttermost ends of the earth react one upon the other.

But even apart from this influence, as already noted, America cannot escape the military any more than she has escaped the commercial and financial effects of this war. She may never be drawn into active military co-operation with other nations, but she is affected none the less; by a demand for a naval programme immensely larger

than any American could have anticipated a year since, by plans for an enormously enlarged army.

That, it will be argued, is the one thing needed: to be stronger than our prospective enemy. And of course any enemy—whether he be one nation or a group—who really does contemplate aggression would on his side take care to be stronger than us. War and peace are matters of two parties, and any principle which you may lay down for one is applicable to the other. When we say: "*Si vis pacem, para bellum*" we must apply it to all parties. One eminent upholder of this principle, has told us that the only way to be sure of peace is to be so much stronger than your enemy that he will not dare to attack you. Apply that to the two parties and you get this result: here are two nations or two groups of nations likely to quarrel. How shall they keep the peace? And we say quite seriously that they will keep the peace if each is stronger than the other. This principle therefore, which looks at first blush like an axiom, is as a matter of fact an attempt to achieve a physical impossibility and always ends, as it has ended in Europe on this occasion, in explosion. You cannot indefinitely pile up explosive material without an accident of some sort occurring; it is bound to occur. But you will note this: that the militarist—while avowing by his conduct that nations can no longer in a military sense be independent, that they are obliged to co-operate with others and consequently depend upon some sort

of arrangement, agreement, compact, alliance with others—has adopted a form of compact which merely perpetuates the old impossible situation on a larger scale! He has devised the "Balance of Power."

For several generations Britain, which has occupied with reference to the Continent of Europe somewhat the position which we are now coming to occupy with regard to Europe as a whole, has acted on this principle: that so long as the Powers of the Continent were fairly equally divided she felt she could, with a fair chance of safety, face either one or the other. But if one group became so much stronger than the other that it was in danger of dominating the whole continent then Britain might find herself faced by an overwhelming power with which she would be unable to deal. To prevent this she joined the weaker group. Thus Britain intervened in continental politics against Napoleon as she has intervened to-day against the Kaiser. But this policy is merely a perpetuation on a larger scale of the principle of "each being stronger than the other." Military power, in any case, is a thing very difficult to estimate; an apparently weaker group or nation has often proved, in fact, to be the stronger, so that there is a desire on the part of both sides to give the benefit of the doubt to themselves. Thus the natural and latent effort to be strongest is obviously fatal to any "balance." Neither side, in fact, desires a balance; each desires to have the

balance tilted in its favour. This sets up a perpetual tendency towards rearrangement; and regroupings and reshufflings in these international alliances sometimes take place with extraordinary and startling rapidity, as in the case of the Balkan States. It is already illustrated in the present war; Italy has broken away from a definite and formal alliance which everyone supposed would range her on the German side. There is at least a possibility that she may finally come down upon the Anglo-Franco-Russian side. You have Japan, which little more than a decade ago was fighting bitterly against Russia, to-day ranged upon the side of Russia. The position of Russia is still more startling. In the struggles of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries Britain was almost always on the side of Russia; then for two generations she was taught that any increase of the power of Russia was a particularly dangerous menace. That once more was a decade ago suddenly changed, and Britain is now fighting to increase both relatively and absolutely the power of a century which her last war on the Continent was fought to check. The war before that which Great Britain fought upon the Continent was fought in alliance with Germans against the power of France. As to the Austrians, whom Britain is now fighting, they were for many years her faithful allies. So it is practically true to say of nearly all the combatants respectively that they have no enemy to-day that was not, historically speaking,

quite recently an ally, and not an ally to-day that was not in the recent past an enemy.

These combinations, therefore, are not, never have been, and never can be, permanent. If history, even quite recent history, has any meaning at all, the next ten or fifteen or twenty years will be bound to see among these ten combatants, now in the field, rearrangements and permutations out of which the crushed and suppressed Germany that is to follow the war—a Germany which will embrace, nevertheless, a hundred million of the same race, highly efficient, highly educated, trained for co-ordination and common action—will be bound sooner or later to find her chance.

If America should by any catastrophe join Britain or any other nation for the purpose of maintaining a “Balance of Power” in the world, then indeed would her last state be worse than her first. The essential vice of the Balance of Power is that it is based upon a fundamentally false assumption as to the real relationship of nations and as to the function and nature of force in human affairs. The limits of the present article preclude any analysis of most of the monstrous fallacies, but a hint can be given of one or two.

First, of course, if you could get such a thing as a real Balance of Power—two parties confronting one another with about equal forces—you would probably get a situation most favourable to war. Neither being manifestly inferior to the

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other, neither would be disposed to yield; each being manifestly as good as the other would feel in "honour" bound to make no concession. If a Power quite obviously superior to its rival makes concessions the world may give it credit for magnanimity in yielding, but otherwise it would always be in the position of being compelled to vindicate its courage. Our notions of honour and valour being what they are, no situation could be created more likely to bring about deadlocks and precipitate fights. All the elements are there for bringing about that position in which the only course left is "to fight it out."

The assumption underlying the whole theory of the Balance of Power is that predominant military power in a nation will necessarily—or at least probably—be exercised against its weaker neighbours to their disadvantage. Thus Britain has acted on the assumption that if one Power dominated the Continent, British independence, more truly perhaps British predominance in the world, would be threatened.

Now how has a society of individuals—the community within the frontiers of a nation—met this difficulty which now confronts the society of nations, the difficulty that is of the danger of the power of an individual or a group? They have met it by determining that no individual or group shall exercise physical power or predominance over others; that the community alone shall be predominant. How has that predominance

been secured? By determining that any one member attacked shall be supported by the whole weight of the community (exercised, say, through the policeman). If A flies at B's throat in the street with evident intention of throttling him to death, the community, if it is efficient, immediately comes to the support of B. And you will note this: that it does not allow force to be used for the settlement of differences by anybody. The community does not use force as such at all; it merely cancels the force of units and determines that nobody shall use it. It eliminates force. And it thus cancels the power of the units to use it against other units (other than as a part of the community) by standing ready at all times to reduce the power of any one unit to futility. If A says that B began it, the community does not say, "Oh, in that case you may continue to use your force; finish him off." It says, on the contrary, "Then we'll see that B does not use his force; we'll restrain *him*, we won't have either of you using force. We'll cancel it and suppress it wherever it rears its head." For there is this paradox at the basis of all civilized intercourse; force between men has but one use, to see that force settles no difference between them.

And this has taken place because men—individually—have decided that the advantage of the security of each from aggression outweighs the advantage which each has in the possible exercise of aggression. When nations have come to the same

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decision—and not a moment before—they will protect themselves from aggression in precisely the same way; by agreeing between them that they will cancel by their collective power the force of any one member exercised against another. I emphasize the fact that you must get this recognition of common interest in a given action before you can get the common action. We have managed it in the relations between individuals because the numbers being so much greater than in the case of nations individual dissent goes for less. The policeman, the judge, the gaoler have behind them a larger number relatively to individual exceptions than is the case with nations. For the existence of such an arrangement by no means implies that men shall be perfect, that each shall willingly obey all the laws which he enforces. It merely implies that his interest in the law as a whole is greater than his interest in its general violation. No man for a single day of his life observes all the Ten Commandments, yet you can always secure a majority for the support of the Ten Commandments for the simple reason that, while there are a great many who would like to rob, all are in favour of being protected against the robber. While there are a great many who would like on occasion to kill, all are in favour of being protected against being killed. The prohibition of this act secures universal support embracing “all of the people all of the time”; the positive impulse to it is isolated and occasional—with

some individuals perhaps all the time—but with all individuals only some of the time, if ever.

When you come to the nations, there is less disproportion between the strength of the unit and the society. Hence nations have been slower than individuals in realizing their common interest. Each has placed greater reliance on its own strength for its protection. Yet the principle remains the same. There may be nations which desire for their own interest to go to war, but they all want to protect themselves against being beaten. You have there an absolutely common interest. The other interest, the desire to beat, is not so universal; in fact, if any value can be given whatever to the statement of the respective statesmen, such an interest is non-existent. There is not a single statesman in Christendom to-day who would admit for a moment that it is his desire to wage war on a neighbouring nation for the purpose of conquering it. All this warfare is, each party to it declares, merely a means of protecting itself against the aggression of neighbours. Whatever insincerity there may be in these declarations, we can at least admit this much, that the desire to be safe is more widespread than the desire to conquer, for the desire to be safe is universal. We ought to be able, therefore, to achieve, on the part of the majority, action to that end. And on this same principle there can be no doubt that the nations as a whole would give their support to any plan which would help to secure them from

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being attacked. It is time for the society of nations to take this first step towards the creation of a real community; to agree, that is, that the influence of the whole shall be thrown against the one recalcitrant member.

The immensely increased contact between nations, which has set up a greater independence (in the way hinted at in my last article), has given weight to the interest in security and taken from the interest in aggression. The tendency to aggression is often a blind impulse due to the momentum of old ideas which have not yet had time to be discredited and disintegrated by criticism. And of organization for the really common interest—that of security against aggression—there has in fact been none. If there is one thing certain it is that in Europe, in July, 1914, the people did not want war; they tolerated it, passively dragged by the momentum of old forces which they could not even formulate. The really general desire has never been organized; any means of giving effect to a common will—such as is given it in society within the frontiers—has never so far been devised.

I believe that it is the mission of America in her own interest to devise it; that the circumstances of her isolation, historical and geographical, enable her to do for the older peoples—and herself—a service which by reason of their circumstances, geographical and historical, they cannot do for themselves.

The power that she exercises to this end need not be military. I do not think that it should be military. This war has shown that the issues of military conflict are so uncertain, depending upon all sorts of physical accidents, that no man can possibly say which will win. The present war is showing daily that the advantage does not always go with numbers, and the outcome of war is always to some extent a hazard and a gamble, but there are certain forces that can be set in operation by nations situated as is the United States, that are not in any way a gamble and a hazard, the effect of which will be quite certain. I refer to the pressure of such a thing as organized non-intercourse, the sending of a country to moral, social, economic Coventry. We are, I know, here treading somewhat unknown ground, but we have ample evidence to show that there do exist forces capable of organization, stronger and more certain in their operation than military forces. That the world is instinctively feeling this is demonstrated by the present attitude of all the combatants in Europe to the United States. The United States relatively to Powers like Russia, Britain, and Germany, is not a great military Power, yet they are all pathetically anxious to secure the goodwill of the United States.

Why?

It can hardly be to save the shock to their moral feelings which would come from the mere disapproval of people on the other side of the world. If any percentage of what we have read

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of German methods is true, if German ethics bear the faintest resemblance to what they are so often represented to be, Germany must have no feeling in the political sphere to be hurt by the moral disapproval of the people of the United States. If German statesmen are so desperately anxious, as they evidently are, to secure the approval and goodwill of the United States it is because they realize, however indistinctly, that there lie in the hands of the United States powers which could be loosed, more portentous than those held by the masters of many legions.

Just what these powers are and how they might be used to give America greater security than she could achieve by arms to place her at the virtual head of a great world-state and to do for mankind as a whole a service greater than any yet recorded in written history must be left to another chapter.

CHAPTER III

AMERICA AS LEADER

What are the most powerful forces and sanctions in modern life?—

The non-military character of those sanctions—How the world admits their force without knowing it—The opportunity for America to organize these forces—How she can ensure her own security—How she can do for Europe what Europe cannot do for herself—America as the centre of the new World-State—Her mission as initiator and organizer of the new sanctions in international life—Will America show herself capable of real world leadership?

IN the preceding chapter I indicated that America might undertake at this juncture of international affairs an intervention in the politics of the Old World which is of a kind not yet heretofore attempted by any nation, an intervention, that is to say, that should not be military, but in the first instance mediatory and moral, having in view, if needs be, the employment of certain organized social and economic forces which I will detail presently.

The suggestion that America should take any such lead is resisted, first, on the ground that it is a violation of her traditional policy, and, secondly, that “economic and social forces” are bound to

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be ineffective unless backed by military, so that the plea would involve her in a militarist policy. With reference to these two points, I pointed out in the preceding chapter that America's isolation from a movement for world agreement would infallibly land her in a very pronounced militarist policy, the increase of her armaments, the militarization of her civilization and all that that implies.

There are open to America at this present moment two courses: one which will lead her to militarism and the indefinite increase of armaments—that is the course of isolation from the world's life, from the new efforts that will be made towards world organization; the other, to anticipate events and take the initiative in the leadership of world organization, which would have the effect of rendering Western civilization, including herself, less military, less dependent upon arms, and put the development of that civilization on a civilist rather than a militarist basis.

I believe that it is the failure to realize that this intervention can be non-military in character which explains the reluctance of very many Americans to depart from their traditional policy of non-intervention. With reference to that point it is surely germane to remember that the America of 1914 is not the America of 1776; circumstances which made Washington's advice sound and statesmanlike have been transformed. The situation to-day is not that of a tiny Power not yet solidified, remote from the main currents

of the world's life, outmatched in resources by any one of the greater Powers of Europe. America is no longer so remote as to have little practical concern with Europe. Its contacts with Europe are instantaneous, daily, intimate, innumerable—so much so indeed that our own civilization will be intimately affected and modified by certain changes which threaten in the older world. I will put the case thus: suppose that there are certain developments in Europe which would profoundly threaten our own civilization and our own security, and suppose further that we could, without great cost to ourselves, so guide or direct those changes and developments as to render them no longer a menace to this country. If such a case could be established, would not adherence to a formula established under eighteenth-century conditions have the same relation to sound politics that the incantations and taboos of superstitious barbarians have to sound religion? And I think such a case can be established.

I wonder whether it has occurred to many Americans to ask *why* all the belligerents in this present war are showing such remarkable deference to American public opinion. Some Americans may, of course, believe that it is sheer personal fascination of individual Americans or simple tenderness of moral feeling that makes Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Austria, take definitely so much trouble at a time when they have sufficient already, to demonstrate that they

have taken the right course, that they are obeying all the laws of war, that they are not responsible for the war in any way, and so forth. Is it simply that our condemnation would hurt their feelings? This hardly agrees with certain other ideas which we hold as to the belligerents. There is something beyond this order of motive at the bottom of the immense respect which all the combatants alike are paying to American opinion. It happened to the writer in the early stages of the war to meet a considerable number of Belgian refugees from Brussels, all of them full of stories (which I must admit were second or third or three hundredth-hand) of German barbarity and ferocity. Yet all were obliged to admit that German behaviour in Brussels had on the whole been very good. But that, they explained, was "merely because the American Consul put his foot down." Yet one is not aware that President Wilson had authorized the American Consul so much as to hint at the possible military intervention of America in this war. Nevertheless there can be no doubt that these "Huns," so little susceptible in our view for the most part to moral considerations, were greatly influenced by the opinion of America; and we know also that the other belligerents have shown the same respect for the attitude of the United States.

I think we have here what so frequently happens in the development of the attitude of men towards large general questions: the intuitive recognition

of a truth which those who recognize it are quite unable to put into words. It is a self-protective instinct, a movement that is made without its being necessary to think it out. (In the way that the untaught person is able instantly to detect the false note in a tune without knowing that such things as notes, or crotchets and quavers exist.)

It is quite true that the Germans feared the bad opinion of the world because the bad opinion of the world may be translated into an element of resistance to the very ends which it is the object of the war to achieve for Germany.

Those ends include the extension of German influence, material and moral, of German commerce and culture. But a world very hostile to Germany might quite conceivably check both. We say rightly enough, probably, that pride of place and power had its part—many declare the predominant part—in the motives that led Germany into this war. But it is quite conceivable that a universal revulsion of feeling against a Power like Germany might neutralize the influence she would gain in the world by a mere extension of her territorial conquests. Russia, for instance, has nearly five times the population and very many times the area of France; but one may doubt whether even a Russian would assert that Russian influence is five or ten times greater than that of France; still less that the world yielded him in any sense a proportionately greater deference than it yields the Frenchman. The extent to which

the greatest Power can impose itself by bayonets is very limited in area and depth. All the might of the Prussian Army cannot compel the children of Poland or of Lorraine to say their prayers in German; it cannot compel the housewives of Switzerland or Paraguay or of any other little state that has not a battleship to its name, to buy German saucepans if so be they do not desire to. There are so many other things necessary to render political or military force effective; and there are so many that can offset it altogether. We see these forces at work around us every day accomplishing miracles, doing things which a thousand years of fighting were never able to do—and then say serenely that they are mere "theories." Why do Catholic Powers no longer execute heretics? They have a perfect right—even in International Law—to do so. What is it that protects the heretic in Catholic countries? The police? But the main business of the police and the army used to be to hunt him down. What is controlling the police and the army?

By some sort of process there has been an increasing intuitive recognition of a certain code which we realize to be necessary for a decent society. It has come to be a sanction much stronger than the sanction of law, much more effective than the sanction of military force. During the German advance on Paris, I happened to be present at a French family conference. Stories of the incredible cruelties and ferocity of

the Germans were circulating in the northern Department where I happened to be staying. Everyone was in a condition of panic, and two Frenchmen, fathers of families, were seeing red at the story of all these barbarities. But they had to decide—and the thing was discussed at a little family conference—where they should send their wives and children. And one of these Frenchmen, the one who had been most ferocious in his condemnation of the German barbarian, said quite naively and with no sense of irony or paradox: "Of course, if we could find an absolutely open town which would not be defended at all, the women folk and children would be all right." His instinct, of course, was perfectly just. The German "savage" had had three-quarters of a million people in his absolute power in Brussels, and, so far as we know, not a child or a woman has been injured. Indeed in normal times our security against foreigners is not based upon physical force at all. I suppose during the last century some hundreds of thousands of British and American tourists have travelled through the historic cities of Germany, their children have gone to the German educational institutions, their invalids have been tended by German doctors and cut up by German surgeons in German sanatoria and health resorts, and I am quite sure that it never occurred to any one of these hundreds of thousands that their little children, when in the educational institutions of these "Huns," were in any

way in danger. It was not the guns of the American Navy or the British Navy that were protecting them; the physical force of America or of Great Britain could not certainly be the factor operative in, say, Switzerland or Austria, yet every summer tens of thousands of them trust their lives and those of their women and children in the remote mountains of Switzerland on no better security than the expectation that a foreign community, over whom we have no possibility of exercising force, will observe a convention which has no sanction other than the recognition that it is to their advantage to observe it. And we thus have the spectacle of millions of Anglo-Saxons absolutely convinced that the sanctity of their homes and the safety of their property are secure from the ravages of the foreigner only because they possess a naval and military force that overawes him, yet serenely leaving the protection of that military force, and placing life and property alike within the absolute power of that very foreigner against whose predatory tendencies we spend millions in protecting ourselves.

No use of military power, however complete and overwhelming, would pretend to afford a protection anything like as complete as that afforded by these moral forces. Sixty years ago Britain had as against Greece a preponderance of power that made her the absolute dictator of the latter's policy, yet all the British battleships and all the threats of "consequences" could not

prevent British travellers being murdered by Greek brigands, though in Switzerland only moral forces—the recognition by an astute people of the advantage of treating foreigners well—had already made the lives and property of Britons as safe in that country as in their own.

In the same way, no scheme of arming Protestants as against Catholics, or Catholics as against Protestants (the method which gave us the wars of religion and the massacre of St. Bartholomew), could assure that general security of spiritual and intellectual possessions which we now in large measure enjoy. So indeed with the more material things, France, Great Britain, and some of the older nations have sunk thousands of millions in foreign investments, the real security of which is not in any physical force which their government could possibly exercise, but the free recognition of foreigners that it is to their advantage to adhere to financial obligations. Englishmen do not even pretend that the security of their investments in a country like the United States or the Argentine is dependent upon the coercion which the British Government is able to exercise over these communities.

The reader will not, I think, misunderstand me. I am not pleading that human nature has undergone or will undergo any radical transformation. Rather am I asserting that it will not undergo any; that the intention of the man of the tenth century in Europe was as good as that of the man

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of the twentieth; that the man of the tenth century was as capable of self-sacrifice, was, it may be, less self-seeking. But what I am trying to hint is that the shrinking of the world by our developed intercommunication has made us all more inter-dependent. The German Government moves its troops against Belgium; a moratorium is immediately proclaimed in Rio de Janeiro, a dozen American Stock Exchanges are promptly closed, and some hundreds of thousands of our people are affected in their daily lives. This world-wide effect is not a matter of some years or a generation or two. It is a matter of an hour; we are intimately concerned with the actions of men on the other side of the world that we have never seen and never shall see; and they are intimately concerned with us. We know, without having thought it out, that we are bound together by a compact; the very fact that we are dependent upon one another creates as a matter of fact a partnership. We are expecting the other man to perform his part; he has been doing so uninteruptedly for years, and we send him our goods or we take his bill of exchange, or our families are afloat in his ships, expecting that he will pay for his goods, honour the bill of exchange, navigate safely his ship—he has undertaken to do these things in the world-wide partnership of our common labour and then he fails. He does not do these things, and we have a very lively sense of the immorality of the doctrine which permits him to

escape doing them. And so there are certain of these things that are not done, certain lengths to which even in war time we cannot go. What will stop the war is not so much the fighting, any more than Protestant massacres prevented Catholic massacres. Men do not fear the enemy soldiers; they do fear the turning of certain social and moral forces against them. The German Government does not hesitate for a moment to send ten thousand of its own people to certain death under enemy guns even though the military advantage of so doing may be relatively trifling. But it dare not order the massacre of ten thousand foreign residents in Berlin. There is some force which makes it sometimes more scrupulous of the lives of its enemy than of the lives of its own people.

Yet why should it care? Because of the physical force of the armies ranged against it? But it has to meet that force in any case. It fears that the world will be stirred. In other words it knows that the world at large has a very lively realization that in its own interest certain things must not be done, that the world could not live together as we now know it, if it permitted those things to be done. It would not so permit them.

At the bottom of this moral hesitation is an unconscious realization of the extent of each nation's dependence upon the world-partnership. It is not a fear of physical chastisement; any nation will go to war against desperate odds if a foreign nation talks of chastising it. It is not

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that consideration which operates, as a thousand examples in history prove to us. But there are forces outside military power more visible and ponderable than these.

There exists, of course, already a world-state which has no formal recognition in our paper constitutions at all, and no sanction in physical force. If you are able to send a letter to the most obscure village of China, a telegram to any part of the planet, to travel over most of the world in safety, to carry on trade therewith, it is because for a generation the Post-Office Departments of the world have been at work arranging traffic and communication details, methods of keeping their accounts; because the shipowner has been devising international signal codes, the banker arranging conditions of international credit; because in fact not merely a dozen but some hundreds of international agreements, most of them made not between governments at all, but between groups and parties directly concerned, have been devised. There is no overlord enforcing them, yet much of our daily life depends upon their normal working. The bankers or the shipowners or the makers of electric machinery have met in Paris or in Brussels and decided that such shall be the accepted code, such the universal measurement for the lamp or instrument, such the conditions for the bill of exchange, and from the moment that there is an agreement you do not need any sanction. If the instrument does not conform to the

measurement it is unsalable and that is sanction enough.

We have seen in the preceding chapter that the dependence of the nations goes back a good deal further than we are apt to think; that long before the period of fully developed intercommunication, all nations owed their civilization to foreigners. It was to their traffic with Gaul and the visits of the Phœnician traders that the early inhabitants of the British Isles learned their first steps in arts and crafts and the development of a civilized society, and even in what we know as the Dark Ages we find Charlemagne borrowing scholars from York to assist him in civilizing the continent. The civilization which our forefathers brought with them to America was the result of centuries of exchange in ideas between Britain and the Continent, and though in the course of time it had become something characteristically Anglo-Saxon, its origins were Greek and Arabic and Roman and Jewish. But the interdependence of nations to-day is of an infinitely more vital and insistent kind, and, despite superficial set-backs, becomes more vital every day. As late as the first quarter of the nineteenth century, for instance, Britain was still practically self-sufficing; her very large foreign trade was a trade in luxuries. She could still produce her own food, her population could still live on her own soil. But if to-day by some sort of magic Britain could kill off all foreigners, the means of livelihood for quite an appreciable

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portion of her population would have disappeared. Millions would be threatened by actual starvation. For Britain's overseas trade, on which so large a proportion of the population actually lives, is mainly with the outside world and not with her own Empire. We have seen what isolation merely from two countries has meant for Great Britain. Britain is still maintaining her contacts with the world as a whole, but the cessation of relationship with two countries has precipitated the gravest financial crisis known in all her history, has kept her Stock Exchanges closed for months, has sent her consols to a lower point than any known since the worst period of the Napoleonic wars, and has compelled the Government ruthlessly to pledge its credit for the support of banking institutions and all the various trades that have been most seriously hit. Nor is Germany's isolation altogether complete. She manages through neutral countries and otherwise to maintain a considerable current of relationship with the outside world, but how deeply and disastrously the partial severance of contact has affected Germany we shall not at present, probably at no time, in full measure know.

All this gives a mere hint of what the organized isolation by the entire world would mean to any one nation. Imagine the position of a civilized country whose ports no ship from another country would enter, whose bills no banker would discount, a country unable to receive a telegram or a

letter from the outside world or send one thereto, whose citizens could neither travel in other countries or maintain communication therewith. It would have an effect in the modern world somewhat equivalent to that of the dreadful edicts of excommunication and interdict which the Papal Power was able to issue in the mediæval world.

I am aware, of course, that such a measure would fall very hardly upon certain individuals in the countries inflicting this punishment, but it is quite within the power of the Governments of those countries to do what the British Government has done in the case of persons like acceptors of German bills who found themselves threatened with bankruptcy and who threatened in consequence to create great disturbance around them because of the impossibility of securing payment from the German endorsers. The British Government came to the rescue of those acceptors and used the whole national credit to sustain them. It is expensive if you will, but infinitely less expensive than a war, and finally most of the cost of it will probably be recovered.

Now if that were done, how could a country so dealt with retaliate? She could not attack all the world at once. Upon those neighbours more immediately interested could be thrown the burden of taking such defensive military measures as the circumstances might dictate. You might have a group of Powers probably taking such defensive measures and all the Powers of Christen-

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dom co-operating economically by this suggested non-intercourse. It is possible even that the Powers as a whole might contribute to a general fund indemnifying individuals in those States particularly hit by the fact of non-intercourse; I am thinking for instance of shipping interests in a port like Amsterdam if the decree of non-intercourse were proclaimed against a Power like Germany.

We have little conception of the terror which such a policy might constitute to a nation. It has never been tried, of course, because even in war complete non-intercourse is not achieved. At the present time Germany is buying and selling and trading with the outside world, cables from Berlin are being sent almost as freely to New York as cables from London and German merchants are making contracts, maintaining connections of very considerable complexity. But if this machinery of non-intercourse were organized as it might be, there would be virtually no neutrals, and its effect in our world to-day would be positively terrifying.

It is true that the American administration did try something resembling a policy of non-intercourse in dealing with Mexico. But the thing was a fiction. While the Department of State talked of non-intercourse the Department of the Treasury was busy clearing ships for Mexico, facilitating the dispatch of mails, etc. And of course Mexico's communication with Europe remained unim-

paired; at the exact moment when the President of the United States was threatening Huerta with all sorts of dire penalties, Huerta's Government was arranging in London for the issue of large loans, and the advertisements of these Mexican loans were appearing in the London *Times*. So that the one thing that might have moved Huerta's Government, the United States Government was unable to enforce. In order to enforce it, it needed the co-operation of other countries. I have spoken of the economic World-State—of all those complex international arrangements concerning post-offices, shipping, banking, codes, sanctions of law, criminal research, and the rest, on which so much of our civilized life depends. This World-State is unorganized, incoherent. It has neither a centre nor a capital, nor a meeting place. The ship-owners gathered in Paris, the world's bankers in Madrid or Berne, and what is, in effect, some vital piece of world regulation is devised in the smoking-room of some Brussels hotel. The World-State has not so much as an office or an address. The United States should give it one. Out of its vast resources it should endow civilization with a Central Bureau of Organization—a Clearing House of its international activities as it were, with the funds needed for its staff and upkeep.

If undertaken with largeness of spirit it would become the Capitol of the world. And the Old World looks to America to do this service, because it is the one which it cannot do for itself. Its old

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historic jealousies and squabbles, from which America is so happily detached, prevent any one Power taking up and putting through this work of organization, but America could do it, and do it so effectively that from it might well flow this organization of that common action of all the nations against any recalcitrant member of which I have spoken as a means of enforcing non-militarily a common decision.

It is this World-State which it should be the business of America during the next decade or two to co-ordinate, to organize. Its organization will not come into being as the result of a weekend talk between ambassadors. There will be difficulties, material as well as moral, jealousies to overcome, suspicions to surmount. But this war places America in a more favourable position than any one European Power. The older Powers would be less suspicious of her than of any one among their number. America has infinitely greater material resources, she has a greater gift for improvised organization, she is less hidebound by old traditions, more disposed to make an attempt along new lines. That is the most terrifying thing about the proposal which I make; it has never been tried. But the very difficulties constitute for America also an immense opportunity. We have had nations give their lives and the blood of their children for a position of supremacy and superiority. But we are in a position of superiority and supremacy which for the most part

would be welcomed by the world as a whole and which would not demand of America the blood of one of her children. It would demand some enthusiasm, some moral courage, some sustained effort, faith, patience, and persistence. It would establish new standards in, and let us hope a new kind of, international rivalry.

One word as to a starting point and a possible line of progress. The first move toward the ending of this present war may come from America. The President of the United States will probably act as mediator. The terms of peace will probably be settled in Washington. Part of the terms of peace to be exacted by the Allies will probably be, as I have already hinted, some sort of assurance against future danger from German militarist aggression. The German, rightly or wrongly, does not believe that he has been the aggressor—it is not a question at all of whether he is right or wrong, it is a question of what he believes. And he believes quite honestly and sincerely that he is merely defending himself. So what he will be mainly concerned about in the future is his security from the victorious Allies. Around this point much of the discussion at the conclusion of this present war will range. If it is to be a real peace and not a truce, an attempt will have to be made to give to each party security from the other, and the question will then arise whether America will come into the combination or not. I have already indicated that I think

she should not come in, certainly I do not think she will come in, with the offer of military aid. But if she stays out of it altogether, she will have withdrawn from this world congress, that must sit at the end of the war, a mediating influence which may go far to render it nugatory. And when, after, it may be somewhat weary preliminaries, an international council of conciliation is established to frame the general basis of the new alliance between the civilized powers for mutual protection along the lines indicated, America, if she is to play her part in securing the peace of the world, must be ready to throw at least her moral and economic weight into the common stock, the common moral and economic forces which will act against the common enemy, whoever he may happen to be. That does not involve taking sides, as I showed in my last chapter. The policeman does not decide which of two quarrellers is right; he merely decides that the stronger shall not use his power against the weaker. He goes to the aid of the weaker and then later the community deals with the one who is the real aggressor. One may admit, if you will, that at present there is no international law and that it may not be possible to create one. But we can at least exact that there shall be an inquiry, a stay; and more often than not that alone would suffice to solve the difficulty without the application of definite law. It is just up to that point that the United States should at this stage be ready to commit herself

in the general council of conciliation, namely to say this:

We shall throw our weight against any Power that refuses to give civilization an opportunity at least of examining and finding out what the facts of the dispute are. After due examination we may reserve the right to withdraw from any further interference between such Power and its antagonist. But at least we pledge ourselves to secure that, by throwing the weight of such non-military influence as we may have on the side of the weaker.

That is the point at which a new society of nations would begin, as it is the point at which a society of individuals has begun. And it is for the purpose of giving effect to her undertaking in that one regard that America should become the centre of a definite organization of that World-State which has already cut athwart all frontiers and traversed all seas.

It is not easy without apparent hyperbole to write of the service which America would thus render to mankind. She would have discovered a new sanction for human justice, would have made human society a reality. She would have done something immeasurably greater, immeasurably more beneficent than any of the conquests recorded in the long story of man's mostly futile struggles. The democracy of America would have done something which the despots and the conquerors of all time from Alexander and Cæsar to Napoleon

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and the Kaiser have found to be impossible. Dangerous as I believe national vanity to be, America would, I think, find in the pride of this achievement—this American leadership of the human race—a glory that would not be vain, a world-victory which the world would welcome.

PART II

THE DOCTRINES THAT MAKE WAR

CHAPTER I

THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PRUSSIANISM

The importance of "theories"—This war by universal consent due to false theories—The German nation transformed by them—What is the theory that has caused the war?—How the ideals of a people may be changed—What do the Germans hope to achieve by their victory?—Why Americans should understand these questions—For what purpose are States maintained?—What is the ultimate test of good politics?—What does military and political power achieve for the ultimate realities of human life?—"The Great Illusion"—The moral, intellectual, and economic foundations of Prussianism—Materialistic roots of militarism—No refuge save in the improvement of human understanding—America's part in bringing about that improvement.

IF America is to fulfil the rôle which has been indicated in the first part of this book, if she is to become the leader in the new World-State, it is essential that the American people should understand the circumstances by which this opportunity has been created and should know something of the alternative lines which the development of the world may take. They must know something of the peculiar character of the present struggle in Europe and of the results which are likely to spring from it. For only by a knowledge

of these things can they determine the manner in which their own influence must be exerted in order to obtain security for themselves and contribute to the full measure of their opportunities to the progress of the world. Now the one outstanding feature of the European War is that according to the testimony of the combatants themselves it is mainly a war of ideas.

All fine-spun theories, all sentimental aspirations and vague generalities, the whole collection of shibboleths treasured by the idealists and the dreamers, are shattered by the first whiff of grapeshot [wrote a popular journalist some years ago]. The idealogues and doctrinaires [he went on] do not seem capable of realizing the difference between the world of theory and the world of fact—the material world in which we live: that all the argument in the world won't penetrate an inch of armour-plate, and that a syllogism is no answer to a Dreadnought.

It is the “practical” view always, one would have thought, that is beloved of the Anglo-Saxon peoples: the importance of “facts”—Dreadnoughts, beef-steaks, machine-guns, and a balance at the bank—as opposed to the “theories,” ideals, desires, aspirations, of the idealogues and the doctrinaires. These things cannot change human nature or the “hard” facts of the world; they can be no concern of men of affairs or those responsible for practical policy—above all, should such logomachies of the study be no concern of statesmen and men of

action, since it is their business to deal with "things as they are."

Such is the attitude, as of course you are aware, if you have followed the discussion of the issues of war and peace or of the more fundamental problems of international relationship, that has invariably been adopted by all those in the United States or in Great Britain who desire to retain their reputation for practicality and common sense.

Yet to-day the British people have not only become convinced, but are saying loudly and insistently, that, so far from theories, doctrines, professors and philosophers, being of no account, the war in which they are engaged, the greatest in so many respects that has marked their history, or any history, has but one basic and fundamental cause: theories, aspirations, dreams, desires—the false theories of professors, the false ideals of idealogues. And there is a general disposition in America to accept this view of the matter.

The people of Great Britain are practically agreed that this war is the result of a false national doctrine, which is in its turn the work of half a dozen professors and a few writers and theorists—Nietzsche, Treitschke, and their school. And a large proportion, perhaps the great bulk of American public opinion, is inclined to agree. Not only have the false ideas and ideals of these theorists produced the greatest war of history, but they have, according to this view, accomplished a miracle still more startling: they have radically

transformed the nature and character of a nation of some seventy million souls. For very rightly the evil influence of the Germans is attributed to an idea and a tradition, and not to the inherent wickedness of the race. The Germans are, of all the peoples of Europe, the most nearly allied to the English-speaking peoples in race and blood; in all the simple and homely things our very language is the same. Every time that we speak of house and love, father and mother, son and daughter, God and man, work and bread, we attest to common origins in the deepest and realest things that affect us. Our religious history is allied; the political ties between Great Britain and Germany in the past have been many. The British Royal Family is largely of German origin. As for ourselves, we have living amongst us millions of German descent who have contributed largely to the building up of our prosperity and civilization. Some of the most cherished names in our history are those of our German citizens. Now, if they say that German wickedness is inherent in the race, and not in doctrine, the Anglo-Saxon peoples condemn themselves. If we are to see straight in this matter at all, we must, in judging Germans, remember what they *were* and what they have *become*. That is not easy.

The public memory is notoriously a short-lived one. If twenty years ago the average Briton had been asked what people in Europe were most like himself, in moral outlook, in their attitude to the

things which really matter—family life, social morality, the relations of the sexes, and the respective importance which we ascribe to the various moral qualities—he would have said that that nation was Germany. The notion that they were more naturally allied in character to the French would have appeared twenty years ago, to ninety-nine Britons out of a hundred, almost offensive. Until yesterday, for nearly three hundred years, among educated men in Europe and America, German idealism had been recognized as the outstanding moral force in Europe. From the days of the Reformation until military ambitions and necessities changed it all, her great work has been in things of the mind. Voltaire embodied this common judgment of educated men in Europe two hundred years ago, when he said that “France ruled the land, England the sea, and Germany the clouds.” And even now, in the passion and heat of war, there are Britons who cannot be accused of pro-Germanism who recognize this in the fullest degree. One of them has said quite recently:

The world’s debt to Germany for thought and knowledge is inestimable. . . . Germany was a land of dreams. Her peoples from the earliest times had been children of romance, and they became, not only pioneers of thought, but the unequalled masters of certain forms of imaginative art. Of that the mere names of their composers and poets—Grimm and Humperdinck, Schubert and Schumann, Schiller,

Heine, Weber, Brahms—are sufficient testimony. Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, Wagner—no other people has had such genius in the world of blended thought and emotion out of which music springs; and no other people has shown so constantly the power of laborious craftsmanship which musical creation demands. Goethe, who represented in his single work all three of the great movements of German mind—in science, in thought, and in romance—was typical of German capacity, and in his attitude to the world a typical German of his time. . . . The ideal of that Germany was art and culture, not patriotism. Its vital forces were turned to the production, not of political efficiency or military leadership, but of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, and Goethe's *Faust*. This was the Germany on which the figure of the genial professor, familiar to caricature, was founded. To it the world owes, and has always paid, a steady tribute of affection and gratitude.¹

Here, then, are a people so closely allied to the British and to ourselves in race that their children in the hotels of France and Italy are mistaken for British children; a people with whom Great Britain has for a thousand years maintained practically unbroken peace, from whom the British have drawn their rulers, and with whom their Royal Family remains to-day closely associated, who have often been their allies in the past, and to whom we and they have given unstinted admiration and respect—to-day become, thanks to the

¹ *The Round Table*, September, 1914.

metamorphosis of a false doctrine and idea, unspeakable savages and barbarians quite unworthy to be regarded as belonging to the family of civilization, surpassing Huns in barbarity, Turks in wickedness. This miracle of transformation, the work of a few professors, has been accomplished within a period of half a century or less.

And the very practical Anglo-Saxon people who give this verdict were until yesterday declaring that ideas, theories, and doctrines, are of no account or import in the world; that, indeed, they are not "facts" at all, and that that term must be reserved only for such things as battleships and howitzers.

I hope the reader will not suppose that I am overstating a case in order to support a contention which happens to be the burden of everything that I have written upon this subject—namely, that war and peace, like all good and bad things in human relationship, like all problems of the good or bad use which we make of the raw materials of nature, depend upon the justice or the fallacy of the ideas of men; that the final solution of this problem will come through the reform and clarification of ideas, and by no other way whatsoever.

The fact that a false theory, the fermentation of wrong ideas, has wrought this incredible miracle, the production of the vastest war in human history, and the transformation of a nation from a very good to a very bad force in human society, is one upon which practically all Britons and the

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majority of Americans now writing on this subject are agreed.

So well-known a British writer and thinker as Mr. H. G. Wells, for instance, puts the matter as follows:

All the realities of this war are things of the mind. This is a conflict of cultures, and nothing else in the world. All the world-wide pain and weariness, fear and anxieties, the bloodshed and destruction, the innumerable torn bodies of men and horses, the stench of putrefaction, the misery of hundreds of millions of human beings, the waste of mankind, are but the material consequences of a false philosophy and foolish thinking. We fight not to destroy a nation, but a nest of evil ideas.

We fight because a whole nation has become obsessed by pride, by the cant of cynicism and the vanity of violence, by the evil suggestion of such third-rate writers as Gobineau and Stewart Chamberlain, that they were a people of peculiar excellence destined to dominate the earth. . . .

On the back of it all, spurring it on, are the idea-mongers, the base-spirited writing men, pretentious little professors in frock coats, scribbling colonels. They are the idea. They pointed the way, and whispered "Go!" They ride the world now to catastrophe. It is as if God in a moment of wild humour had lent His whirlwinds for an outing to half a dozen fleas.

And the real task before mankind is quite beyond the business of the fighting line, the simple, awful business of discrediting and discouraging these stupidities, by battleship, artillery, rifle, and the blood and

courage of seven million men. The real task of mankind is to get better sense into the heads of these Germans, and therewith and thereby into the heads of humanity generally, and to end not simply a war, but the idea of war. What printing and writing and talking have done, printing and writing and talking can undo. Let no man be fooled by bulk and matter. Rifles do but kill men, and fresh men are born to follow them. Our business is to kill ideas. The ultimate purpose of this war is propaganda—the destruction of certain beliefs, and the creation of others. It is to this propaganda that reasonable men must address themselves.¹

Substantially the same view is expressed again and again in the leading articles of the great British dailies. I take typical passages from the leaders of the *London Times*, as follows:

Peace cannot come till the theories of the Prussian Junkers and of the German military party, the theories of which men like von Treitschke and Bernhardi are the frank exponents, the theories which are summed up in the principle that "Might is the highest right," have been universally renounced."²

The spokesmen of the nation realize to the full that this, in Mr. Asquith's words, is a "spiritual conflict." We have not entered on this war for material gain or for military glory. We have gone into it, and we will fight it out, to defeat the monstrous code of international immorality which a certain school of German

¹ *London Nation*, August 29, 1914.

² August 10, 1914.

professors and German soldiers have long been teaching, and which the German Government have adopted to the horror of mankind.¹

The Allies will go to Berlin to settle accounts, and not to lay waste the Fatherland. They have to say to the German people: "This worship of war must cease, and the sword you have forged must be broken."

. . . Not until the capital is reached will the sword be struck from Germany's hands, and not until they see the conquerors in their midst will the Germans turn from Treitschke and Nietzsche to Luther and Goethe once more.²

An eminent British journalist puts the case thus:

As this great tragedy proceeds, it becomes increasingly clear that the issue that is being fought at this moment in the trenches of the Aisne is not this or that national gain or loss, but the spiritual governance of the world. Someone—I think it was Sir Robertson Nicoll—has expressed it in the phrase "Corsica or Calvary." I think that is more true than picturesque phrases ordinarily are, for the cause for which the Allies fight is more vast than any material motive that inspires them. They are the instruments of something greater than themselves.

If the phrase is unjust, it is unjust to Corsica, for behind the militarism of Napoleon there was a certain human and even democratic fervour; but behind the gospel of the Kaiser there is nothing but the death of the free human spirit. . . . If he were to triumph, the world would have plunged back into barbarism.

¹ September 5, 1914.

² September 15, 1914.

. . . We are fighting not against a nation so much as against an evil spirit who has taken possession of that nation, and we must destroy that spirit if Europe is to be habitable to us. . . . But at the moment we have one thing to do—to hang together until we have beaten the common enemy of humanity. When that is done, we shall remember the cause for which we stand. We shall break the Prussian idol for ever. . . . We stand for the spirit of light against the spirit of darkness.¹

Mr. Thomas Hardy, the doyen of British letters, also gives testimony to the immense influence of a little group of professors:

What a disastrous blight upon the glory and nobility of that great nation has been wrought by the writings of Nietzsche, with his followers! I should think there is no instance since history began of a country being so demoralized by a single writer.

Sir Arthur Conan Doyle writes in substantially identical terms, and concludes:

Where, now, is that "deep, patient Germany" of which Carlyle wrote? Was ever a nation's soul so perverted, so fallen from grace!

Among ourselves this opinion has been endorsed notably by Dr. Eliot, ex-President of Harvard University, who says in a letter to the *New York Times* on "America and the Issues of the European War":

¹ "A. G. G." in *London Daily News*, September 26, 1914.

It would be a serious mistake to suppose that Americans feel any hostility or jealousy towards Germany, or fail to recognize the immense obligations under which she has placed all the rest of the world, *although they now feel that the German nation has been going wrong in theoretical and practical politics for more than a hundred years, and to-day is reaping the consequences of her own wrong thinking and wrong doing.*¹ [The italics are mine.]

The *New York Times*, summarizing American opinion of the war, wrote as follows:

Why do the American people condemn Germany? Because they condemn and abhor militarism. . . . The supremacy of German militarism would turn back the hands of the clock. The civilized world would thereafter be less civilized.²

Now, a doctrine that can accomplish the double miracle—so to transform a great and civilizing nation as to make it a danger to mankind, and to render it necessary for civilized Europe to put some fifteen millions of its soldiers into the field in order to fight it—is obviously worth a little study. We are very particularly concerned to know, now that we ourselves are suffering from the effects of the war which is being waged to destroy it, what will be necessary for its destruction, what will be the chances of its revival, what measures are

¹ October 3, 1914.

² September 7, 1914.

likely to be successful in keeping it under—all these are practical problems which will concern us, as well as the nations of Europe, to-morrow, and we cannot pretend even to deal with this spiritual enemy of mankind unless we know something of the facts—for doctrines and ideas, false and true, are as much facts as shrapnel or dynamite, and far more difficult to deal with.

What, therefore, is the nature of the Prussian doctrine that has wrought all this havoc? Why, in fact, did Germany go to war? The need of an increasing population for territorial expansion? That motive—which I shall deal with presently—may have played its part; I think it has. The German, like most of the other men of Europe, may have a general impression that conquest will somehow enrich him; that he will be better off as the subject of a great empire than as the subject of a small one—which is much like saying that the people of New York are richer and better off than the people of Boston or Pittsburg; or that a Russian is of course richer than a Hollander or Swiss. But as it is one of the beliefs universally accepted in Europe, he may share it.

But everyone is agreed that the material motive alone does not explain German aggression. Germany, it is said, desires to make herself the master of Europe, and so of the world, and to impose her culture thereon, not necessarily, presumably, because Germans will be benefited thereby, but as a matter of national pride. It is an Ideal, sedu-

lously cultivated by the new teachers who have won Germans from their old intellectual allegiance.¹

The British, and to some extent the American public, are, indeed, by this time fairly familiar with the cruder manifestations of this new Ideal owing to the immense circulation of such books as Bernhardi's *Germany and the Next War*. According to the school which Bernhardi represents, triumph by arms is a thing desirable in itself; as, indeed, is war, which is "God's test of the nations." (The whole philosophy, by the way, as expounded by Germans, as distinct from the Polish exponents like Nietzsche and Treitschke, is permeated by intense piety.) War, says Bernhardi, is the greatest factor in the furtherance of culture and power; it is not so much a painful necessity as a splendid duty. It has already been for Germany a means to national union, and must now be a means of securing for the German spirit and German ideas that fitting recognition "which has hitherto been withheld from them." For, continues Bernhardi, a nation must dominate

¹ The change of sentiment and ideal to which the writers I have cited one and all testify is the more remarkable because the older Germany (the Germany that influenced Europe intellectually and morally) had the nationalist spirit very feebly developed. Kant, for instance, with his *Dissertations on World Peace*, was an internationalist and a cosmopolitan before the French had given names to those things; Goethe was so little nationalist or patriotic that he tells us that he could not bring himself to care particularly even about Napoleon's overrunning of the German States.

others, or be dominated by others; there is no other alternative. There is in all virile and worthy nations the "Will to Power," of which Nietzsche has sung, and which Treitschke, Stewart Chamberlain, and other like non-German writers, and their followers, have applied to definite politics. Such a "Will to Power," such desire to dominate others, involves in the nation animated by it the belief, not merely that its own civilization is the best for itself, but that it is the best for all others; and that if war be needed to impose it, why, that justifies war, which is a great selective process, the weeder-out of the feeble, a school of discipline, a moral tonic. These philosophers declare that the motives prompting war are inherent in human nature, and that the amiable sentimentalists who would substitute for it peace and arbitration lack the virile human outlook, and are attempting to set at nought a great natural law. War is the struggle for life among nations corresponding to the struggle which goes on in all other spheres of sentient nature.

The philosophy need hardly be defined; indeed, it existed long before Nietzsche, and has been voiced by militarist exponents in every country that ever gained a military victory.

Behind it there lie very definite biological and economic fallacies: the idea that nations are condemned to struggle as rival units against one another for a fixed and limited quantity of sus-

tenance and opportunity; that a people's relative advantage in such a fight depends upon the military or political power which it can exercise over others; that to be prosperous and to feed its population a nation must be great and expanding; that it acquires wealth by conquest of territory; and all the subsidiary illusions which are bound up with those fallacies.

But the "Will to Power" philosophy goes a little deeper than the false arguments which buttress it. It is a crude expression of the idea that it is "inherent in human nature" for men to wish to see their nation more powerful than others, the ideals it represents triumphant over other ideals, its influence imposed on the world; that such a clash of nationalities is inevitable, because, in spiritual things, there must take place the same conflict as goes on in the struggle for physical life.

Well, there is the same confusion here as once made religious faith in Europe, not a matter of truth and feeling for the eternal verities, but a matter of opposing cavalry and artillery, and the cleverness of one general at deceiving and outwitting another in a trade where "all is fair." In the wars of religion the spiritual conflict was replaced by a very material one, a conflict dragged down from the higher plane whereon it might have purified men to a plane whereon it certainly debased them. For hundreds of years men were sure that they had to fight out their religious

differences by war, and that it was necessary to protect and promote their religious ideas by that means. The Protestants of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were as certain that Catholic power had to be destroyed by arms as Englishmen of the twentieth century that Prussianism must be destroyed by the same means. And, indeed, so long as Catholic and Protestant alike based their position upon military force, so long as both believed that their only security was in dominating the other by that force, collision was, of course, inevitable. This conflict, the determination of each group to impose its military domination on the other, was also certainly "inherent in human nature." Yet the day came when one group ceased to attach any very great value to the military domination of the other, because it came to be realized that the religious and moral value of such domination was nil, and that the military conflict was irrelevant to religious or moral realities; that the religious possessions of all were rendered more secure by ceasing to fight for them. It is difficult for us here in America to realize that our forefathers ever thought it a proper objective of state action to suppress the Quakers by force. If men are sufficiently wise, a like transformation will take place in the domain of the ideals of nationality. You had men in the religious struggles not concerned with religious dogma at all, but only with the military glory of their particular religious group, with the simple desire to have

their side win as against the other side. And you have a corresponding motive in war as between nations: millions animated by a determination to achieve victory, and to give their lives for it, for the simple end of victory. In the Nietzschean and other "Will to Power" philosophies you will find plenty of this glorification of victory for itself, irrespective of any moral or material aim whatsoever. It may be true, in fact, urge these defenders of war, that we could not impose our national ideals by war, that we could not destroy our enemy's ideals by destroying his armies, that his language and literature and intellectual and moral influence in the world will still go on, and our military glory would be irrelevant to that conflict; but we should have beaten him and vindicated our nation's military superiority.

And that we are told is the final poser, that you cannot get over this human desire to beat the other man.

It is one of the curiosities of the general attitude towards the less tangible but none the less real things, like ideals and aspirations, that they are regarded as unchangeable and immutable; not in any way the result of contact of mind with mind, born of literature and the intellectual activities of men, but as something which argument and discussion can in no way affect. Now, I submit that, far from argument and discussion not affecting ideals like those which I have indicated, they are the direct outcome of such intel-

lectual activity, as I think the whole spectacle of the moral and intellectual transformation of Germany, and the still profounder change in Europe as a whole which has come over the relationship of rival religious groups, conclusively show. The desire of the Huguenots to impose their military and political power upon Catholics, and Catholics upon Huguenots, was marked by a hatred so intense that incidents like the massacre of St. Bartholomew, where tens of thousands of men, women, and children were murdered in cold blood, were the natural outcome. A Catholic would not sit at table with a Huguenot "because of the special odour that attached to heretics." Yet as the result of an intellectual fermentation that went on through a period of theological discussion, not merely did Catholics and Huguenots cease massacring one another; something much more remarkable occurred: they ceased wanting to do so, and the odour of the heretic disappeared.

It is quite true that the question, "What does the power to dominate other men, to conquer them, achieve?" will be answered by millions in Europe, to the effect that it achieves nothing but itself; that is all it is intended to achieve. And among ourselves there has come into existence a school of writers and politicians who take the same view. But the fact of wanting such a thing for itself depends upon our relative estimate of moral values—whether, for instance, we regard sheer physical domination of another as a worthy

thing—as a fit aim for the nation that we desire to have respected—and that depends upon precisely this intellectual fermentation, the discussion and comparison of values to which I have referred.

That brings us to this: that you cannot deal with this problem of Prussianism, the moral attributes it connotes, and of the military conflicts which it provokes, without asking the question, "For what purpose does the State exist? What sort of life do we desire that it shall assure to its people?" "A life of war and struggle and victory," says the Nietzschean (and some Christians). "If it contains that, little else matters." Well, that might conceivably be the aim which a society should set before itself as the objective of its collective action—the common and final test of policy and conduct—but for this fact, that it cannot be common or universal. Men will always be able to form themselves into groups. Victory, domination, mastery, cannot be for all. It is an ideal which presupposes victims, and no one will freely choose to be the victim. It is only for half the world—the top half—and as in war the decision as to which comes out on top is often a matter of accident—decided sometimes by such things as the sudden illness of a general, a fog or rain-storm, giving the advantage of a decisive battle to the side that would not otherwise have had it—no one who desires to be the master of his fate and to direct his conduct will place himself knowingly in a position where he becomes the helpless puppet

of physical accident and chance. Since Nietzscheanism involves surrender to blind physical forces, it defeats itself. Its inevitable end is the slavery of all—of the mind of all—to dead matter.

What, then, must be the ultimate test of the true aim of the State? There are rival conceptions of "good," of what men should strive for. Even religion does not furnish a common ultimate test—no common denominator—for the modern State has no common religious faith.

And yet both politics and religion have slowly been evolving a common test, and it is important to this discussion to note the direction of that development.

Early religious ideals have little to do with moral or social ends; their emotion is little concerned with the sanctification of human relations. The early Christian thought it meritorious to live a sterile life at the top of a pillar, eaten by vermin, just as the Hindoo saint to-day thinks it meritorious to live an equally sterile life upon a bed of spikes. But as the early Christian ideal progressed, sacrifices having no end connected with the betterment of mankind lost their appeal. Our admiration now goes but faintly to the recluse, while the saint who would allow the nails of his fingers to grow through the palms of his clasped hands would excite, not our admiration, but our revolt.

Something similar is taking place in politics. The first ideals are concerned simply with personal allegiance to some dynastic chief, a feudal lord,

or a monarch; the well-being of a community hardly enters into the matter at all. Later, the chief must embody in his person that well-being, or he does not obtain the allegiance of a community of any enlightenment; later, the well-being of the community becomes the end in itself, without being embodied in the person of an hereditary chief, so that the people realize that their efforts, instead of being directed to the protection of the personal interest of some chief, are, as a matter of fact, directed to the protection of their own interests, and their altruism has become self-interest, since self-sacrifice of a community for the sake of the community is a contradiction in terms. More and more is a given religious code subject to this test: does it make for the improvement of society? If not, it stands condemned. Political ideals will inevitably follow a like development, and will be more and more subjected to a like test.

Now I well know the derision to which that test can be subjected: that it is a wide and question-begging term, since "well-being, improvement of society," can be variously interpreted; that so far as it is definite at all, it is material and sordid, and belongs to the order of "pig philosophy."¹

¹ I happened once in Paris to be present at an informal discussion between some French priests touching the question of divorce, and the most suggestive thing about the whole, I thought, was their tendency to justify this or that line taken by the Church by one test—that it made, or it did not make, for the disintegration of society. And wherever the dogmatic sanction was introduced, I believe it was introduced as an afterthought. On

And to that I would reply: the widest instincts of Christendom condemn that derision as ill-founded; the commonest sense of Christendom in our age gives a quite definite meaning to this term, knows full well what it implies—quite well enough for the practical purposes of politics—and has decided that the end it represents is neither sordid nor materialistic; the narrowing of the gulf which is supposed to separate ideal and material aims does not necessarily degrade religious emotion, and does sanctify the common labour and endeavours, the everyday things of life. It is suggestive that the Founder of Christianity in the invocation which has become the universal prayer of Christendom has embodied in it a plea for daily bread. That plea is not a sordid one because, without food, there can be no human life, and consequently no human emotion and morality or society. The ultimate realities of life, whether they be moral or material, are in part “economic” realities.

For the economic interests of a people mean, not merely food and clothing and habitable houses, the means of decency and cleanliness and good health, but

another occasion a man of religious instincts resented what he regarded as a slighting reference of mine to St. Simon Stylites. He thought to reprove me by pointing out that these lives of austerity were a protest against a condition of society which amounted to social putrefaction. In other words, he justified them by attempting to show that they had a social end—that they made for the betterment of mankind in the widest terms. This line of argument pursued by such a person indicates that the Western man is simply incapable of any other conception.

books, education, and some leisure, freedom from care and the cramping terror of destitution, from the effects of the deadly miasma of the slum. The material thing is but the expression of still profounder realities which cannot be separated therefrom, because with leisure and a wider outlook come a finer affection—the laughter of children, the grace of women, some assurance that maternity shall be a joy instead of a burden—the keener feeling for life. Bread is not merely the pulverized seed of a plant, it is the bloom on a child's cheek, it is life; for it is human food—that is to say, a part of what human life represents. And to save for mothers their children, and for men their wives; to prolong human life, to enlarge and dignify it, are aims not to be dismissed as an appeal to the pocket. And yet too often they are so dismissed.

The idealist of war may see in economics, in "the science of the daily bread," nothing but a sordid struggle for "profit." But that will certainly not indicate imaginativeness, nor is it an attitude that will make for the elevation of the common lives of men. To make of the activities to which the immense mass of mankind for the most of their lives are condemned something mean and sordid is to degrade the quality of ordinary life and of ordinary men. One cannot inspire those things by making ideals something apart from them, from the workaday world, something that one puts on for special occasions, like a Sunday coat, and leaves behind for six days of the week. It can only be accomplished by the contrary

process of giving to the week-day task something of inspiration and sanctity.

The great mass of the western world to-day know full well that by "well-being" they imply a condition in which life is not only rendered possible, but expansive and inspiring, the things to which men, as a simple matter of fact, do devote their lives and work. The enlargement and security of those ultimate realities I have taken as the test by which our politics shall be judged.

In the sub-title of *The Great Illusion*, I indicated that that book was intended as "a study of the relation of military power to national advantage," and I have defined "advantage" as "national well-being in the widest sense of the term," as including such things as the fact of belonging by contact and association to people of one's own racial group, speech, and outlook; all that makes for happiness and dignity: health, sufficiency, cleanliness, leisure, laughter, contact of mind with mind, satisfaction of physical, intellectual, and emotional hunger and thirst, affection, the play of childhood, grace, courtesy, beauty, love—those things which, by the common consent of Christendom and the western world, give value to human life.

Does victory, the political power of one State over other States, promote these things? So long as much doubt remains in our minds on that question, war will go on. We must realize at least that that is the ultimate test.

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And this test, moreover, unlike the ideal of the Nietzschean, who extols war and force as beautiful and desirable in themselves, more beautiful and desirable than affection and laughter, and all the other components of happiness which I have indicated, is capable of universal application: all can accept all its implications, whereas no one will willingly choose defeat and slavery; and yet Nietzscheanism necessarily involves defeat and slavery for some. It involves victims on one side and those who profit by the victims on the other; but the ends which I have indicated are best achieved by the partnership of men, and in a sound partnership there are no victims.

We have at last, then, our least common denominator, a basic moral sanction common to all western society, now that, whether we like it or not, such common sanction can no longer be found in religious dogma or in any universally accepted authoritative code. Here is the final test, the only one capable of universal application.

Now, this war is a struggle for political power and domination. All Englishmen and many Americans believe it is the outcome of an attempt on the part of Germany to dominate Europe. Germans believe it is an attempt of the Slav to do so. In any case, political power is the objective. Now the question which *The Great Illusion* asked is this: "What can such political power, even when achieved by the victor, do for the betterment of his people?" And it answered that question by

saying that it does and can do nothing whatsoever for those things upon which we are agreed as the ultimate realities of life, the ends for which the State in the western world is supposed to be created. As applied to this present war the question asked is this: "If you, Frank or Teuton, Slav or Briton, could secure this mastery of Europe, how would it profit your people or add any mortal thing, moral or material, of value to your lives?" Again, the answer which that book gives is that it would profit them not at all morally or materially; that military and political power is economically, socially, spiritually, futile.

Let us examine the thing a little more closely and in detail.

To take first the moral and ideal as distinct from the narrowly economic problem, accepting for the moment the conventional distinction.

Suppose that Germany had been able to carry out her intention and to bring Europe under her sway, conquer India, and force Britain to give up her Colonies, would any German have been the better morally, using that word in the largest sense? Would those German workmen and peasants and teachers gain anything whatsoever in the moral realities of life? Would they have been more truthful, better fathers and husbands, jollier, more sincere? Would the relationship they maintain together be finer? Would life have been emotionally keener? Would the children have shown greater affection? Would the love of the

women have been deeper?—because the German State happened to have conquered unwilling provinces? Is it the people of the great military States—Russia for instance—that display the moral qualities to a greater degree than the people of the little States, of Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, Holland? Are these “little people” poorer in the spiritual realities of existence than the people of the great States, the Austrians, Germans, and the rest? Is life in a Russian village happier and spiritually fuller than life in a Dutch or Scandinavian or Swiss village? What *is* the moral gain that comes of the power to dominate others by the sword?

There is no moral gain. It is an illusion. This political domination over other men is in terms of the deepest realities of human feeling an empty and futile thing, which adds neither to the dignity nor happiness of those who exercise it, and has in it an infinity of moral danger from which no people in history has yet escaped, or can in the nature of things escape. It carries with it a fatal contradiction and stultification: it implies that a people who desire to be just to all men, to do as they would be done by, are asking others to accept a situation which they themselves would rather die than accept. We all believe it our duty to give our lives rather than be subject to the rule of foreigners, of aliens, yet this philosophy of conquest and imperialism demands that others shall accept the rule of aliens. That which we believe

would be a moral degradation for ourselves we try to enforce upon other millions of our fellows; it is an arrangement which makes, as someone has said, of the top dog a bully, and of the bottom dog a cur. It would divide the world into master and slave, and the world should be neither master nor slave; it is the negation of human dignity, and its moral foundations are unsound. It does not stand the first test which should be given to any principle of human relationship—namely, that it can be made of general application. We cannot all be conquerors; we can all be partners. This philosophy is poisoned at its roots, and there never yet was a people who permanently resisted the effect of such poison. We could not resist it ourselves if ever we allowed ourselves to be led away by its high-sounding phrases.

We say, therefore, that, on its moral side, this Prussianism, this desire for domination, is an empty, futile, and evil thing, and when accomplished can achieve nothing of worth. We have not said that the desire does not exist. It does exist, just as did the desire among religious men a century or two ago to dominate by military means the men of other creeds; and it was that desire which brought about the wars of religion. But we have urged that this desire is in itself a human idea, due to the light in which we see certain things, and can be changed like all ideas by seeing those things in a different light, more clearly. And just as that fierce thirst for mastery in terms of force,

for the military control of men of other faith, which kept Europe ablaze for a century or two, disappeared in large part with the correction of the intellectual and moral defect that caused it, as the result of certain definite intellectual and moral efforts of certain definite individual men, so in like manner can the senseless craving for political domination disappear.

So much for the ideal impulses that inspire Prussianism, but what of the economic and material side? If, as the Prussians say, war is also a struggle for bread, why, cessation of that struggle is for an expanding nation equivalent to slow starvation; and war will go on unless, of course, we can ask a nation to commit suicide. I cannot conceive of any morality which should demand that.

The economic case for military domination in the circumstances of a State like Germany have been well put by an English writer as follows:

Germany *must* expand. Every year an extra million babies are crying out for more room, and, as the expansion of Germany by peaceful means seems impossible, Germany can only provide for those babies at the cost of potential foes, and France is one of them.

A vanquished France might give Germany all she wants. The immense colonial possessions of France present a tantalizing and provoking temptation to German cupidity, which, it cannot be too often repeated, is not mere envious greed, but stern necessity.

The same struggle for life and space which more than a thousand years ago drove one Teutonic wave after another across the Rhine and the Alps is now once more a great compelling force. Colonies fit to receive the German surplus population are the greatest need of Germany. This aspect of the case may be all very sad and very wicked, but it is true. . . . Herein lies the temptation and the danger. Herein, too, lies the ceaseless and ruinous struggle of armaments, and herein for France lies the dire necessity of linking her foreign policy with that of powerful allies.¹

The author by the way adds: "So it is impossible to accept the theory of Mr. Norman Angell." And, as a matter of fact, if this author's statement of the case is correct, my theory is absolutely and completely wrong. I will hazard, however, the guess that the writer of the article in question has not the faintest notion of how that theory is supported; his form of statement implies that he has buried the series of facts to which he refers; whereas, of course, it has, on its economic side, been stated in terms of them. This view concerning the necessity of Germany's expansion as a sheer matter of finding bread for her increasing population is the generally accepted view of the necessities of national expansion: she needs the wheat and food of Canada, or of some other British colony, wherewith to feed her children.

The illusion, the confusion of facts underlying this conception, can be indicated in a line or two.

¹ *National Review*, September, 1913.

Is it not quite obvious that Germany can in normal times have the food of Canada now by paying for it, and that even if she conquered Canada, she would still have to pay for it? That the fact of political conquest would make no difference to the problem of subsistence one way or another? I can briefly indicate a process, which I have sketched in very considerable detail in *The Great Illusion*, by reproducing the following passage:

In the days of the sailing ship, and the lumbering wagon dragging slowly over all but impassable roads, for one country to derive any considerable profit from another, it had practically to administer it politically. But the compound steam-engine, the railway, the telegraph, have profoundly modified the elements of the whole problem. In the modern world political dominion is playing a more and more effaced rôle as a factor in commerce; the non-political factors have in practice made it all but inoperative. It is the case with every modern nation actually, that the outside territories which it exploits most successfully are precisely those of which it does not "own" a foot. Even with the most characteristically colonial of all—Great Britain—the greater part of her overseas trade is done with countries which she makes no attempt to "own," control, coerce, or dominate, and incidentally she has ceased to do any of those things with her colonies.

Millions of Germans in Prussia and Westphalia derive profit or make their living out of countries to which their political dominion in no way extends. The modern German exploits South America by

remaining at home. Where, forsaking this principle, he attempts to work through political power, he approaches futility. German colonies are colonies *pour rire*. The Government has to bribe Germans to go to them: her trade with them is microscopic; and if the twenty millions who have been added to Germany's population since the war had to depend on their country's political conquest, they would have had to starve. What feeds them are countries which Germany has never "owned," and never hopes to "own": Brazil, Argentina, the United States, India, Australia, Canada, Russia, France, and Britain. (Germany, which never spent a mark on its political conquest, to-day draws more tribute from South America than does Spain, which has poured out mountains of treasure and oceans of blood in its conquest.) These are Germany's real colonies.¹

In the book from which this extract is taken I have dealt in detail with questions which partially affect this generalization—the question of hostile tariffs, of preferential treatment in Colonies for the Motherland, and so forth. For the full treatment of those I must refer the reader thereto. But I would like to give a hint of the nature of the fallacy involved in the idea of the necessary economic conflict of states by reminding the reader of certain processes that have operated in human society:

When the men of Wessex were fighting with the men

¹ *The Great Illusion*, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York. Fourth Edition, pp. 141-142.

of Sussex, far more frequently and bitterly than to-day the men of Germany fight with those of France, or, either, with those of Russia, the separate States which formed this island were struggling with one another for sustenance, just as the tribes which inhabited the North American Continent at the time of our arrival there were struggling with one another for the game and hunting grounds. It was in both cases ultimately a "struggle for bread." At that time, when this island was composed of several separate States, that struggled thus with one another for land and food, it supported with great difficulty anything between one and two million inhabitants, just as the vast spaces now occupied by the United States supported about a hundred thousand, often subject to famine, frequently suffering great shortage of food, furnishing just the barest existence of the simplest kind. To-day, although this island supports anything from twenty to forty times, and North America something like a thousand times, as large a population in much greater comfort, with no period of famine, with the whole population living much more largely and deriving much more from the soil than did the men of the Heptarchy, or the Red Indians, the "struggle for bread" does not now take the form of struggle between groups of the population.^x

This simple illustration is at least proof of this, that the struggle for material things does not involve any necessary struggle between the separate groups or States; for those material

^x *Arms and Industry*, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, pp. 156-157.

things are given in infinitely greater abundance when the States cease to struggle. Whatever, therefore, was the origin of those conflicts, that origin was not any inevitable conflict in the exploitation of the earth. If those conflicts were concerned with material things at all, they arose from a mistake about the best means of obtaining them, of exploiting the earth, and ceased when those concerned realized the mistake.

For the moral and material futility of war will never of itself stop war—it obviously has not stopped it. Only the recognition of that futility will stop it. Men's conduct is determined not necessarily by a right conclusion from the fact, but what it believes to be the right conclusion. "Not the facts, but men's opinions about the facts, is what matters," as someone has remarked. If the propositions I have quoted are true, war will go on; also, it will go on if men believe them to be true. As long as men are dominated by the old beliefs, those beliefs will have virtually the same effect in politics as though they were intrinsically sound.

That is the fundamental problem of all: Can men be brought to see their best interest and be guided by wisdom and reason? That is the ultimate question. Very rarely does either party to our discussion realize what that question involves; nor how essential it is that for any useful discussion we should realize its implications and relation to the whole problem.

Before dealing analytically with the moral and practical implications of this doctrine I want to recall once more two orders of historical fact that bear on it. One is that complete change of *feeling* that has followed upon a change of *opinion*. I have already touched upon the fact that it was impossible for the Catholics in the fifteenth century to sit at table with a heretic, "because of the odour which he carried." The odour at all events has disappeared in consequence of certain theological works appealing purely to reason. And the second one is the change of opinion in such a matter as witchcraft. Montaigne declared men would never lose this belief. "If," he argued, "educated judges, trained in the laws of evidence, can send old women to their deaths for changing themselves into snakes, how can we expect that the average uneducated person will rise above these errors?" We know that grave and pious magistrates in Massachusetts were condemning old women for witchcraft less than three hundred years ago. Yet to-day a child would not be taken in by them, and is able without special learning to judge rightly where the "expert" of the past judged wrongly.

That shows this: that the essential truths of life are self-evident, if they are not overlaid by false theories. In the witchcraft days the interpretation of the common phenomena of life was in the judge's mind overlaid by false theories of devils and goblins. Destroy such theories, and the truth is self-evident to a child.

Our conception of foreign politics—of international relations—is in the witchcraft stage; it is overlaid with untrue analogies, false pictures of States as units and persons, that create artificial national animosities, abstractions that have no relation to fact. Destroy these things, and the real facts of human and international relationship will emerge as easily as does the truth about the witch story to a schoolboy. It is not a matter of expert knowledge upon abstruse points in economics and international trade; it is a matter of seeing the simple visible facts of life (*e. g.*, as that the people of a “great” and conquering State are no better off morally or materially than those of the little Powers) straight instead of crooked.

This, then, is the fundamental question: “Can the wisdom of men as a whole be so far strengthened as not merely to enable them to realize abstractedly the fallacy of war and devise means of avoiding it, but to use those means and be guided by this wisdom, and not by their passions and impatience?”

That man’s fighting instincts are ineradicable, that he does not act by “reason,” and cannot be guided by “logic,” that wars are the result of forces beyond the control of the makers of theories, is a position which the average believer in orthodox political doctrine regards as so impregnable that the great majority hardly esteem it worth while to defend any other. So far, indeed, his instinct is correct. Not merely is the question I have

indicated "the first and last," concerned with the whole philosophical foundations of our faith and attitude to life and politics, not merely is it the question which must be answered if we are to make any progress in this discussion at all, not merely do many points of detail arise out of misconceptions concerning the problem it presents, but it represents practically, as well as philosophically, the most important phase of the whole problem. Now, suppose it were true that man does not act from reason, from an intelligent realization of his interest, but from temper, passion, his fighting instinct, blindly. What would be the conclusion to be drawn from it? The conclusion, say the militarists, is that you should give him as many destructive arms as possible, so that his capacity for damage while in his condition of blind rage should be as great as possible.

Is that the right conclusion? Or is not rather the right conclusion that, if man is really that kind of animal, it is the duty of all of us to keep destructive weapons out of the hands of such an irresponsible creature, and to use such lucid intervals as he may have to persuade him to drop them?

There are some militarist writers who seem to imagine that they can evade the consequences of their own conclusion by pleading, not that all parties should be highly armed, but only that we should be so armed ourselves. But, obviously, since every nation is free to adopt the same

philosophy, the result is the same as if no qualification of the conclusion had been made.

So much for the bearing of the fundamental question upon the problems of armaments. Another conclusion, drawn by militarist philosophers from their answer to this question, gives still more startling results when subjected to a similar test. They say in effect: "Human reason," "logic," has not the slightest effect upon war. Man acts from forces which he cannot control. He is the plaything of fate. This is the note of nearly all militarist literature. Professor Cramb (who is the best and most sympathetic interpreter of Bernhardi and Treitschke in English) says:

The forces which determine the actions of empires and great nations . . . lie beyond the wishes or intentions of the individuals composing those nations. They may be even contrary to those wishes and intentions. . . . It may be questioned whether in the twentieth century any plebiscite would be in favour of war. . . . In the history of nations there is fate, an inexorable nexus of things . . . more akin to Nature and the elements than to the motives of human action.

The works of an American author, Homer Lea, sound this note from beginning to end:

National entities, in their birth, activities, and death, are controlled by the same laws that govern all life—plant, animal, or national—the law of struggle, the law of survival. These laws are universal as

regards life and time, unalterable in causation and consummation. . . . Plans to thwart them, to shortcut them, to circumvent, to cozen, to deny, to scorn and violate them, is folly such as man's conceit alone makes possible.

Again, suppose that this were absolutely and completely true, what is the conclusion to be drawn?

Well, it is evident that if it were absolutely and completely true, all learning, all accumulated knowledge, all books and churches, codes, Ten Commandments, laws, would have no effect on human affairs, and that in so far as their practical work is concerned, they might just as well be swept away.

As a matter of fact, among great masses of men—in a great part of the Eastern world—that pure fatalism is predominant. “Kismet, it is the will of Allah.” It is an attitude of mind associated either as a cause or an effect—for the moment it does not matter much which—with the crudest forms of Oriental stagnation; it marks those who, at least as far as this world is concerned, have no hope. It is, indeed, a statement of the proposition that it does not matter how man uses his mind or moral effort, since impulses and forces that are stronger than his own volition will determine his conduct, despite any moral or intellectual effort of his own.

Now, this has only to be pointed out to be evident. It is certain, therefore, that the pro-

position in the crude form in which I have couched it—although that form is exactly that in which it is most generally made—cannot be absolutely and completely true.

It then becomes plain that the militarist has not asked himself in any clear and fresh and real way what his own proposition means, what even the immediate and necessary consequences must be. Otherwise he would not have enunciated it. To say that man is always in danger of losing his head, and of acting in opposition to his own best interests, is not an argument for furnishing him with the instruments of destruction. To say that reasoning and the effort to know the truth do not affect human conduct is to condemn all those activities which distinguish man from the beast.

Presumably, the militarist who had taken into account the consequences of his proposition as to the futility of human reason and the helplessness of man would put a qualified case, somewhat in these terms:

War is the last resort in a collision of two rights. That is to say, two parties believe that each has right on his own side, and will not yield to the other. When this is the case, and when the questions involved are fundamental enough, there is no outcome but force, and we can accept that fact because victory will in the long run go to the party which has the greater earnestness, the greater spiritual passion, the greater cohesion, and so forth. Man's instinct and intuition are in all crises a surer and better guide than ratiocination,

argumentation. The profounder truths, which we know to be true, but which we are quite incapable of defending rationally, are those things which we perceive intuitively. As a matter of simple fact, again and again in history, you have two parties, both of whom are pushed by all their instincts and intuition to settle their differences by resort to the sword. And the outcome has been as true and as just as any that could have been devised by a court of lawyers or arbitrators, judging by dry law and the argumentation of legal advocates.¹

Now, however this statement of the case for war may disguise it, it is, nevertheless, a plea for the superiority of physical force or of chance to the force of the mind. It is either the statement in less crude terms of Napoleon's dictum, "That Providence is on the side of the biggest battalions," or it is the philosophy which stood behind the trial by ordeal, a claim for matter as against reason, for muscle as against brains, for the dead weight of material things as against the spiritual, the

¹ Thus, a British author, Mr. Harold Wyatt, in an article which has had the honour of being twice printed in the *Nineteenth Century and After*, writes: "In the crash of conflict, in the horrors of battlefields piled with the dead, the dying, and the wounded, a vast ethical intention has still prevailed. Not necessarily in any given case, but absolutely certainly in the majority of cases, the triumph of the victor has been the triumph of the nobler soul of man. . . . In that great majority of instances which determines general result, the issue of war has made for the ethical advantage of mankind. It must have been so; it could not be otherwise, because ethical quality has tended always to produce military efficiency."

intellectual recognition of right and wrong. It is the abdication of the mind, of conscience. One may find among the reasons urged by old defenders of "trial by ordeal" pleas far more eloquent from this point of view, and about as compelling as any of those made in our day on behalf of warfare. The old lawyer urged with great sincerity that God would not permit the arm of the innocent man to be scalded when boiling oil or boiling water was poured over it or when it was plunged into a cauldron. Still less would God permit, when accused and accuser met upon the field, that the innocent should be slain and the guilty should escape. But to-day, if you deny the justice of this argument in the case of the individual, why should we suppose that it would be any truer in the case of nations? We have recognized that a mere conflict of physical strength in the case of individuals does not establish the rights or wrongs of the case. It establishes nothing except which of the two is the stronger, or, in the case of the ordeal by boiling oil, which has the thicker skin. And just as in the establishment of equity and right in the individual field we cannot escape the need for understanding, so we cannot escape the need for understanding in the establishment of right and equity as between groups of men.

The appeal to force is at bottom an effort to escape the responsibility and labour of intellectual judgment, as was the "ordeal." If the judges had any strong feeling of the clear justice of the

case, any strong feeling that one of the parties had been outrageously ill-treated, their consciences would have revolted at the idea of submitting the issue to the "ordeal of battle." But when the ideas of law and equity and obligation are obscure and ill-defined, so that just decision is difficult, the judges naturally desire to escape the labour and responsibility of intellectual judgment, and to submit the matter to the outcome of mere physical conflict. And the outcome of physical conflict, the arbitrament of the sword, is in the end only an accident so far as the moral issues are concerned, dependent on the amount of force or the sharpness of the sword, not on any principle of justice or wisdom. Indeed, it is only where the issues are not clear that anyone thinks of appealing to force. Perhaps the whole case against the appeal to force rather than the appeal to reason, on behalf of justice, can be summarized by saying that justice will not be secured by intellectual laziness, and that the labour of the mind, quite as much as the labour of the body and the risk of the body, is necessary to secure the triumph of right.

It is necessary again and again to urge that we no more assume that men will act rationally than we assume the impossibility of war. Even so clear-sighted and well-informed a British critic as Mr. Brailsford can be guilty of the confusion involved in the following remark: "Mr. Norman Angell is convinced that mankind is guided by

reason." Mr. Norman Angell is convinced of nothing of the kind. About nineteen-twentieths of the time mankind seems to be guided by the negation of reason. I am convinced that when mankind acts wisely it is guided by reason. The trouble is that most of the time it does not act wisely. What I am convinced of is that its only hope lies in wisdom, and that that is the thing we must mature and cultivate.

So deep set is this materialist determinism in the mind of the militarist that he insists upon ascribing the same attitude to the pacifist. Ninety-nine out of a hundred of our critics will tell you that pacifists are people who believe that "war is impossible," and every war is taken as a triumphant demonstration of the folly of their creed. There is not even a glimmering in the minds of such critics of the pacifists' real position: That whether war continues or not depends absolutely upon whether men decide to go on waging it or not.

"It is the last resort." Well, in a badly managed community, where even agriculture is not developed, one may get periods of famine when cannibalism is the last resort—it happened during some of the Irish famines, and it is said to happen during some of the Russian famines now. Conceivably one might argue from that, that cannibalism is justifiable. Well, so it may be in certain circumstances, but the fact that it is resorted to is not an argument for so neglecting the tilling of the soil that it is likely to be resorted to.

Rather is it an argument for saying: "If we do not cultivate our fields, we shall suffer from hunger, and be compelled to eat our children; let us, therefore, cultivate our fields with industry." In the same way we should argue with reference to the use of force:

If we neglect the understanding of human relationships, and the cultivation of political wisdom, we shall in periods of tension get to flying at one another's throats, because we shall not be able to understand the differences which divide us. And that will lead to murder. Therefore let us so understand human relationships that we shall not be likely to degenerate to that kind of thing, and let us, perhaps, establish some sort of machinery for the settlement of difficulties so that those kinds of abominations shall be avoided.

But that is not the way men have argued. They have argued that what they want in this matter is not a better understanding of national relations, but better arms; not machinery for the settlement of difficulties with other nations, but machinery for their destruction. We have had no faith in a society of nations, we have given no real effort to establish it; we have derided and held up to scorn and contempt those who have urged it. If a hundredth part of the time and wealth, the sacrifice, heroism, discipline, expert knowledge, which have been given to preparing the destruction of the nations had been given to their consolidation, if we had been willing for the

sake of ordered co-operation with other nations to expose our own to a tenth of the risk and sacrifice that we readily expose it to in war, war itself would have disappeared from the western world long since.

If the organized society of nations of which we have spoken is to be made possible and if America is to take her natural position as the initiator and leader in this World-State, the American people must be inspired by a real and reasoned faith in the possibility of international co-operation. They are in a peculiarly advantageous position for doing so, for while, as we have seen, they have a very real dependence, moral, intellectual, and economic upon the nations of the older world, they are happily detached, by virtue of their position and history, from the old traditions and quarrels by which, for the peoples of Europe, the real facts of international relationship are obscured. While it has become impossible for them altogether to stand aside from the political developments of Europe, they are happily placed to become the leaders in the political reformation of the world by which alone the creation of a better human society can be effected.

CHAPTER II

ANGLO-SAXON PRUSSIANISM

The danger of self-deception in advocacy of disarmament and universal peace—The influence of America will play an important part in the settlement which will follow the war—What that influence will be, depends upon our attitude to these things—The influence of militarist writers in shaping the Allies' attitude—and our own—A few examples of Anglo-Saxon Prussianism—The need for knowing the nature of the Prussian doctrine and of fighting it—The special importance of clear thinking by Americans.

"BRITAIN is fighting for disarmament and universal peace," says a writer in the *London Times*.¹ I think most Britons are now persuaded of that, and of the belief that when Germany is destroyed war and armaments will oppress Europe no more. It is because this belief is so largely shared in America that American public opinion, as a whole, is on the side of the Allies in the present war.

It would be broadly true to say that for most of us just now armaments, militarism and war, international bad faith and rapacity, fear and resentment, all the errors of passion that lead to

¹ Mr. Stephen Graham on "Russia's Holy War," October 13, 1914.

conflict, are merely, or at least mainly, German things; they have not marked in the past in any period that need concern us, and presumably could not in the future, mark our conduct or that of the Allies, of countries like Great Britain, or Russia, or France, or Servia, or Japan, or Montenegro; that all the immense difficulties which have stood heretofore in the way of international co-operation will, at least in large part, disappear as soon as the German State has been destroyed.

This last point will be dealt with in Part III of this book. It is with the former one—that these ideas are purely German ideas, and not likely in any circumstances to affect the conduct of the Anglo-Saxon peoples—that I now want to deal. I think that we have quite genuinely talked ourselves into this view, and I want to suggest that it constitutes a very dangerous self-deception, which, if nursed, will come near to rendering impossible those changes for the better which it is the object of this war to accomplish and which we in America hope to see it accomplish; that this doctrine of Prussianism has very wide acceptance not only in Britain, as in most other countries of Europe, but also among ourselves. Though I believe as strongly as anyone that it could never be the ground for an aggressive war on our part, I suggest that that belief—if not corrected—will, nevertheless, affect the kind of influence which America will exercise in the world of to-morrow.

I want to emphasize the point that it is unlikely

that the American, or indeed the British, nation would ever be brought to believe in the justice of an aggressive war waged for domination *à la* Bernhardi; but as I think I have shown towards the end of the preceding chapter, those ideas involve a good deal more than the advocacy of ruthless war for the mere sake of conquest. It involves the belief that universal peace is an idle dream; that even if it were realizable, it would be fruitful of slothfulness and decadence; that it is, in fact, hopeless to form a society of nations; that the true work of the patriot is to add to the political and military power of his State; that extension of territory and domination over others is a justifiable subject of pride and glory for a nation. After this war there is likely to be a widespread—and not unnatural—feeling that Germany has sacrificed any right to consideration; that the Allies will be placed in a position whereby their aggrandizement at the expense of Germany would be justified, and we may be brought to feel that circumstances excuse in the Allies that policy which we have condemned in the Prussians. If we hold this idea it is likely to have a very disastrous effect upon the influence of America on the settlement and on the future evolution of civilized society.

Three things, most of us hope, will be the outcome of this war: First, that the Allies will be victorious; second, that Great Britain will be the most powerful of the Allies, exercising a dominating

influence on the settlement; and third, that the influence and opinion of America are going to play a very great part in the framing of that settlement. How are we going to use that influence? Are we going so to use it that the struggle between European units will go on as before with a mere reshuffling of rôles, or shall we use it so as to put an end to that feature of European life from which we ourselves suffer so disastrously? It is this latter policy which for the moment has the approval of the great mass of the people in this country and in Great Britain. But to carry it out will not be the work of a single conference, or a few weeks of negotiation following the peace. It will be a matter of pursuing for many years with faith and persistence, during changes of party, through much criticism and many set-backs, a policy having that end in view. If it is to succeed, it will be because there is an abiding faith in its possibility of success on the part of the American and British peoples. That faith at present has a very slender intellectual foundation. If the British end the war in the kind of temper (for which there will be much excuse) indicated in the expression used by one paper, "that we must exterminate the vermin," then there will be no new Europe. It will be the old Europe with parts of it painted a different colour on the map. And it will be part of the opportunity which is now open to the American people to use their influence against the adoption of such a tone.

Let me make this point clear. We are all hoping that the outcome of this war may be a general stock-taking, by which we shall get rid of the old rivalries, that we shall establish a real council of the nations, that we shall replace a struggle for domination by work in partnership to common ends, that we shall be able to agree to something in the shape of the reduction of armaments, because we shall see that it is to no one's advantage to use those armaments aggressively, to conquer, to subdue unwilling peoples, to impose unfavourable commercial conditions on others, and so forth.

But the British people go into this conference having certain obligations to allies less liberalized than themselves—Russia, Servia, Japan, Montenegro—and if they believe that the annexation of conquered provinces is an advantage, that it is a just reward of victory, and that military expansion of virile peoples is a natural and inevitable process, will they really be able to stand out against certain claims which will be made by those allies? Will they not be charged justly with the accusation that they are prepared to favour their enemies rather than their friends? The only thing which could justify their insistence upon abstention from annexation, respect of nationality, and so forth, would be their belief that the essential condition of civilization, of a real society of nations, is the abandonment by all of the policy of conquest, and a determined effort by all to eliminate war and conflict. But if they do not believe in that

possibility, if they believe that the society of nations, the council of the world, are a mere Utopian dream setting at nought inherent tendencies, "biological laws," and Heaven knows what, how can we hope that they will use their influence, and exercise that doggedness and patience, which alone, in peace as in war, can achieve great ends? If we ourselves do not believe in these possibilities, if we are still dominated by the old illusions, how shall we be in a position to urge upon the Allies a just and permanent settlement, or how shall we be able to use our influence in favour of the organization of a World-State based on international co-operation?

It should be remembered that in the domain of political ideas we have been the leader of the world, and that the world will look to us for leadership in these things; but if underneath the mere conventional assent to the belief in the newer order there is a strong and instinctive belief that the old order represents the realities in a hard world, how can we hope for a moment that the net and final result of the very difficult efforts in which our influence must play so large a part will be anything but failure? How can we hope that our representatives will be able to initiate and to urge upon the nations of Europe ideas in which the mass of our public do not as a matter of fact believe?

No one will doubt this: that a disarmed world living in perpetual peace will involve adherence

on the part of many nations to a policy very different from that which they have pursued in the past; no one will deny that it will involve very deep-seated and radical changes of attitude and view, the abandonment of ideals and beliefs which have exercised a fatal fascination not merely over the Germans, but over very many peoples. A change so radical and profound will not come about without difficulty, or all at once. If the new policy, until this war a very unpopular one, is to win, as against a very old and, until this war, very popular one, we, as the people most detached from the entanglements of the old ideas and the bitterness of the present struggle, will have to maintain in the councils of the nations a long and earnest fight; maintain it through, it may be, many changes of administration and of parties. And unless our faith is abiding, and our persistence for peace as great as the persistence of the Allies in war, the old enemy, so powerfully entrenched intellectually and in the passions of men, will not be defeated. In any fight no fault is greater than this: contempt of one's enemy; and it is because I want to give to the American reader some true notion of the strength of that evil doctrine which he believes the Allies to be fighting that this chapter has been written.

All that we are now saying as to the miraculous force which this idea of conquest has exercised over the mind of the German, all that we are now pointing out as to the transformation which has

been wrought in the German people by half a dozen writers, is striking evidence of the subtle power of the evil doctrine that must be destroyed. One point to note particularly is this: that the tempter did not come only in evil guise to the old Germans that the world respected, to the people who spun for us cradle songs and fairy stories, the songs of Christmas and the old moonlit towns, to the country of "philosophers who could forget the world in thought like children at play," who studied, indeed, so lovingly the untaught mind of the child. This people were not won from all that by a doctrine that came to them in the guise of brutality and wickedness. It came to them at first, at least, and in some respects, in a noble form—the glory of their Fatherland, the safety of their homes, the vindication of their great ideals, the spread of enlightenment. Is there no danger that the evil may come in a like guise during the long contest that will follow this war to the Allies or even to ourselves? Is there no danger there, unless we and they learn to penetrate these disguises and to know the various attractive forms under which our enemy can appear?

I want to suggest that this is a very real danger, that the national conversion of the British and of ourselves to the creed of universal peace is too sudden to have gone very deep, and that the reversion may be as rapid as the conversion. And to do certain of the opponents of that idea justice, they have warned us against the easy self-decep-

tion to which I am referring. Thus, Lord Roberts, the most popular of British soldiers, earnestly warned his fellow-countrymen "not to be led away by those who say that the end of this great struggle is to be the end of war, and that it is bound to lead to a great reduction of armaments; nor should we pay any attention to the foolish prattle of those who talk of this war as the doom of conscription." And among ourselves a big campaign in favour of greatly increased armaments and a more militarized policy is being based on the presumed "lessons" of the present war. Thus, Representative A. P. Gardner has moved in the House of Representatives for an inquiry "into the unpreparedness of the United States for war" and tells us that "the time has not yet come when the United States can afford to allow the martial spirit of her sons to be destroyed" and that "we must begin at once to reorganize our military strength."

Now we have already noted that the transformation of the German spirit and the direction given to German policy have been the work of a few men. In very many circumstances a few active individuals can carry their point against a very large number that are inert and inarticulate. There is no evidence that the German nation as a whole has been actively indoctrinated with Nietzscheanism, but its inertia has been overcome. Bernhardi complains bitterly that he speaks only for a few. The American and British public in centering its

attention upon Bernhardi's book seem to have overlooked the fact that as Bernhardi announces in his introduction, he wrote the work because for the most part his countrymen did *not* share the ideas therein expressed. He accuses them of being unwarlike, unmilitary, dangerously permeated with the doctrines of peace and pacifism, just as our own militarists on our side say exactly the same thing of their country.

The value of war for the political and moral development of mankind has been criticized by large sections of the modern civilized world in a way which threatens to weaken the defensive powers of States by undermining the warlike spirit of the people. Such ideas are widely disseminated in Germany, and whole strata of our nation seem to have lost that ideal enthusiasm which constituted the greatness of its history. . . . They have to-day become a peace-loving—an almost "too" peace-loving nation. A rude shock is needed to awaken their warlike instincts, and compel them to show their military strength. . . . An additional cause of the love of peace, besides those which are rooted in the very soul of the German people, is the wish not to be disturbed in commercial life. . . . Under the many-sided influence of such views and aspirations we seem entirely to have forgotten the teaching which once the old German Empire received.¹

It is as well, therefore, not lightly to dismiss as unimportant and isolated opinion the Anglo-

¹ *Germany and the Next War*, pp. 1, 2, 3.

Saxon expressions of the Prussian doctrine here dealt with. Those readers of Bernhardi, by the way, who condemn his book as an expression of Nietzscheanism, which could only find support and sanction in Germany, and could in no circumstances voice opinion inspired by the ideas of Anglo-Saxon civilization, seem to have overlooked the fact that some time before the war this book found warm commendation from no less a person than Earl Roberts. The fact that Bernhardi's thesis should thus find warm applause from a great and valiant British soldier who certainly, be it noted, represents not a base and jingo spirit, but the spirit of very good and honourable Britons who have thought seriously on these matters, shows how little true it is to describe Bernhardi's as a purely Prussian doctrine.

Here is what Lord Roberts says:

How was this Empire of Britain founded? War founded this Empire—war and conquest! When we, therefore, masters by war of one third of the habitable globe, when *we* propose to Germany to disarm, to curtail her navy or diminish her army, Germany naturally refuses; and pointing, not without justice, to the road by which England, sword in hand, has climbed to her unmatched eminence, declares openly, or in the veiled language of diplomacy, that by the same path, if by no other, Germany is determined also to ascend! Who amongst us, knowing the past of this nation, and the past of all nations and cities that have ever added the lustre of their name to human annals,

can accuse Germany or regard the utterance of one of her greatest a year and half ago (or of General Bernhardi three months ago) with any feelings except those of respect?¹

And in order that there should be no doubt as to the meaning of this passage, Lord Roberts adds the following footnote:

In March, 1911, when every pulpit and every newspaper, under the influence of President Taft's message, promised us within a brief period universal peace and disarmament, the German Chancellor, Herr Bethmann-Hollweg, had the courage and the common sense to stand apart; and, speaking for his Emperor and his nation, to lay it down as a maxim that, at the present stage of the world's history, the armed forces of any nation or empire must have a distinct relation to the material resources of that nation or empire. This position seems to me as statesmanlike as it is unanswerable; but in applying the principle to our own country, I should be inclined to modify it by saying that the armed forces of any nation or empire ought to represent, not only its material resources, but the spirit which animates that nation or empire—in a word, that its armed forces should be the measure of the nation's devotion to whatever ends it pursues.

As one disagreeing fundamentally with these views, I should like to emphasize the respect that I feel for Lord Roberts's candour and frankness.

¹ *Message to the Nation* (Murray), pp. 8, 9.

It is infinitely preferable that those who do not believe in the peace-ideal should say so, rather than that they should pay conventional homage to it and disguise their real feeling towards it.

In what follows I want to show how much Prussianism, which we now persuade ourselves is the work of Nietzsche and Treitschke, and has so large a responsibility for this war, is in reality just part of the general political conception of the western world, and how much Anglo-Saxon thought has contributed to it.

Take, for instance, its more material and economic foundations. Few in the Anglo-Saxon world have had greater authority in the domain of international politics than the late Admiral Mahan. And he referred to the naval ambitions of Germany, which are at least one of the origins of the conflict, in these terms:

Governments are corporations, and corporations have no souls; Governments, moreover, are trustees, and as such must put first the lawful interests of their wards—their own people. . . . More and more Germany needs the assured importation of raw materials, and, where possible, control of regions productive of such materials. More and more she requires assured markets and security as to the importation of food, since less and less comparatively is produced within her own borders by her rapidly increasing population. This all means security at sea. . . . Yet the supremacy of Great Britain in European seas means a perpetually latent control of German com-

merce. . . . The world has long been accustomed to the idea of a predominant naval power, coupling it with the name of Great Britain, and it has been noted that such power, when achieved, is commonly often associated with commercial and industrial predominance, the struggle for which is now in progress between Great Britain and Germany. Such predominance forces a nation to seek markets, and, where possible, to control them to its own advantage by preponderant force, the ultimate expression of which is possession. . . . From this flow two results: the attempt to possess, and the organization of force by which to maintain possession already achieved. . . . This statement is simply a specific formulation of the general necessity stated; it is an inevitable link in the chain of logical sequences—industry markets, control, navy bases. . . .¹

Indeed, it has been more than hinted that Admiral Mahan's work played no small part in prompting the German naval policy. Professor Spenser Wilkinson, a British writer of high repute on questions of naval and military policy, remarks:

No wonder that when, in 1888, the American observer, Captain Mahan, published his volume *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, other nations besides the British read from that book the lesson that victory at sea carries with it a prosperity, an influence, and a greatness obtainable by no other means.²

¹ *The Interest of America in International Conditions.*

² *Britain at Bay*, p. 41.

This plea of the inevitability of national conflict, owing to the pressure of increasing needs and population in a world of limited space and opportunity, is expressed with even greater frankness by certain British writers than by the great American authority on naval power. One characteristic presentation of the case is quoted in the first chapter of Part II.¹ Another British writer puts it as follows:

The teaching of all history is that commerce grows under the shadow of armed strength. Did we not fight with Dutch and French to capture the Indian trade? Did we not beat Dutch and French because we happened to be the strongest? Could we have beaten either Dutch or French but for the fact that we had gained command of the sea?

Disarmament will not abolish war; you *cannot* abolish war from a competitive system of civilization; competition is the root-basis of such a system of civilization, and competition is war. When a business firm crushes a trade rival from the markets by cut prices, there is exactly the same process at work as when a business nation crushes a trade rival by physical force; the means vary, but the end in view, and the ethical principles in question, are identical. In both cases the weaker goes to the wall; in both cases it is woe to the vanquished.²

Among ourselves the same view is expressed hardly less brutally in Mr. Homer Lea's book, *The Day of the Saxon*, which had a year or two

¹ See pp. 96-97.

² *The Struggle for Bread*, by A. Rifleman, pp. 142, 143, 209.

since a very considerable vogue. Mr. Lea says (pp. 10, 11):

The brutality of all national development is apparent, and we make no excuse for it. To conceal it would be a denial of fact; to glamour it over, an apology to truth. There is little in life that is not brutal except our ideal. As we increase the aggregate of individuals and their collective activities, we increase proportionately their brutality.

Nations cannot be created, nor can they become great, by any purely ethical or spiritual expansion. The establishment, in great or small entities, of tribes and states is the resultant only of their physical power; and whenever there is a reversal, or an attempted reversal to this, the result is either internal dissolution or sudden destruction, their dismembered territories going to make up the dominions of their conquerors.

In just such a manner has the British Empire been made up from the fragments of four great maritime Powers, the satrapies of petty potentates, and the wilderness of nameless savages.

In *The Valour of Ignorance*, again, he tells us:

In theory international arbitration denies the inexorability of natural laws, and would substitute for them the veriest Cagliostroic formulas, or would, with the vanity of Canute, sit down on the ocean-side of life and command the ebb and flow of its tides to cease.

The idea of international arbitration as a substitute for natural laws that govern the existence of political entities arises not only from a denial of their fiats and

an ignorance of their application, but from a total misconception of war, its causes, and its meaning.

This thesis is emphasized by General John J. P. Storey, who writes an introduction to Mr. Lea's book:

A few idealists may have visions that with advancing civilization war and its dread horrors will cease. Civilization has not changed human nature. The nature of man makes war inevitable. Armed strife will not disappear from the earth until human nature changes.

Leaving for the moment economic Prussianism, we find the more mystic and idealistic side duplicated in an ample English and American literature. The author, who is perhaps the very best English interpreter of Treitschke, Professor Cramb, allows his admiration for the Prussian ideal absolutely to blaze out:

Let me say with regard to Germany that of all England's enemies she is by far the greatest; and by "greatness" I mean not merely magnitude, not her millions of soldiers, not her millions of inhabitants, I mean grandeur of soul. She is the greatest and most heroic enemy—if she is our enemy—that England, in the thousand years of her history, has ever confronted. In the sixteenth century we made war upon Spain and the empire of Spain. But Germany, in the twentieth century, is a greater power, greater in conception, in thought, in all that makes for human dignity, than

was the Spain of Charles V. and Philip II. In the seventeenth century we fought against Holland; but the Germany of Bismarck and the Kaiser is greater than the Holland of De Witt. In the eighteenth century we fought against France; and again the Germany of to-day is a higher, more august power than France under Louis XIV.

. . . These two empires, both the descendants of the war-god Odin, and yet, *because* of that, doomed to this great conflict.¹

While he out-Bernhardi's Bernhardi in his moral justification of war as an end in itself:

In the laws governing the States and individuals the highest functions transcend utility and transcend even reason itself. In the present stage of the world's history to end war is not only beyond man's power, but contrary to man's will, since in war there is some secret possession or lingering human glory to which man clings with an unchangeable persistence; some source of inspiration which he is afraid to lose, uplifting life beyond life itself; some sense of a redeeming task which, like his efforts to unriddle the universe, for ever baffled yet for ever renewed, gives a meaning to this else meaningless scheme of things.²

Indeed, when British and American writers and journalists hold up their hands in horror—which they have been doing since this war broke out—at Prussian and Nietzschean defence of war as an

¹ *Germany and England*, pp. 46, 69.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 71, 72.

ennobling, elevating, and disciplining factor in human life, one wonders whether such writers have any memory at all for the attitude of certain great figures of English literature reviewed on both sides of the Atlantic, on the subject—Carlyle, Ruskin, Kingsley, Kipling, Swinburne, to mention just a few that come prominently to mind. Is there any German defence of war which transcends this passage from Ruskin:

All the pure and noble arts of peace are founded on war. . . . There is no great art possible to a nation but that which is based on battle. . . . All great nations learned their truth of word and strength of thought in war; they were nourished in war and wasted by peace; taught by war and deceived by peace; trained by war and betrayed by peace.¹

Ex-President Roosevelt, too, holds this ideal out to us as the highest national ambition:

We must play a great part in the world, and especially . . . perform those deeds of blood, of valour, which above everything else bring national renown.²

I shall show in the two following chapters in what manner this spirit has influenced the temper and attitude of this country at more than one crisis in its career; and while I am convinced that we are at this moment absolutely sincere in our outspoken disapproval of the Prussian theory,

¹ From an address on "War" in *The Crown of Wild Olive*, etc.

² *The Strenuous Life*.

we shall never be able to play our part effectively in exorcising it from the world's life unless we recognize frankly that although it may have found its fullest development in German politics, it is by no means an exclusively German product, but is founded on misconceptions only too widely held among all nations, including our own.

As to the pietistic Prussianism, which we are apt to regard now as blasphemous, it has at all times found its counterpart among British and American theologians. Its ethic was very definitely voiced by a recent article in the London *Nineteenth Century*,¹ entitled "God's Test by War" (by Mr. Wyatt), which the editor found so apposite to present circumstances that he reprinted it. Its avowals are significant from many points of view.

The truth is that armaments are the reflection of the national soul. The immense naval and military strength of Germany is the reflex of moral and social conditions better than our own. The excess of her birth-rate over ours (and still more over that of France) is in itself the proof of that superiority. For the growth of her population involves not the production of degenerates, but of a sound and vigorous race. Patriotism, public spirit, frugality, and industry are the essential moral factors which render possible the vast armed force which Germany wields. And in all these factors it must be admitted, with whatever shame and sorrow, that she surpasses England. Therefore, if in the gigantic process of international competition

¹ September, 1914.

England fall before Germany—which fate may God avert—then that fall will follow from no other destiny than the destiny inwoven with the universal law which in this article I have attempted to set forth—the law that the higher morality tends to produce the greater military strength.

If in all these considerations any force be admitted to inhere, then clearly the duty of patriotism and of preparation for war is reinforced ten thousandfold. If what has been here advanced is sound, then from every pulpit in the land the voice of exhortation should be heard, urging every man and every woman to serve God in and through service to their country.

The discovery that Christianity is incompatible with the military spirit is made only among decaying peoples. While a nation is still vigorous, while its population is expanding, while the blood in its veins is strong, then on this head no scruples are felt. But when its energies begin to wither, when self-indulgence takes the place of self-sacrifice, when its sons and its daughters become degenerate, then it is that a spurious and bastard humanitarianism masquerading as religion declares war to be an anachronism and a barbaric sin. . . .

What is manifest now is that the Anglo-Saxon world, with all its appurtenant Provinces and States, is in the most direct danger of overthrow, final and complete, and of the noble qualities upon which all military virtue is built. Throughout that world, in churches and in chapels, on the platform, as in the pulpit, in the press, and on the stage, which is our chief temple now, the voice of every God-fearing man should be raised, through the spoken or through the written word, to kindle anew the spark that is dying, to preach

the necessity of self-sacrifice for the country's cause, and to revive that dying military spirit which God gave to our race that it might accomplish His will upon earth.

It is only Prussia, we are now sure, that could frame the ideal of carrying its civilization and culture by force throughout the world. Yet it was a very great Englishman, who was also a profound admirer of the United States, who visioned just such a rôle for the Anglo-Saxons. We read of Cecil Rhodes that the dream of his life "was nothing less than the governance of the world by the British race." A will exists written in Mr. Rhodes's own handwriting in which he states his reasons for accepting the aggrandizement and service of the British Empire as his highest ideal of practical achievement. The document begins with the characteristic sentence: "I contend that the British race is the finest which history has yet produced." His biographer tells us:

The argument [continued through some twenty foolscap pages] is a clear if somewhat crude summary of the articles of faith on which the edifice of modern British Imperialism is based. It puts forward broadly, as an aim which must appeal to every elevated mind, the conception of working for the governance of the entire world by its finest race; and it ends with a single bequest of everything of which he might die possessed for the futherance of this great purpose. Five-and-twenty years later his final will

carried out, with some difference of detail, the same intention.¹

Among other Englishmen who have not hesitated to give expression to the thought reflected in Rhodes's will is Earl Grey, who says:

Probably everyone would agree that an Englishman would be right in considering his way of looking at the world and at life better than that of the Maori or Hottentot, and no one would object, in the abstract, to England doing her best to impose her better and higher view on those savages. But the same idea will carry you much farther. In so far as an Englishman differs in essentials from a Swede or Belgian, he believes that he represents a more perfectly developed standard of general excellence. Yes, and even those nations nearest to us in mind and sentiment—German and Scandinavian—we regard on the whole as not so excellent as ourselves, comparing their typical characteristics with ours. Were this not so, our energies would be directed to becoming what they are. Without doing this, however, we may well endeavour to pick out their best qualities and add them to ours, believing that our compound will be superior to the common stock.²

It is, however, Lord Grey's view as to the point at which the champions of this ideal may find a moral justification for war that is particularly interesting in view of current condemnation of

¹ F. L. S., in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, new volumes, vol. xxxii. (tenth edition).

² *Memoir of Herbert Harvey*, by Earl Grey. London, 1899.

German world-ambitions. Lord Grey concludes the reflections just quoted as follows:

It is the mark of an independent nation that it should feel thus. How far such a feeling is, in any particular case, justified, history alone decides. But it is essential that each claimant for the first place should put forward his whole energy to prove his right. This is the moral justification for international strife and for war, and a great change must come over the world and over men's minds before there can be any question of everlasting universal peace, or the settlement of international differences by arbitration.¹

Nor were these writers alone in such conceptions. When Bernhardi uses the expression "World Power or Downfall," we see in it the indication of a particularly mischievous and dangerous political megalomania. Yet British writers of repute use almost this expression, and voice certainly this idea with reference to Britain without any particular misgiving. Among other well-known publicists, Professor Spenser Wilkinson has urged the need for Britain's assuming the "leadership of the human race." In the preface to his book, *The Great Alternative*, he writes:

The Great Alternative is such a choice given to England—a choice between the first place among the nations of the world and the last; between the leadership of the human race and the loss of Empire and of all but the shadow of independence. The idea set

¹ *Memoir of Herbert Harvey*, by Earl Grey. London, 1899.

forth in this book is that England has the choice between these two extremes, with no middle course open to her. . . .

It may fairly be argued that what distinguishes German and Anglo-Saxon political ambition is that the former is pursued without regard to the rights of others, and the latter is not. As a statement of simple fact that can doubtless be accepted. But this distinguishing mark is not, I fear, due to the influence of the nationalist and militarist writers. To the degree to which they influence opinion and policy their tendency is to obliterate that difference. Even the article of the Bernhardi creed which (in him) so shocks us—the declaration that “What is right is decided by the arbitrament of war; war gives a biologically just decision, since its decisions rest on the very nature of things”—differs in no essential from the deeply religious view of (for instance) Mr. Wyatt, whom I have quoted. Mr. Wyatt accepts to the full even the logical conclusion of Bernhardi’s doctrine: “If in the gigantic process of international competition England fall before Germany—which fate may God avert—then that fall will follow from . . . the law that the higher morality tends to produce the greater military strength.” Admiral Mahan comes very near to the same proposition that military might makes right:

National power is surely a legitimate factor in international settlements; for it is the outcome of

national efficiency, and efficiency is entitled to assert its fair position and chance of exercise in world matters. . . .

The existence of might is no mere casual attribute, but the indication of qualities which should, as they assuredly will, make their way to the front and to the top in the relations of States.¹

Among British writers Colonel Maude expresses an allied view when he says that "War is the divinely appointed means by which the environment may be readjusted until ethically 'fittest' and 'best' become synonymous."²

In the vindication of this policy at least some of our own popular military writers wave aside certain scruples as readily as could any Prussian. In the book on *The Day of the Saxon*, which he has dedicated to Lord Roberts, Homer Lea writes concerning certain international moralities as follows:

The necessity of a declaration of war is only a modern illusion. During the last two centuries we have less than ten cases where declarations have been issued prior to the regular commencement of hostilities, though in one form or another war already existed. During this same period of time we have one hundred and eleven cases where war was begun without any notification.

No nation has followed more persistently than the

¹ *Armaments and Arbitration*.

² *War and the World's Life* (Smith, Elder), London, p. 18.

English this principle of making war without prior declaration. They have done so, as have others, because the initiation of a conflict constitutes the most essential principle of warfare. . . . During the former century there are recorded forty-seven wars begun without any prior declaration, while in the nineteenth century eighty wars were begun without any prior declaration.

The occupation of the Persian and Afghanistan frontiers prior to war with Russia, or the European frontiers in a conflict with Germany, arouses in the British nation the appearance of great opposition to the violation of neutral territory. This is false, for the Empire is not moved by the sanctity of neutrality.

Neutrality of States under the conditions just mentioned has never heretofore nor will in future have any place in international association in time of war. Such neutrality is a modern delusion. It is an excrescence.

In the year 1801 the island of Madeira was taken possession of by the British, without any previous communication to the Court of Lisbon, in order that it should not fall into the hands of the French, observing in this action the true principle governing such activities in war.

In 1807 the British fleet, without any notification, with no intimation given of hostile intentions, no complaint of misconduct on the part of Denmark, entered the Baltic, seized the Danish fleet, and blockaded the island of Zealand, on which is situated the city of Copenhagen. At this time both nations had their Ambassadors residing in their respective capitals, and were in perfect harmony. The purpose of this attack was to anticipate the occupation of Denmark

and the use of her fleets by France. So correct is the principle of this initiation that it stands out with remarkable brilliancy in the darkness of innumerable military errors made by the Saxon race.

If England were, therefore, justified in seizing Denmark in the beginning of the nineteenth century for no other reason than to prevent the employment of the Danish fleet by the French, how much more is she justified during peace in the twentieth century in the occupation of its southern frontiers for the protection of both nations against German aggression.¹

Nor do certain British military writers, to do them justice, shirk this point (and again I will emphasize the point that they do a real service to the sincere and honest discussion of these subjects by their frankness). Lord Roberts has written a laudatory preface to Major Stewart Murray's book, *The Future Peace of the Anglo-Saxons*. In this book (pp. 40, 41) Major Stewart Murray, speaking of the seizure of the Danish fleet in 1807, says:

Nothing has ever been done by any other nation more utterly in defiance of the conventionalities of so-called international law. We considered it advisable and necessary and expedient, and we had the power to do it; therefore we did it.

Are we ashamed of it? No, certainly not; we are proud of it. In like manner, if any nation can surprise Britain, far from being ashamed of it, they will be equally proud of it. And what sickening hypocrisy

¹ *The Day of the Saxon*, by Homer Lea.

it must seem to other nations to hear us, of all people, prate of the sanctity of international law and call aloud on its sacred rules as a sure protection to our commerce and food supply, or as a sure protection against surprise. Whatever course of sudden and unexpected violence, whatever sudden naval surprise, whatever surprise attack on our commerce, etc., any nation may adopt against us, can be amply justified by the precedents we ourselves have set. . . .

For people in this country to talk of the sanctity of international law is nothing but hypocrisy or ignorance.

And Major Murray has made it clear that ferocity in war is not Prussianism but—war. He welcomes Clausewitz as “the Shakespeare of military writers, the greatest and deepest of military thinkers, whose book forms to-day the foundation of all military thought in Europe, and should form the foundation of all military thought in Britain,” and warmly applauds the appeals against “sickening humanitarianism.” Major Murray fully endorses the principle of making war as “frightful” as possible:

The worst of all errors in war is a mistaken spirit of benevolence. . . . For “he who uses his force unsparingly, without reference to the quantity of bloodshed, must obtain a superiority if his adversary does not act likewise.” . . . Now this is an elementary fact which it is most desirable that those of our politicians and Exeter Hall preachers and numerous old women of both sexes who raise hideous out-

cries about "methods of barbarism," etc., every time we have a war, should endeavour to learn. By their very outcries for moderation and weakness they clearly show that they know nothing about war. They impede the proper energetic use of the national forces; they encourage the enemy to trade on our probable weakness and folly; they prevent the proper measures being taken to bring the war to a conclusion; they lengthen the war, thereby causing an infinitely greater loss of life and an infinitely greater sum of misery; and they delay the conclusion of peace. By their noisy, foolish, thoughtless din in the name of humanity they murder humanity. In this country their name is legion; they fill the pulpits and the platforms and Parliament with their outcries and the press with their articles and letters, and do their utmost to mislead the people into a display of false humanity and deplorable weakness in the conduct of war. They are the greatest possible enemies to our peace.¹

Nor does Major Murray stand alone. Dr. Miller Maguire, an English military critic and authority of standing, writes:

The proper strategy consists in the first place in inflicting as terrible blows as possible upon the enemy's army, and then in causing the inhabitants so much suffering that they must long for peace and force their Government to demand it. The people must be left with nothing but their eyes to weep with over the war. It will require the daily and hourly exertions of those

¹ *Future Peace of the Anglo-Saxons*, p. 27.

who have been burnt out to procure a scanty subsistence to sustain life. When the soldier learns that his family—his wife and little children—are sure to suffer, he will become uneasy in his place, and will weigh the duty he owes his family; and what the promptings of nature will be it is not difficult to determine.¹

Dr. Maguire borrows this reasoning from the Federal Generals of our own Civil War, and adds that “the Federal Generals knew their business. Their duty was to bring about peace by so ruining the property of the Confederate civilians as to make all classes disgusted with the war. This policy was deliberately and very properly applied.”

It is not for the purpose of a trivial *tu quoque* that I have disinterred these opinions of American and British writers, but in order that, rereading them, we may honestly ask ourselves whether our real feeling just now is against the doctrine or against those who put it into effect—against Prussianism or against Prussians. For if it is against the people and not against the idea, then our feelings will not render us less, but more likely to become ourselves victims of the doctrine and to fall once more beneath its evil influence.

We deem the crime of Germany fully proved because Bernhardi writes of “World-Power or Downfall,” but when a British professor writes that England has no alternative between the

¹ *London Times*, July 2, 1900.

leadership of the human race and loss of her empire, the British public accept it as a quite natural and laudable political conception; and we are horrified at German adulation of war as a noble thing in itself; but our own poets and clergymen urge just that thing, and we are not horrified at all. We point to German hostility to peace as a proof of her ineradicable barbarism, while our own popular journalists have for years poured ferocious contempt upon "the amiable sentimentalists at The Hague with their impossible dreams of arbitration and disarmament."

Do we really believe that this doctrine is an evil and anti-social thing, or merely that it is evil and anti-social when embraced by others? In that case—if we ourselves at the bottom of our hearts believe it and excuse allegiance to it in ourselves—then it is inevitably destined to dominate the policy and conduct of the nations after the war is over.

This truth has evidently appealed with particular force to a writer whose opinion in the special circumstances of Europe at this juncture should have weight with us. A very distinguished Belgian author, Dr. Sarolea, whose work, *The Anglo-German Problem* has won the highest encomiums from, among others, the King of the Belgians, writes on this aspect of the problem as follows:

What is even more serious and ominous, so far as the prospects of peace are concerned, the German, who

knows that he is right from his own point of view, knows that he is also right from the English point of view; he knows that the premises on which he is reasoning are still accepted by a large section of the English people. Millions of English people are actuated in their policy by those very Imperialistic principles on which the Germans take their stand. After all, German statesmen are only applying the political lessons which England has taught them, which Mr. Rudyard Kipling has sung, and Mr. Chamberlain has proclaimed in speeches innumerable. Both the English Imperialist and the German Imperialist believe that the greatness of a country does not depend mainly on the virtues of the people, or on the resources of the home country, but largely on the capacity of the home country to acquire and to retain large tracts of territory all over the world. Both the English Imperialist and the German Imperialist have learned the doctrine of Admiral Mahan, that the greatness and prosperity of a country depend mainly on sea-power. Both believe that efficiency and success in war is one of the main conditions of national prosperity.

Now, as long as the two nations do not rise to a saner political ideal, as long as both English and German people are agreed in accepting the current political philosophy, as long as both nations shall consider military power not merely as a necessary and temporary evil to submit to, but as a permanent and noble ideal to strive after, the German argument remains unanswerable. War is indeed predestined, and no diplomatists sitting round a great table in the Wilhelmstrasse or the Ballplatz or the Quai d'Orsay will be able to ward off the inevitable. It is only,

therefore, in so far as both nations will move away from the old political philosophy, that an understanding between Germany and England will become possible. . . . It is the ideas and the ideals that must be fundamentally changed: "Instauratio facienda ab imis fundamentis." And those ideals once changed, all motives for a war between England and Germany would vanish as by magic. But alas! ideas and ideals do not change by magic or prestige—they can only change by the slow operation of intellectual conversion. Arguments alone can do it.

It could not be more lucidly expressed, and this Belgian author is good enough to add that it is particularly such arguments as those with which this book deals that must operate in any intellectual conversion.¹

And if we, in America, who are detached to a great extent from the sufferings and passions of the war, continue to be swayed by the old ideas, our influence will not represent a progressive factor in the creation of a better organized World-Society. If, on the other hand, we can clear our minds of these fallacies and if we have clearly before us the danger of allowing the Prussian idea to dominate the evolution of the future, either in Europe or among ourselves, we may hope to play a predominant part in the creation of that World-State which is necessary to ensure the peaceful development of our own civilization.

¹ *The Anglo-German Problem*, pp. 362-3.

CHAPTER III

A RETROSPECT OF AMERICAN PATRIOTISM

The necessity for national stock-taking—Anglophobia as the expression of American patriotism—War with England “in the interests of human freedom”—The Venezuelan Crisis—Sudden disappearance of the British peril—The war with Spain—“Free and independent” Cuba—The Philippines—Adoption of Spanish methods—The water cure—The doctrine of Military Necessity—American opinion of the Filipinos before and after the war—Colonies and Imperialism—The new doctrine as to annexation

ONE of the great problems of international relationship—it is in one sense the very greatest of all—is that no nation ever deems that its patriotism can by any possibility need watching or that there can ever be the slightest danger of it developing into that disregard of the rights of others, into the “my country right or wrong” attitude, which has made German patriotism, for instance, a menace to civilization.

I have touched on this danger in the preceding chapter, but in order that we may have it clearly before us, I think that in this connection, a stock-taking of the not very remote past of American patriotism may be wholesome. For this purpose

I have thought it useful to reprint three papers that date back in part nearly twenty years. The chapter which follows was taken from a book published in England in 1902 but which has not yet appeared in the United States. The two later papers forming Chapter IV are from a little Western publication of an earlier date, now defunct.

Writing a year or two after the Venezuelan message of President Cleveland and speaking of the national temper both before and after that incident, I said:

This Anglophobia was not a mere historical sentiment, a memory of wrongs inflicted upon a more or less distant ancestry, but an active and powerful political motive influencing, not merely the foreign relations of the country, but what was more important, almost the whole range of domestic politics. To no passion could the politician be so sure of appealing with such success as to hatred of England. To call a thing "British," whether it were Free Trade, or an independent judiciary, or a reformed civil service, was to condemn it as un-American, something no true patriot could countenance. No theme was so popular as that which represented England as a malicious Power eternally plotting the downfall of the American Republic, and which would one day have to be crushed, "in the interests of human freedom." Such sentiments were expressed, not merely by obscure tub-thumpers, but by senators and

editors of great newspapers. One of the most notable Anglophobes in the Senate, Henry Cabot Lodge, is the author of historical works of no mean merit,¹ the graduate of a great university, the confidante of cabinet ministers, the particular friend of a former President. Another United States Senator starts out upon a lecturing tour to advocate a war with England, "with or without cause," as he himself expressed it; that a great American newspaper could recommend that notice be served upon England "to quit this free soil forever." An eminent American publicist, Mr. David A. Wells, has put it on record that this out-and-out Anglophobia was "accepted and endorsed by nearly every member of our national or state legislatures, and by nearly every newspaper or

¹ The conversion of these strenuous Anglophobes to equally strenuous Anglophiles is dealt with farther on. Regarding Senator Lodge, the *Evening Post* points out that through nine-tenths of the *Story of the Revolution* (the part written in the pre-Anglophile period), the Senator bangs and bethumps the English in the familiar old ward-caucus style. At the very end, the able historian suddenly turns square about and gushes over England as extravagantly as he had before abused her. "It simply meant he had caught the trick of utterance common when he was finishing his gigantic labours, just as he similarly caught it at the beginning of them. When he began to write, it was the fashion to curse England, and he cursed her soundly. When he ended, everyone was falling on England's neck, and he fell blubbering with the rest. The conversion was suspiciously sudden. The repentant sinner was only a rice Christian, penitent for value received, and as soon as the heathen crops are good once more, an unblushing and roaring heathen he will be again."

magazine in the country." Enumerating the causes of this prejudice, he says:

It is all but universally assumed that the governmental and commercial policy of England is characterized by no other principle save to monopolize, through arbitrary, selfish, and unjust measures, everything on the earth's surface that can glorify herself and promote the interests of her own insular population, to the detriment of all other nations and peoples; and that it is the bounden duty of the people and Government of the United States, in behalf of popular liberty, civilization, and of Christianity, to put an end to the further continuance of such a policy, even if a resort to war be necessary to effect it.

One might justly base a general condemnation of the "patriotic instinct" as a guide in politics upon this single fact, that sixty millions of the shrewdest and most hard-headed people in the world should, during several generations, represent as intolerably oppressive the most liberal commercial policy in the history of the world; that they should set before themselves as one of the first objects of their national ambition the impoverishment of a people whose wealth was an essential element in their own prosperity. Yet such assumption and the policy which, as Americans themselves in our day recognize, defied both fact and common-sense, were endorsed by the American nation with a completer unanimity than the English nation showed in the war upon the South African

Republics. The pro-Boer party in England was considerable, including the official leaders of the Opposition; the pro-British party ten years since had no existence in American politics. A Democratic President sent the Venezuelan Ultimatum, the Republican Opposition "fell over itself" in voting the appropriation for military preparation. The Republicans exploited Anglophobia as against the Free-Trade Democrats; the Democrats exploited it as against the Gold-Bug Republicans. Both parties deemed themselves to be passing the severest condemnation upon the policy of their opponents when they could represent it as "British."

But if American patriotism be condemned by the attitude of generations in the matter of England's commercial and territorial policy, it may be said to have reached the burlesque when it insisted that the enlargement by a few square miles of a small British colony in South America endangered the institutions and independence of America. This hard-headed people, who for a hundred and thirty years had had England as a neighbour along three thousand miles of their frontier, seriously contended that if England enlarged by so much as an arrow-shot her frontier in South America, a country separated from them by half a continent, their national existence was threatened. So seriously indeed did they presumably believe this that they stood ready to provoke a war which must in any case have been one of the most stupendous conflicts in history, to prevent such

enlargement. And American patriotism was so sensitive on the point that the mildest objection to such a view was stigmatized as "treason," as "siding with the enemies of one's country."¹

And yet, so little real basis in fact had this insane hostility that it was at a certain juncture suddenly abandoned, and transferred to another country. In a few weeks the "British peril," which had haunted the imagination of American patriots for generations, completely disappeared, and the Spaniard, against whom not one American in a

¹ A curious proof of the extent of American Anglophobia at the time of which I am writing is furnished by Herbert Spencer in *Facts and Comments*. No charge against England was commoner with American Anglophobes than that she favoured the Southern cause in the War of the Rebellion. Desiring to show on what little evidence this charge rested, Spencer overhauled the English newspapers of the day, and was able to show that they all—Tory, Whig, and Radical—condemned the action of the South both before and after the declaration of war. *Blackwood's Magazine* furnished the single exception. This was embodied in a letter to the *Tribune*, but friends of Spencer in America were so persuaded that it would do no good and would only intensify bitterness, that the letter was not printed. Spencer adds: "Some years afterwards, however, when the ill-feeling had diminished, the London correspondent, to whom I mentioned the matter, asked me to let him have the letter for publication. I did so, and it eventually appeared. There was an accompanying leading article referring in a slighting way to the evidence that it contained, and, as I gathered, though some effect was produced, it was but small." We see from this, that not merely was the feeling against England intense, but it was so intense as to resent any evidence that went to prove England in any way friendly. Even so influential a paper as the *Tribune* dared not jeopardize its patriotic orthodoxy by printing evidence which might contribute to Anglo-American good-feeling.

million had any real grievance whatever, became the monster which it was necessary to annihilate. But this sudden change of front was shortly to be altogether outdone, and the American patriot to perform a feat of mental gymnastics which has probably never been equalled by any other people in the history of the world. The situation which gave rise to this exhibition may be resumed thus: America had intervened in Cuba to stop the severities of war waged against a people struggling for independence and the right to govern itself. The joint resolution in Congress declared that the "people of Cuba are, and by right ought, to be free and independent." Mr. McKinley, in his message to Congress later, declared that such autonomous government as Spain had set up in the capital and elsewhere, "appeared not to gain the favour of the inhabitants, nor to be able to extend its influence to the large extent of territory held by the insurgents." Hence, "in the name of humanity, in the name of civilization . . . the war in Cuba must stop." Spain replied that such grievances as Cubans could show would be honestly considered the moment the rebels would lay down their arms, which they must do before she could treat with them. The national honour of Spain demanded as much. America regarded these reasons as puerile and fantastic: she declared war. There can be no doubt that the American people were honest in the matter. They were fully convinced that they were going to war to vindicate

the American principle of political independence, to relieve suffering and starving insurgents. Senator Wolcott declared in Congress that

in the eyes of every man in Europe, we must be free from ulterior motives, if we are to preserve their respect and our own. . . . We cannot take territory, because our constitution is founded upon the consent of the governed. It is the principle upon which we, as a nation, exist, and which gives us, above all others, the right to intervene in Cuba. The war must be fought, because, in the eyes of the world, we stand as the sentinel of liberty in the western hemisphere, and, because, if we fail to listen to the voice of the suffering and the down-trodden, we will be untrue to the principles upon which this government is founded, as upon a rock.

Archbishop Ireland declared that the "people of America offered their lives through no sordid ambition of pecuniary gain, of conquest of territory, of national aggrandizement. An all-ruling providence. . . ."

Never had such a flood of patriotism swept over the country. Those who doubted the wisdom of America's action were attacked with a virulence which it is difficult at this date to conceive. The opponents of the Cuban policy were declared to have "no conception of the spirit that Americanism represented, of the principles upon which American government was based. . . ."

This was in June, 1898. In June, 1899, America

was in the midst of a war for destroying the independent government of a people lying ten thousand miles from her shores, alien alike in race, in language, in law, religion, traditions; a people which had never at any time acknowledged any allegiance of any sort to America, a people of whose very existence most Americans were ignorant before the war of subjugation and conquest was started upon. None of the excuses, even, which England could advance in the case of her war against the Boers, were available. America had no injustice to redress, no paramount interest to defend. Her national security was not threatened. The most apprehensive patriot could not pretend that the existence of an Hispano-Eurasian Republic off the coast of China threatened American independence, or that she had any mission for the prevention of anarchy there, when anarchy had reigned more or less normally in a score of republics on the American continent—some of them at the very doors of the United States—for upwards of a century. Nor was it pretended that America had great commercial interests in the islands. Her commercial interests there were trivial, immeasurably inferior to England's or Spain's, and nothing like so great as American interests in such countries as Chili, Costa Rica, or Bolivia. Nor could it be claimed that America had pressing need of territory for an expanding population. She had already more territory than she could populate in generations, while the physical conditions of the

Philippines are such that Americans cannot in health and comfort live there. America's only possible excuse for the war was that she had bought the sovereignty of the Philippines from Spain—a sovereignty, which, by her policy, and by a thousand patriotic utterances of six months before, she had vociferously declared Spain did not possess. After co-operating with the insurgents for the expulsion of Spanish authority, after declaring that Spain had sacrificed further right to the exercise of that authority, America buys it like so much mining stock, and demands that the Filipinos submit to it. The wishes of the inhabitants were never consulted in the matter (although for over a century Americans had been declaring that government could only derive its just power from the consent of the governed), while so far as the legal title is concerned, it was acquired in 1898 from a source which in 1897 Americans were declaring invalid.

Mr. McKinley himself, in his message to Congress in December, 1897, declared, with regard to the Philippines: "I speak not of forcible annexation, because that is not to be thought of, and under our code of morality would be a criminal aggression." Exactly a year later the President, on his own initiative, a month before the Treaty of Peace was ratified by the Senate, issued a proclamation to the Islanders, announcing that they must unconditionally submit to American authority, which would be established "at any cost whatever."

This, as the outcome of a war, undertaken to deliver a people from a foreign yoke, to vindicate the sacred right of self-government. It is unimaginable that any people in the world, savage or civilized, would, when suddenly called upon, so surrender their country unconditionally into the hands of a foreign nation, a nation of which most had never heard, a nation which had not previously the remotest interest or concern in the country they thus suddenly undertook to rule, a nation in every imaginable respect alien, if not hostile. The Americans would themselves have been the first to resist a sovereignty imposed in such an unheard-of fashion. Spain, whom America had turned out, was in some senses, at least, better qualified for the government of the islands. She, at least, had been established there during three centuries, had given the islands such civilization as they possessed, the language which was the medium of civilized intercourse, their laws and religion. The Americans were alien in all these respects. Not a self-respecting American but would have done as did the Filipinos, yet for doing so much the Filipinos have for four years been harassed with a severity that Spain never exceeded.

It is not a mere effort of rhetoric but an absolute truth to say that there is not an act of tyranny, not a crime, not a cruelty which was alleged against Spain in her waging of the Cuban War as the justification of American intervention which America herself has not been guilty of in the Philippines,

and which the American patriots have not, when committed by their own government, palliated, or excused, or directly defended.¹ The reconcentrados system, the ruthless massacre of whole populations, including the women and children, the denial of quarter to prisoners, torture, the

¹ See Reports quoted below.

The *Evening Post* of 4th March says: "Governor Taft's testimony before the Senate Committee on the Philippines is an admission that some of the ugliest stories told of the conduct of the war are true. There has been, he stated, some 'unnecessary killing' (polite official phrase for murder), some cases of whipping and the use of the water cure (that is torture). We are thus . . . caught doing the very things which led us to go to war in solemn protest and in the name of an outraged humanity. When it was the Spaniards who were guilty of 'unnecessary killing' (in Governor Taft's elegant words) and of torture and of reconcentration in Cuba and in the Philippines, we did not fall back on the cold philosophic comfort that war is 'inherently a cruel thing'; that it is necessary to be 'severe,' and that the more truculently we make war, the sooner will the enemy ask for peace. No, these salves we prudently reserved for our own conscience. The Spaniards we denounced to high heaven as monsters without excuse. Our war against them was a holy war, and it was as champions of religion and the tenderest humanity that we unfurled our banners, only to find that we were soon to allow, or at least to apologize for, in ourselves the things we had fiercely condemned in others."

The *Chicago Intercean*, representing the apologist attitude, says, editorially, on 21st July, 1902, that General Smith has been reprimanded for "violent language. His record remains unstained." General Smith was reprimanded by the President—not a severe punishment—for ordering his subordinate to "take no prisoners, to kill everything over ten, to make Samar a howling wilderness." This to the *Intercean* is mere "violent language." Yet the *Intercean* was especially notable for its perfervid condemnation of Weyler in Cuba.

entrapping of native leaders by the meanest trickery—a trickery which in the words of Senator Hoar was “in violation, not only of the laws of war, but of that law of hospitality which governs alike everywhere the civilized Christian or pagan wherever the light of chivalry has penetrated”—the laying waste of a score of peaceful villages for the killing of a single soldier, all this has been calmly watched without a protest from those patriots who appealed to high heaven when similar crimes were committed in the Philippines and in Cuba by Spain. More, the distinctly patriotic organs of opinion have treated as sentimentalists, and even traitors, those Americans who have protested.

It is impossible to reproduce here the enormous mass of evidence—of which the great majority of Americans are ignorant—which justifies these strictures. But I will recall a few facts of an official nature, and the reader may judge whether the foregoing is overdrawn.

General Jacob Smith, at the court-martial which became necessary owing to the acquittal of a subordinate on charges of murder based upon the execution of military orders, admitted having issued the following:

I wish you to kill and burn. The more you kill, the more you will please me. The island of Samar must be made a howling wilderness.

Asked by the subordinate above-mentioned what age limit should be placed to the killing,

General Smith replied, "Kill everything over ten."

This seems pretty definite. General Smith, far from denying the issue of such orders, stoutly defended their necessity and their "humanity."¹ That they were thoroughly carried out, and that their spirit animated large sections of the American army in the Philippines, there can be no manner of doubt. Major Gardner—extracts from whose report I give later in another connection—officially notified his government as civil governor of the Province of Tayabas, that "a third of the population had disappeared as the result of the military operations." He complains that the wholesale and indiscriminate "killing" was depopulating the country. Captain Elliott at about this time published over his own signature a letter from which the following is an extract:

Caloocan was supposed to contain 17,000 inhabitants. The Twentieth Kansas swept through it, and Caloocan contains not one living native. Of the buildings the battered walls of the great church and the dismal prison alone remain. The village of May-paja, where our first fight occurred on the night of the

¹ "Colonel Woodruff, Counsel for General Smith, at the opening of the trial, at once stated that he desired to simplify matters, and with that object was willing to admit that he wanted everybody to be killed who was capable of bearing arms, and that he did specify ten years as the age limit for such killing, since Samar boys of that age were as dangerous as those of maturer years." —Manila Dispatches to American Papers of 25th April, 1902.

14th, had 5000 people in it on that day. Now not one stone stands upon another.

The report reads like an account of the campaigns of Timur or Ghengis Khan.¹ Yet when revelations of this character were being made Senator Chauncey Depew, in a Fourth of July oration which I had the pleasure of hearing him deliver in Paris, assured his hearers that "millions in the far-off Philippines were that night on their knees thanking God that the free flag of the Stars and Stripes, the glorious emblem of freedom and humanity, at last floated over them."

The Smith incident of itself would not perhaps

¹ Perhaps the best historical parallel may be found in the history of British campaigns in Ireland. Froude quotes Maltby's report to government as follows: "I burnt all their corn and houses, and committed to the sword all that could be found. In like manner, I assaulted a castle when the garrison surrendered. I put them to the misericordia of my soldiers. They were all slain. Thence I went on, sparing none which came in my way, which cruelty did so amaze their followers that they could not tell where to bestow themselves." Of the commander of the English forces at Munster we read, "He . . . diverted his forces into East Clanwilliam and Muskery-Quirke, and, harassing the country, killed all mankind that were found therein, for a terror to those as should give relief to the runagate traitors. Thence we came to Aberleagh (the beautiful glen of Aberlow) where we did the like, not leaving behind us man or beast, corne or cattle." Lord-Deputy Chichester, commander of the English forces in Ulster, writes: "I burned all along Lough Neagh, within four miles of Dungannon . . . sparing none of what quality, age, or sex soever, besides many burned to death. We killed man, woman, and child, horse, beast, or whatever we could find."

have great importance were it not that there is overwhelming evidence that the spirit of the "kill and burn" order animated most, if not all, the later American operations in the Philippines. Not the least suggestive fact in connection with the whole evidence is the determined effort that has been made officially to hush matters up. Acts of the most serious nature have, despite the Senate Enquiry Commission, only come to light months, and years, after their committal. At the very time that the Secretary of War made his statement to the effect that the "war in the Philippines had been conducted with scrupulous regard for the rules of civilized warfare," he was in possession of a report (which he conveniently suppressed) from one of his own officers complaining that the laws of civilized warfare were habitually violated by the American troops, and that unless such a policy were stopped the seed of perpetual revolution and resistance in the islands would be sown. This report, which was produced at the Senate investigation, and was drawn up by Major Gardner, the Civil Governor of the Philippine Province of Tayabas, states:

Of late, by reason of the conduct of the troops, such as the extensive burning of the barrios in trying to lay waste the country, so that the insurgents cannot occupy it; the torturing of natives by so-called water cure and other methods, in order to obtain information; the harsh treatment of natives generally, and the failure

of inexperienced lately-appointed lieutenants to distinguish between those who are friendly, and to treat every native as if he were, whether or no, an insurrectionist at heart, the friendly sentiment above referred to is being fast destroyed, and a deep hatred towards us engendered. If these things need be done, they had best be done by native troops, so that the people of the United States will not be credited therewith. Almost without exception, soldiers, and also many officers, refer to natives in their presence as "niggers." . . . The course now being pursued in this province, and in the provinces of Batangas, Laguna, and Samar, is, in my opinion, sowing the seeds for a perpetual revolution against us wherever a good opportunity occurs.

. . . We are daily making permanent enemies. In the course above referred to, the troops made no distinction often between the property of those natives who are insurgents, or insurgent sympathizers, and the property of those who heretofore have risked their lives by being loyal to the United States, and giving us information against their countrymen in arms. Often every house in a barrio is burned. In my opinion, the situation does not justify the means employed, and especially when taking into consideration the suffering that must be undergone by the innocent, and its effect upon the relations with these people hereafter

Yet with this report in his possession, the Secretary of War, in reply to newspaper criticism of the conduct of the troops and the Philippine policy generally, spoke with indignation of "base slanders having not the least justification," and

of "self-restraint and humanity never before surpassed in any war."¹

I have before me as I write, copies of the letters of nearly two hundred American soldiers; they are all signed, and in most cases the writer's regiment is given. They all have stories to tell of scenes like that described by Captain Elliott, or of tortures so revolting that it is scarcely possible to believe that they could have occurred. And yet when one soldier after another describes in practically the same words, with a little more or less detail, the same acts of barbarous atrocity, what conclusion can be drawn? Are they all inventing horrors of which only a morbid imagination could conceive? Massacre, torture, wholesale destruction and devastation, rape and savage licence are all reflected. One writer describes the shooting of a whole village which offered no resistance: old men, sick people, children—all fell.

¹ It is curious that Mr. Chamberlain should, in defence of English conduct in South Africa, have appealed to the American conduct of the Philippine campaign. Compare the American secretary's language, under the peculiar circumstances of its use, with the declaration of Mr. Chamberlain (Birmingham, 30th August, 1902), that "there never has been a war recounted to us in history, or within the experience of the oldest living man amongst us, in which a more sincere endeavour was made to reduce the evils of war to a minimum . . . never has there been in the course of a campaign less cruelty or less wanton mischief," in the face of an English Field-Marshal's (Neville Chamberlain) emphatic declaration: "I can recall no campaign in which there has been such wholesale devastation of the enemy's country as in this."

In addition to the soldiers' letters, there are those of newspaper correspondents. Joseph Ohl, a trustworthy correspondent of the *Atlanta Constitution*, an old paper of very good standing, writes as follows:

The officer commanding the battalion over on Bohol has been giving instructions to kill off everybody suspected of connection with the insurgents. He has been told that these orders give him the widest latitude, that he is not to be very particular whether the suspected is bearing arms or has been; if he is a suspect, he is to be treated as an outlaw and shot down. General Hughes is of opinion that this is the only way to deal with the rebellion in the present stage. Never will it be thoroughly stamped out until those responsible for the resistance have been killed off.

As the military officers over and over again have attempted to justify their measures, by the fact that "every Filipino is at heart a rebel," the islands are likely to be pacified when they are depopulated. What a striking confirmation of the facts cited in this letter is given by the report of Major Gardner may be judged from a comparison therewith.

The following letter is signed by A. A. Barnes, Battery G, 3rd United States Artillery, first published in the *Standard* of Greensburg (Ind.), an "Imperialist" paper:

Last night one of our boys was found shot and his stomach cut open. Immediately orders were received

from General Wheaton to burn the town, and kill every native in sight; which was done to a finish. About a thousand men, women, and children were reported to be killed. I am probably growing hard hearted, for I am in my glory when I can sight my gun on some dark skin, and pull the trigger. . . . Tell all my enquiring friends that I am doing all I can for Old Glory.

Another soldier's letter, published in the *Portland Oregonian*, of 4th May, 1900, reports that while Wheaton's column was near Malapat, near Bato—

Reports, which afterwards proved to be somewhat exaggerated, came in, that two companies of the Twenty-second Infantry had been literally cut to pieces, having fallen into an ambush. After a hasty consultation, it was decided to proceed at once to kill or drive into the lake every native possible to be found in the half-moon-shaped district, lying between the mouth of the Mateo River and the farther end of the lake, a distance of twelve miles.

To kill every human being within a hundred odd square miles of territory, because of the rumoured cutting up of a military company, seems hardly the way to impress natives with Anglo Saxon civilization. At the very time that these letters were appearing, the papers were noisily urging "greater severity," and condemning the "weak-kneed policy of toying with rebellion." On the very day

that the last quoted letter appeared, the War Department issued the following to the press:

The War Department has urged upon General Otis the necessity of putting aside the insurgent temporizing over peace, and of assuming the most aggressive tactics. The wisdom of this course is fully realized by General Otis, who has seen that the natives needed further chastisement in order to bring them to a sense of their position.

The *Philadelphia Record* prints the following statement from Michael Snee, Company M, Ninth Infantry, under the command of John B. Schoeffel, of Rochester, New York, in its issue of 21st April, 1902.

Our orders (in Samar) were clear and strict. Everybody found in the hills, man, woman, and child, was to be killed. Shoot all hogs and dogs was the order, and we were not instructed to spare children. . . . I saw as many as twenty Filipinos given the water cure. The native, of course, resisted, and the soldier rubbed the bottle across the mouth, lacerating the flesh and breaking the teeth, and leaving the man's face covered with blood. After the cure was over, the prisoner was shot, and his body left for the dogs. . . . One night last November we found seven old natives in a shack. There was no fight as we took them unawares. The native interpreter plied them with questions, but they refused to tell anything; so we tied them in a row and shot the lot, and left them for the dogs. . . . I was very sick.

A great number of these letters refer to the application of the "water cure." What that means is well described by the letter of a resident of Manila, for whose high character and unimpeachable veracity the New York *Evening Post* vouches. The letter appears in that paper of 8th April, 1902, and the following is a quotation:

The native is thrown upon the ground, and, while his legs and arms are pinioned, his head is raised partially so as to make pouring in the water an easier matter; an attempt to keep the mouth closed is of no avail, a bamboo stick or a pinching of the nose will produce the desired effect. And now the water is poured in, and swallow the poor wretch must, or strangle. A gallon of water is much, but it is followed by a second and third. By this time the victim is certain his body is about to burst. But he is mistaken, for a fourth and even a fifth gallon are poured in. By this time the body becomes an object frightful to contemplate, and the pain and agony are terrible. While in this condition speech is impossible and so the water must be squeezed out of him. This is sometimes allowed to occur naturally, but is sometimes hastened by the pressure, and "sometimes we jump on them to get it out quick," said a young soldier, a mere boy, hardly ten years out of his mother's lap. I did not wonder when an officer, in answer to my question how often he had seen it, said, "Not often; it is too revolting." Does it seem possible that cruelty could go farther? And what must we think of the fortitude of the native, when we learn that many times the cure is given twice ere the native

yields. I heard of one who took it three times and died.

The object, of course, is the extraction of information—generally information that is likely to implicate some fellow-countryman in “rebellion” and send him to his death.

I have seen it stated over and over again—no less an authority than Mr. Stephen Bonsal, indeed, recently made a similar statement—that cases of “water cure” have been “extremely rare”—two or three at most—and then under “grievous provocation.” I can only suppose that those who make these statements have never read the evidence given before the Senate Commission. Witness after witness—soldiers and non-commisioned officers—testified before that Commission that they had seen or assisted at the administration of “water cure” upon scores of occasions. More than that, several officers, subsequent to the Senate inquiry, were put upon trial for administering it in a wholesale fashion, and condemned. Major Glenn, Lieutenants Cook and Gaujot, were among the number; forty specific charges for such torture were brought against the first officer, and he was convicted, being sentenced to a fine of fifty dollars—something over a dollar apiece. That some of the worst cases have never been brought officially to light we may fairly assume from a fact revealed by the last report (19th November, 1902) of the Judge Advocate-General

to the Secretary of War. In that report is recorded the admission by Captain Cornelius Brownell, that he administered the "cure" to Father Augustine, a Filipino priest at Banate, and that after the torture had been administered a third time the priest died. Captain Brownell had previously reported the man's death, but had made no reference to the cause (which came out by accident long afterwards). Indeed the attitude of the military on this matter inevitably suggests that they regard the wholesale torture of which Major Gardner complains either as a venial offence or as a necessary element in the campaign. Major-General Brooke, speaking at the annual dinner of the St. George's Society at New York, in reply to the toast of the army and navy, said:

Now for the water cure. It is called brutal. Of course it is brutal. That is what it is meant to be. Brutality is war, and it is nothing else. It is necessary to do things in war that are not done in peace. . . . I cannot understand, being a military man, why the American people will not stand for a military government in the Philippines.

Indeed the acquittal of Major Waller and Lieutenant Day for the promiscuous killing of unarmed natives—an acquittal against which General Chaffee himself had to protest¹—shows how lightly the methods of General Smith's "kill and burn" order were regarded.

¹ See Manila Dispatches, 25th May, 1902.

What is of more importance, even, than the attitude of the military towards these abominations is the attitude of the public. The late Bishop Potter said once, concerning the Philippine situation: "The question is not so much what we are going to do with the Philippines, as what the Philippines are going to do with us." Has the moral sense of the American public been seared by its connection with this conquest of the Philippines?

Certain it is that evidence of a much less striking character than that just cited sufficed to set the country aflame when it was alleged against Spain. None of the excuses anent "military necessity" were accepted by the American people in 1898:

As a nation we solemnly denied the validity of such a defence of cruelty in warfare, and appealed to the arbitrament of the sword in protest against it. We went to war with Spain for conducting war cruelly. We did not sneer at sentiment in 1897 and 1898 when stories of Spanish inhumanity and torture roused our indignation. . . . Talk not to us of military necessity. Urge no precedents. We would listen to none of them, but went to war calling men and angels to witness that our motives were of the purest, and that we resorted to arms only because our outraged natures could not longer endure the sight of miserable beings starved, tortured, and massacred by a ruthless soldier.¹

What has been the American attitude with regard to the sort of thing revealed by Major

¹ *Evening Post.*

Gardner, a respected officer of the highest reputation?

On the morrow of the Waller trial, in which the fullest light was thrown upon the sort of campaign waged in Samar, and upon General Smith's methods, and with Major Gardner's report in his possession, the Secretary of War stated in reply to the Senate resolution that he "fully approved of the policy of Generals Bell and Smith," and insisted that "their methods are the most humane and effective that could be followed."¹ Even after Smith's punishment by the President not a few papers of the patriotic order stoutly defended him. The service paper, the *Army and Navy Journal*, did so, bitterly upbraiding the President for having punished the General, and the court-martial for convicting him.

Such an act is not only unjust, but unwise and unfortunate. . . . It will be construed by the Anti-Imperialists as a plea of guilty to all their wicked charges against the army. . . . The detractors of the army have been howling for a sacrifice and it has been offered up to them.

One does not know what "detraction" of the army could well be more severe than that contained in the implication that the court-martial which condemned Smith were prompted in their verdict by fear of the mob and not the obligations of their oath, and that the Commander-in-Chief of the

¹ Reuter's Dispatch, Washington, 8th May, 1902.

army was "howled" into sacrificing an innocent man.

The utmost that the *Army and Navy Journal* will admit General Smith to have been guilty of is "strong language." And it must be admitted that many American papers—above all (it must always be insisted) those that have always emphasized their patriotism—took a like view of the General's orders. The *Chicago Intercean*, which is a paper typical of this class and has been notable for its violent condemnation of England's barbarity in the South African War and the unwarranted nature of England's aggression,¹ comments editorially 18th July, 1902) as follows:—

General Jacob H. Smith has been retired from active service in the army because of his reckless language. Under the influence of excitement he is given to the use of violent language. Under the ordinary ruling General Smith would have retired in a year or two. There is nothing in the sentence of the court-martial nor in the censure of the President

¹ The *Intercean's* comparison is as follows: "In the Philippines the United States, as Englishmen admit, is defending its own, and fighting to establish order and maintain peace. In South Africa England is avowedly striving to subdue the Boers and overthrow two republics, in the interest of the British Empire In the Philippines the Americans are protecting the peaceable Filipinos against brigands and savages. In South Africa the British are making relentless war on patriots fighting for their homes. The cases are very different, but the United States has as good reason to be proud of the American record in the Philippines as England has to be ashamed of the British record in South Africa." Thus does patriotism illuminate our vision.

reflecting on General Smith's courage or efficiency as a soldier. There is no charge of cruelty against him. He is punished for using language that shocked American sentiment, and yet is punished in a way not to discredit his forty years' service in the army.

And that is all. Not for a moment would the *Intercean* admit that American troops have ever acted with ought but the most conspicuous humanity—"a humanity never equalled in any other campaign whatsoever" is its own phrase, a humanity which it deems sets a shining example to the barbarous British in South Africa.

In justice to General Smith it should be said that he himself has never made any such defence. At the trial his counsel stoutly maintained that he fully meant what he said and pleaded justification. The necessity for each order was dealt with in detail, and objections to them stigmatized as "sops to the sentimentalists."¹

It is, indeed, chiefly by the nature of the defence made for the army in this matter that we may judge how far we have fallen away from the high standards of 1898. Dr. Henry C. Rowland, formerly an army surgeon in the Philippines, writes what is evidently intended as a rebuttal of all this evidence, in *McClure's Magazine* for July 1902. Yet he insists that the soldiers must not be judged for their conduct as they would be if they committed similar acts in their native towns.

¹ See Manila Dispatches, American Papers, 8th May, 1902.

The ordinary citizen who exclaims "What brutes!" cannot possibly imagine the psychic reversion by which in a few weeks' time a civilized individual can hark back to a primitive state of savagery.

This surely is an explanation of the bad conduct, not a denial. The writer insists that the American soldier does not obey blindly. In view of the sort of orders we have just been discussing and the common plea that they are not to be taken *au pied de la lettre* and that the men are incapable of carrying them out, the following admission is most important. Says Dr. Rowland:

A knowledge of the conditions forces us to admit that in the case of the wholesale executions of which we read, the orders to kill are carried out by the men, not in blind obedience, but because such orders seem to them good. The factors in the production of such a state of mind cannot be distinguished at a range of 12,000 miles.

And this is written by an American army surgeon in an American magazine as a defence of the American soldier who is in the Philippines, as the result of a war undertaken, in the words of Senator Cullom,

to avenge the black crimes of that sinister tyrant who would destroy, if possible, the patriots fighting for their freedom to the last man; to avenge, in the interest

of humanity, atrocities which have become intolerable to the American people.¹

This astounding contradiction is nearly equalled in the attitude of American public men in 1898 and in 1899 with regard to the character of the Cuban and the Filipino. In his dispatches succeeding the victory of Manila, Admiral Dewey used the following language in a report to Secretary Long:

In my opinion these people are far superior in their intelligence, and more capable of self-government, than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races. . . . Aguinaldo is a leader of disinterestedness and capacity of whom any country might be proud.

In his testimony before the Senate Committee, on 27th June, 1902, this same Admiral Dewey stated:

Aguinaldo is a common robber. I believe that he was at Manila for gain, loot, and money, and that independence never entered his head.

Senator Patterson pertinently asked why, if Aguinaldo were a common robber, Admiral Dewey had given him arms, and assisted him in organizing the insurgent army. To which Admiral Dewey replied, "All's fair in war. Besides, the Americans had no troops in the islands." This revision of opinion, so convenient for the purposes of aggres-

¹ Speech in Senate, 16th April, 1898.

sion, is typical of what has taken place in very many public men, and is not special to America.

The most notable instance of all is, of course, that of ex-President Roosevelt himself. So familiar are we with his fantastic doctrine of the "strenuous life" as a justification for military adventure and territorial conquest, and so accustomed to his infinite scorn for the "weaklings" who hesitate to apply to other nations a policy which they deem tyrannical when applied by other nations to themselves, that we are apt to forget that all this "strenuousness" dates from the Hispano-American War. Before that date, Mr. Roosevelt was as much opposed to Imperialism and territorial expansion as the veriest "anti-American." Writing in the *Bachelor of Arts* for March, 1896, Mr. Roosevelt, the Imperialist conqueror of the Philippines, laid down the following principles:

The establishment of a colony prevents any healthy popular growth.

At the present, the only hope of a colony that wishes to attain full mental and moral growth is to become an independent state.

Under the best of circumstances, a colony is in a false position. But if the colony is a region where the colonizing race has to do its work by means of other inferior races, the condition is much worse.

There is no chance for any tropical colony owned by a Northern race.

This was written in support of the Venezuelans as against England, at the time of Cleveland's

Venezuelan message. He urged that "no people could have a mission to instruct other peoples in the art of government." "Mean and bloody," he wrote, "though the history of the South American Republics had been, it is distinctly in the interests of civilization" that they should be left to develop "along their own lines." Incidentally in this article, Mr. Roosevelt declared that "we do not wish to bring ourselves to a position where we shall have to emulate the European system of enormous armies."

To-day the Americans who voice this self-same philosophy are for Mr. Roosevelt everything that is contemptible: "weakling," "craven," and even hypocritical. He has poured out the vials of his wrath upon them in presidential messages, and adjures the nation to choose the path of action, of warlike vigour, of ever-growing expansion and "glorious destiny." This is how, after the Hispano-American War, he treats the men who voice what was once his own philosophy and use almost his own words. Writing in the *Century Magazine*, he says:

I have even scantier patience with those who make a pretence of humanitarianism to hide and cover their timidity, and who cant about liberty and the "consent of the governed," in order to excuse themselves for their unwillingness to play the part of men.

Yet Mr. Roosevelt is a man who holds all his opinions with passionate conviction and with the

certainty that neither time nor place can affect their validity.

Were the horrors which have just been recounted and the recital of which assuredly make one's blood run cold committed in a passion of self-protection, as the blows delivered blindly in a desperate struggle for national existence, for homes and fatherland overrun by a ruthless invader, it would be possible perhaps to palliate them. But none of these reasons hold. The Americans have gone into the Philippines of their own choice; to pretend that their national existence would be threatened by bad government in islands ten thousand miles away, when bad government has reigned unchecked for generations in the Spanish-American Republics at their door, is ridiculous. We are presented with the spectacle of a great and civilized people led by a false conception of patriotism to watch calmly—such protest as has been made has been feeble and spasmodic—the perpetration of abominable crimes, the infliction of prolonged horror of slaughter and desolation, for the empty pleasure, so far as the great mass of the public is concerned, of triumphing over a small and backward people, of proclaiming themselves "rulers and conquerors" of poor savages—so it is alleged—who, however backward in all else, at least know how to die and suffer for an aspiration which Americans but yesterday declared to be the loftiest that could fill the hearts and minds of men.

That the motives of those responsible in the American Administration were of a quite different character I am entirely disposed to think. The American Government was placed in a particularly difficult position: perhaps it would not have been for the best that the Islands should have fallen into the hands, say, of the Japanese—though that is an arguable point. But it was not these difficulties which perplexed the general public at the time. The regrettable thing and the dangerous thing was that the public as a whole did not care two straws about the dangers of the future, or the difficulties which presented themselves to the American Government, but gloried in the prospect of expansion, right or wrong, safe or dangerous, simply because the national vanity of the cheaper kind was tickled; and in the execution of such a policy gloated in all the dirty work of conquest—regarded it not as a horrible and painful thing but as something that added to the laurels of American fame.

The thing would be unbelievable, had we not the demonstration before our eyes. If the object be not vainglory, what is it? Will those who in one breath proclaim that their country has room for half the population of the civilized world, in the next contend that there is need of these fever-stricken swamps in which white men cannot breed? Will they urge that their object is the regeneration of the Filipinos in the same breath that they voice their passionate contempt for those “treacherous rebel cut-throats?” Even

if some notion of exotic philanthropy were the object, are not these patriots eternally declaring that America's first duty is to herself, that patriots have no right to consider the interest of "foreigners," even though those foreigners be civilized and of our own race?

Pleas of this sort are but the afterthoughts of a feeble casuistry. Where the speech is frank they are abandoned, and the simple desire for conquest, for mastery, even though it be of these half-clad Malays—the primeval coerciveness of the savage mind stands revealed.

Judge whether any rational conception of material benefit to be won, any thought of benevolent assimilation, can have any part in the sentiment which prompts the following declaration of a high-placed American officer, Colonel Crane:

The best thing to do with them (the Filipinos) would be to kill off the people, and then put a bomb under each island, and blow it from the face of the earth. I would never leave there, however, as long as there was one of these fellows left to stick his finger to his nose at us when we were going.

Is this the elevation of mind which comes of Empire and Imperial tasks?

The above is not an isolated illustration of the new Imperial spirit. It is typical of the temper, if not of the language, of most popular Imperial advocacy. Quite early in the business, when yet the ink was hardly dry upon the message of the

President declaring that "forcible annexation was not to be thought of, and under our code of morality would be a criminal aggression," we find nine-tenths of the press demanding the recognition of American sovereignty by the Filipinos as an essential preliminary of even an explanation of what that sovereignty meant. One weighty authority (5th May, 1899) says:

The time has not yet come for agitating the question as to what we are going to do with the Philippines. There is but one problem immediately before us, and that problem is best solved by the indomitable valour of the men of the firing line. General Otis has declared, in words that thrill every true American, that he will listen to nothing, explain nothing, until American sovereignty is unconditionally accepted. All other problems relating to the Philippines must wait until this problem, the recognition of our authority as supreme, has been solved. There must be no parley with rebels.¹ After the guns of our soldiers

¹ Dispatches from Manila to the New York *Herald* of 28th April, 1899: "General Otis declared to-night that he would listen to nothing except unconditional surrender from the rebels" (*i. e.*, those who declined to accept the sovereignty of the alien people to whom they had been sold like so many cattle). In his message of 11th April, 1898, McKinley, justifying the war with Spain, declares that this latter country cannot be trusted to make an honourable peace because of "her refusal to consider any form of mediation, or indeed any plan of settlement which did not begin with the actual submission of the insurgents to the mother country, and then only on such terms as Spain herself might see fit to grant." If this attitude towards a population over whom Spain had had sovereignty during some hundreds of years was tyrannical and

have been silenced in the pæans of victory, there will be time enough for the jaws of the educators, the "reformers," the politicians, the theorists, the college professors, and other garrulous individuals, to get in their deadly work.

In the same strain is the *Portland Oregonian's* contribution:

The Filipinos, by presuming to discuss the terms upon which our sovereignty would be acceptable, have shown themselves the insolent and aggressive foes of our nation. For such as those, there is only one treatment. . . . The first thing to do is to punish our assailants. . . . We have far greater reason to punish them than we had to make war on Spain, for Spain had not done us one half the injury that has been heaped on us through the treachery, insult, and ingratitude of these semi-savage rascals whom some of our people of peculiar mental constitution so much admire.

This paper forgets that, just a year previously, it was acclaiming Cubans and Filipinos alike, as sublime patriots "giving their lives in the holy war of Freedom against Tyranny."

And meanwhile each of these contradictory policies is in turn advocated with a savage passionateness which is given to no other political matter. The senatorial and journalistic patriots

blameworthy, what shall be said of the same attitude adopted by a foreign nation towards a people who never have admitted allegiance to it?

criticize those who do not accept their theories—no matter how much in contradiction with principles of American political life, or how much in contradiction with the theories advocated by the same patriots a month before—not as Republicans criticize Democrats, or Democrats Republicans, but as one might criticize some moral pariah, defending some monstrous heresy—one defending incest or advocating cannibalism.¹ In this patriotic clamour, in the state of intense feeling which such patriotism implies, reason is submerged. Argument is impossible.

Under such circumstances, no contradiction is too flagrant for advocacy, no policy too mean, no act too cruel. Moral sensibility is blunted. Not merely do the crimes which but a short time since excited vehement condemnation fail longer so to do, but they meet with excuse and justification. In the end the nation commits them. It is the Rake's Progress of material waste and moral decline.

¹ No less an organ than the New York *Tribune* (31st July, 1902) compares the critics of General Smith to "hyenas prowling among the wounded of American battlefields."

CHAPTER IV

ANGLOPHOBIA AND OTHER ABERRATIONS

JANUARY, 1896

American patriotism in 1896—The necessity for fighting England—Some expressions of American sentiment—The wickedness of the Pacifist—What should we have gained by fighting England?—Patriotism and farming—The Monroe Doctrine and its meaning—Our “fellow-republicans” in Venezuela—Twelve months later—Spain the real villain in the drama—The noble Cuban—England our friend—Annexing Cuba simply “because we want it”—The doctrine of “the strenuous life”—The law of social progress—American jingoism imported from Europe—Why we escaped war with England—The “finest country on God’s earth”—The real conditions of American life—Can we afford the luxury of militarism?—Patriotism and the Tariff.

IT is becoming quite evident that we must fight England: that the doom has sounded for either the British Empire or the American Republic. The gods, watching this conflict, have turned their thumbs down. The conclusion can no longer be resisted, unless all our honoured guides, our statesmen, our newspapers, our reviews, our preachers, have become quite untrustworthy. For weeks now—ever since 17th December, to be exact, for

most of us were in blissful ignorance of this terrible alternative on December 16th—they have all been insisting with one voice that we must make England bite the dust, humble her, and break her power. Otherwise, these great United States are done for; their glory will have departed, and we are fit subjects for the slavery which we are assured we shall certainly endure. There can be no doubt about it. To question it, is to write oneself down a traitor to his country, an unclean thing. Those unhappy papers or public men (we may rejoice that they are so few), who have taken the unpatriotic line in this matter, have been covered with infamy, cast into the outer darkness where reside Godkin and Pixley, and a few abandoned university professors.

As the full consciousness of a righteous cause gives threefold power to the strongest arm, we may profitably recall the multifarious wrongs that this conflict is to avenge and to redress. Cleveland's Ultimatum does not, of course, traverse the whole field of our grievances. Behind the main point of that communication is the story of a century of wrong upon which our public press and our patriotic mentors generally have been enlightening us. I have, during the last month, been a diligent reader (thanks to the facilities of the Free Library) of a wide range of representative American papers, notably such organs as the *Chronicle*, *Call*, and *Evening Post* of this city, of the *Los Angeles Times*, the *Denver Republican*, the *Omaha Bee*, the *Chicago*

Interocean, the *New Orleans Picayune*, the *Indianapolis Sentinel*, the *Washington Post*, and the leading papers of New York, especially the *Sun*. More than that, I have followed for some time with great care the public utterances of such lights as Senators Chandler, Pettigrew, Frye, Cullom, Hawley, and Lodge, to say nothing of a host of generals, admirals, Congressmen, State senators, and preachers, whose recommendations to wade in and disembowel the Britisher form the staple of daily newspaper fare just now. If opinion thus widely endorsed be not fairly representative of America, where are we to look? Moreover, I have supplemented all these sources of information and guidance by personal talks with many fervent patriots, and the net result of it all is that we must fight England because (1) she is a great advocate of the pestilential doctrine of Free Trade; (2) of gold coinage; (3) of a stable and non-elective Civil Service, a subtle device of tyranny; (4) for the advocacy of these heresies she corrupts our free electorate by the lavish expenditure of "British Gold"; (5) she has more Foreign Trade than we have, and it must be taken from her by stripping her of her Colonies; (6) she is a pirate and land-grabber; (7) her papers speak disrespectfully of the American accent; (8) British tourists are insolent, and wear absurd clothes; (9) she gives rise to Anglomaniacs in America, who turn up their trousers, wear knickers and pyjamas, part their hair in the middle, take "barths," and are an

offence generally to good Americans; (10) she owns too many American securities, which it is time she sacrificed as legitimate spoil of warfare; (11) she corrupts our ambassadors by turning them into "contemptible flunkeys" and Anglo-maniacs (*vide Bayard*); (12) she still insolently repudiates (she does everything insolently, and I am quoting the *Call* here) "the doctrines of 1776. She has never acknowledged the principles of freedom of government, government of the people, by the people, for the people. She is ruled at home for the benefit of the land barons, and her Colonies are oppressed to pay tribute. She is a standing defiance to human freedom"; (13) she favoured the Confederacy (Northern opinion); (14) she did not recognize the Confederacy when she might (Southern opinion); (15) she hates America, and is determined to see her humiliated; (16) we must vindicate the Monroe Doctrine.

This last cause has for the moment outweighed the others, which may be considered as the permanent ones, and I shall consider it separately. I have put down the reasons quite at haphazard—they vary in their relative importance with the varying temperament of the patriot—but I think I have got them all. I desire to say at once that they are all serious. None is put down with the idea of ridiculing the very genuine sentiment which prompts them. It would be possible in each case to give the authority in some notable pronouncement, but that is hardly necessary. Anyone at

all acquainted with the newspaper writing and political talking of the last few weeks will recognize them at a glance. For fear, however, that it should be thought I have done less than justice to the alert patriots, I will quote a few of the statements upon which the foregoing is based.

This arch-land-grabber has planted her flag on all the scattered islands, and on nearly every spot on earth where it could monopolize or control the strategic advantages of location for its own interests. . . . We cannot look with indifference upon this policy of conscienceless encroachment. . . . If left to herself she will finally dominate Venezuela, and a free republic will be crushed by an overpowering Monarchy. (Senator Cullom, United States Senate.)

Our alert watchman will meantime keep an eye on our good friends across the Atlantic, especially, when, having appropriated Africa, the islands, and even the rocks of the sea, or wherever else force or intrigue may gain a footing, they begin to take an interest, not altogether born of curiosity, or a purely Christian spirit, in this hemisphere. One cannot be so innocent as to believe that the sentiment of relationship or friendship of England to the United States would stand in the way of the settled policy of Great Britain to make Englishmen richer and her power greater, even at our cost. Her unvarying policy is, first and last and always, to advance British interests and retain British supremacy—to retain and add to British wealth. Her purposes are material. Whoever gets in the way of that is the enemy of

England, and will be so treated—whether it be the United States, who may be intrigued against and encroached upon and even crippled in some time of her distress, or when off guard; or a tribe of black men in Africa in the way of her colonization schemes, who may be safely massacred with machine guns. (Hon. D. M. Dickinson, ex-Postmaster General, in an address at the Loyal Legion Banquet, Detroit.)

The gold monometallic policy of Great Britain, now in force among all great civilized nations, is, I believe, the great enemy of good business throughout the world at this moment. Therefore, it seems to me, if there is any way in which we can strike England's trade or her moneyed interest, it is our clear policy to do so in the interests of silver. (Henry Cabot Lodge, Senate of the United States, 6th April 1895.¹)

In every emergency with which the United States has been confronted, the British Government has been our enemy. She is pushing us on every side now. She is trying to straddle the Nicaraguan Canal and to grab the Alaskan gold-fields. Whenever she gets hold of a bit of land, from that time her boundary line is afloat. . . . That is the kind of nation that we are fighting. Look at their fancy drill, the other day, when in five days a powerful squadron was gathered at the stated point; is there no object-lesson for

¹ It may be worth while to recall that at this date, 1895-96, the bulk of the Republican party were ardent Free Silverites. It was a year later that Senator Lodge, in common with the entire Republican party, suddenly discovered (the discovery synchronized with the formation of the party platform) that the gold standard was the only possible one.

America in that? *I tell you that we must be ready to fight.* Either we will float a dead whale on the ocean or we must say to Great Britain, "Here is where you stop." (Hon. Joseph Hawley, United States Senator, at the Banquet of the Alumni of Hamilton College, New York.)

The growing strength of the British Navy is a menace to the rest of the world. It is intended to be, and as such ought to be crushed. (Reported interview with Rear-Admiral George E. Belknap, U. S. N. [Retired].)

The object of my lecture tour is to advocate a war with England, with or without cause, in the interests of silver. (Reported interview, Senator Chandler.)

I think we should annex in some way or other, all the countries on this hemisphere. War is a good thing. (Senator John B. Wilson, of Washington, in United States Senate.)

He [the British Lion] is a prowler in search of prey, which is land—land anywhere, everywhere—land to convert the present boast of possessing one-third of the earth's surface into one of holding one-half and then two-thirds, land, more land, to extend the tribute to be paid the British Crown indefinitely. (Correspondent, *Springfield Republican*.)

There is no power on the face of the earth that we need fear trouble with, except England. (President Capen, Tuft's College.)

Grant, Lord, that we may be quick to resent insults.
(Prayer of Blind Chaplain of Senate on the morrow
of the Venezuelan Message.)

War with England! Every good American should
lay awake nights praying for it. (Ambrose Bierce,
Examiner.)

The final result of all these irritations about fisheries
and boundaries will be that a peremptory order will
one day be issued by this country to Great Britain
to quit this free soil for ever. (New York *Journal.*)

The over-bearing insolence of the tyrant; the greed
and lust of the pirate; the prejudice of the ignoramus;
the implacable, the everlasting, the hereditary enemy
of this free land. (The New York *Sun.*)

A successful war by us against Great Britain would,
without doubt, forever sweep monarchical government
from this continent, and transform it into a series of
powerful republics "of the people, for the people, and
governed and directed by the people." The posses-
sions to the north of us would, if States of our Union,
at once leap to the front in population and prosperity,
and the mossy manses of the Canadas would be re-
placed by American homes. The hold of the kingly
hand of mail upon the throats of the people beyond
the seas would be loosened, and grand strides would be
taken in the onward march toward the brotherhood
of man, the federation of the world. (The *Los Angeles*
Times.)

The foregoing gives a fair idea of the spirit which
is now dominating us. Even better evidence than

these expressions of mere opinion is the attitude of Congress and the people with regard to Cleveland's Venezuelan Message. They have stood behind him as one man. Party divisions have been swept away. A united nation supports him in an action which Representative the Hon. Geo. N. Southwick, in his appeal for coast defences, calls a declaration of defiance and of war. That Congress so regarded it is proven by the fact that the Appropriation Bill was passed through the House by unanimous consent the very day following the receipt of the President's message. It is only in the presence of a common enemy that Democrats and Republicans thus drop their differences. The public men outside politics who have opposed the President's policy in this matter can be counted on one's fingers, while newspapers which have taken that attitude are still rarer. The sort of treatment which these latter have received at the hands of patriotic Americans may be gathered from the castigation to which the *Sun* has treated Godkin and the New York *Evening Post*. Says the *Sun*:

People who could stand in ordinary times the dismal egotism and unrelieved snarl and sneer of Godkin's editorial manifestations refused absolutely to tolerate him when he turned his pen to defamation of the American flag and abuse of all that American patriotism holds dearest. The most hardened readers of the *Evening Post* were ashamed to be seen in public places with that sheet in their hands. They felt, not without just cause, that they might be sus-

pected of treason to the United States Government. . . . While the *Evening Post* under Godkin's management was devising and uttering day after day, and week after week, insults more malignant and slanders more infamous against our army, our navy, our flag, and our land.

We know what sort of conduct has merited these reproaches. Godkin has levelled "insults . . . malignant and infamous, against our army, our navy, our flag, and our land," by the infamous suggestion that the army and the navy should not be employed to fight England "in the interests of silver," nor yet even to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. Furthermore, so lost has he been to all patriotic decency as to avow that the British doctrine of Free Trade and a stable Civil Service, are preferable to American Protection and Tammany Hall. This visible preference for the foreigner and his doctrines, the implied slander on American institutions, fully justifies the severe strictures of his neighbour, the *Sun*. Moreover, Godkin's pestiferous advocacy of peace at a time when every patriot's blood is tingling with the distant roll of the war-drums, shuts him out from the sympathy of all true Americans. We may all admit that Peace—in the abstract—is a good thing, and at ordinary times may be praised as the ideal state for civil society. Also, it is in keeping with the New Testament. But, as we may see from the attitude of our popular divines just now, no

Christian should advocate peace when there is a danger of war, otherwise he is certain to offend patriotic susceptibilities. At times like this one should remember that there is an Old Testament as well as a New, and should choose that body of Holy Script which best accords with the political exigencies of the hour. In most of this peace advocacy, so insolently persisted in when we are all thinking of war, one may see the cloven hoof of the Britisher. Otherwise, why is it that it only proceeds from sources which, like the *Evening Post*, are already but too tainted with Anglomania and British heresies of Free Trade? This connection between British Free Trade and peace advocacy was well sketched the other day by the *Chronicle*, in these terms:

It cannot be expected that any Free Traders will join the patriotic league. Did anyone ever see an American Free Trader who was in favour of forts and fleets? . . . If the Free Trader had his way, not a fort would be built nor a gun mounted, nor an armed ship set afloat, nor a militant thing done. . . . His object is to reform human nature out of existence. It would be a sacrilege for him to join such a Club as the Patriotic League, and if anyone doubted it, he would defend himself by the economic principles of the Sermon on the Mount. . . . The American Free Trader is the most solemn, obdurate, consistent and irreclaimable opponent of progress that the world ever saw. But the objects of the Patriotic League can do very well without any help from the Free Trader.

There are enough people of all parties in the country, of good red blood, of hard sound sense, and with feet on solid earth, to carry them all through to success and leave room for the consummation of many good objects more.

Some patriotic paper—I cannot recall which for the moment, as I have mislaid the cutting—went even farther (justifiably so, doubtless) than the *Chronicle*. It pointed out that as in times past the Cobden Club has lavishly spent money in America for the advocacy of Free Trade, we are justified in assuming that the Briton has also financed these treacherous peace advocates.

This barefaced corruption will, however, avail nothing. There are, as the *Chronicle* says, enough patriots “of good red blood, of hard sense, with feet on solid earth,” to defeat the intrigues of Salisbury’s agents or the hysteria of those morally morbid invertebrates, who can talk only of peace, when the soul of the nation demands war.

In our just indignation at this perversion of the moral sense, we should not be led to lose sight of our aim and object in the humiliation of England. In this spiritual exaltation which this new crusade has provoked, we are perhaps apt to overlook the more grossly material side of the question. To what degree of moral and material abasement should England be reduced, what definite objects have we placed before us? American patriots are perhaps a little too apt to regard the defeat of

England as a worthy object in itself, apart from any advantage that it may bring. When Senator Henry Cabot Lodge declares that "if there is any way in which we can strike England's trade or her moneyed interest, it is our clear policy to do so," does he not perhaps overlook somewhat our position here in the West?

What, in reality, is our economic position here in the West with regard to England? I find on inquiry that England buys of us more than all the other countries of the world put together. Now, that is a considerable fact. If we follow Senator Lodge's advice and destroy her as an economic factor in the world her capacity to buy from us vanishes, and since the West, being mainly agricultural, is compelled, and will be compelled for many years, perhaps for generations, to sell her products abroad, we should be in a sorry posture if half that market were taken from us. One may say without exaggeration that whole States in the West owe their prosperity to the British market. It is for us a richer gold mine than all the bonanzas that were ever discovered; the amount of gold that we get from England is many times greater than the amount that we get from the mines of California, Nevada, and Colorado. Can we afford to lose that market? Our farmers are none too well off as it is (nearly ninety per cent. of the farms in this State are mortgaged in one form or another), and to deliberately destroy the prosperity of such a customer—and that of course

would be Senator Lodge's object—would bring many of us, the majority of us, to ruin. I know it is said that our own merchants would get the trade which England now has, and that in consequence our markets would expand in another direction. But if the Protectionists are right that is not possible. They have always told us that our tariff is necessary in order to compete with European pauper labour, and that because our labour is not so cheap we cannot produce things so cheaply. England's foreign market would therefore go to the cheap labour countries of Europe, and not to us.

But we should lose a great deal more than the English market by taking the advice of Senators Lodge and Hawley. Senator Hawley invites us to "look at the map of India" if we would see the sort of nation that we are facing, and infers that it would be to our immense advantage if England were turned out of most of her vast possessions. A leading article in the *Call*, the other day, supported this view, saying that if we could help our good friend Russia into India, we should have struck a great blow for silver and for the "liberation of the world from the British yoke." Yet what would be the result of helping Russia to India? It would be this: that we should lose a market which at present is open to us on exactly the same terms that it is to Englishmen. Great Britain does not claim for her citizens in India a single commercial advantage that she does not as

freely accord to us. Now we know perfectly well that no other nation would adopt this policy. If France or Russia owned India, the first thing those countries would do would be to differentiate by tariffs in favour of their own citizens as against the rest of the world. And we should find the market by means of preferential tariffs monopolized by the paramount power. And India is not the only country in which this would take place. The British Empire includes forty separate colonies, embracing about one-fourth of the population of the globe. At present in those countries we have equal rights, commercially, with Englishmen. England claims no advantage in them which she does not as freely accord to us. The moment those colonies passed under the sway of some other power, as Senators Lodge, Cullom, Hawley, Morgan, Frye, Wilson, Pettigrew, and patriotic statesmen, admirals, generals, and newspapereditors would seem to desire that they should, we would find the doors of a huge market-place banged in our faces by reason of a preferential treatment in favour of other nations. It is not here a question of opinion but of fact. It may be that I run the risk of being accused of placing "pocket before patriotism," but I take it that there is a patriotism also which seeks that policy best calculated to advance the prosperity and well-being of one's fellow-countrymen. Desirable as it is to destroy one's enemies and to humiliate them, the satisfaction should not be too expensive a one.

Even patriotism does not excuse a mis-statement of fact; or rather should I say that it will not save us from the consequences of such mis-statement. And it is to be feared just now that the patriots do mis-state the facts almost invariably in this connection. David Wells, who will be allowed a certain authority in this matter, stated in the *North American Review* the other day that of all the grounds of American grievance against England the one which was more potential than the aggregate influences of all other causes whatsoever,

and which is accepted and endorsed as in the nature of a rightful international grievance by nearly every member of our national or state legislatures, and by nearly every newspaper or magazine in the country is the assumption that the governmental and commercial policy of England is characterized by no other principle save to monopolize through arbitrary, selfish, and unjust measures everything on the earth's surface that can glorify herself and promote the interests of her own insular population, to the detriment of all other nations and peoples; and that it is the bounden duty of the people and Government of the United States, in behalf of popular liberty, civilization, and Christianity, to put an end to the further continuance of such a policy, even if a resort to war would be necessary to effect it.

And yet, universal as this belief is in patriotic American minds, it is as certain as anything can be that it amounts to a flat contradiction of all

the facts of the case. It is not possible to cite one single instance where Great Britain maintains a monopoly for her people as against the rest of the world, in all the immense territory over which she holds sway. More than that, it has been well said that it is impossible to cite any such similar instance of commercial liberality in the world's history. In no other case is it possible to point to the case of a great and strong government, coming into indisputable possession and control of a great area of the earth's surface abounding with almost illimitable elements of natural wealth and consequent vast opportunities for exclusive trade, commerce and the collection of revenue, saying freely to all the peoples of all the other nations and governments: Come and share all these advantages equally with us.

In view of all this, therefore, why must we, as Senator Joseph Hawley says, either "float a dead whale on the ocean," or say to Great Britain, "here is where you stop"?

I am not doubting, mind you, that this must be our policy. I am simply saying that in the light of incontrovertible fact American patriots are largely mistaken in the causes assigned for that policy. A comparison between the fiscal methods of England and the rest of the world shows that our evident interest is on the side of British, rather than any other foreign extension. It is certain, of course, that though this noble patriotic instinct is at fault in so far as one cause for its action is

concerned, that sentiment as a whole must be a righteous one. We may profitably therefore investigate its other presumed motives of action, as we shall be certain by the process of exclusion to arrive finally at what may be termed the "justifying cause," a result which will certainly add to our definiteness of purpose in the coming conflict.

We come to the Monroe Doctrine. Here surely we may find reason for the patriotic faith that is in us. We have been so often told that it is the true "American" doctrine, that it is the "expression of our destiny," "the embodiment of our national aspirations." But, so dense am I, that I have but a vague and shadowy notion of what the Monroe Doctrine *is*, notwithstanding my patient attention to much fiery oratory, learned discourse, and newspaper wisdom. And—though I would not for worlds speak disrespectfully of the Equator or of the Monroe Doctrine—I have a good notion that most Americans are in my case. Some irreverent scoffer in an after-dinner speech the other night was guilty of this ribald jest: Says Jones, "What is this I hear, Smith, about your not believing in the Monroe Doctrine?" Smith retorts, "It's a wicked lie. I never said I did not believe in it. I do believe in it. I would lay down my life for it. What I did say was that I do not know what it means."

That, to be frank, is my position. I believe in the Monroe Doctrine, of course, because I try to be a truly patriotic American. I would lay down

my life for it. We all would. The newspaper editors especially are pining to disembowel the Britisher in the name of the Monroe Doctrine. But I must say I wish I knew what it meant. Although it would not, by a long shot, be the first time in history that men have very willingly shed their blood, voicing a battle-cry the meaning of which they did not understand, it would be more satisfactory at our end of the nineteenth century if we knew why we were to lay waste so many homes, to set so many mothers weeping through the long nights over so many orphans, why we are to go forth and kill so many husbands and fathers who speak our language, read our Bible, share our traditions, and for the most part are born to just such joys and sorrows as make up our own lot.

If we cannot tell what the Monroe Doctrine is, we should do well to see what it evidently is not: for of late assuredly it has been masquerading in borrowed clothes. Until 17th December it is certain that not one American in ten thousand had ever heard of the Monroe Doctrine. It might have been one of the main religious tenets of Mormonism for all they could have told to the contrary on the evening of 16th December, 1895. On 17th December, however, our Government was being supported in war preparations to enforce its respect by England "at any cost whatsoever. To the last dollar and the last man!"

The circumstances which led up to this sudden and marvellous development are sufficiently clear.

During the best part of a century, a boundary dispute has been going on between England and Venezuela. The origins of the dispute reach back to the time when the United States were yet unborn, when this country was part of the British dominions, some sections part of the Spanish. Great Britain has a little colony of no importance bordering upon Venezuela, and some of her settlers, being in doubt as to their status, wanted the matter settled. One is not surprised at this desire of theirs. We know the sort of "republic" which Venezuela is. I find on inquiry that during the first twenty years of her history as a republic, she fought no less than a hundred and twenty battles, either with her neighbours or with herself, and she has maintained that average pretty well since. One can never know for certain which is the government and which the insurgents. An American firm, having secured the orders for some arms from the "government," sent a ship-load down, to find the "insurgents" in power. The arms were promptly seized as "contraband," and the captain indicted for aiding and abetting a movement destined to overthrow the established authority. He appealed to his Consul, but before the Consul could intervene, the new government had been overthrown by a third party. This is a true story. A certain Florentine lawyer—Tomasso Caivano—wrote a book detailing his experiences of twenty years' life in Venezuela and some of the Central American "republics." His

story of the exploits of some Spanish-American presidents outdo anything that we know of the ancient Roman despots or the Sultans. A certain Rufinio Barrois was accustomed to have a dozen of his political enemies shot every afternoon on the public square, to the braying of a military brass band. Their wives and daughters he had exposed stark naked in cages on the same public place. Signor Caivano cites a typical incident in the rule of a Venezuelan President. The election of the President being in dispute, the case went before the Supreme Court. All the judges who pronounced against the President actually in power were promptly caught, imprisoned, and shot. Then the President issued a pronunciamento in which he declared himself dictator—not that he liked personal government, which was abhorrent to his strong republican sentiments, but because such a step was necessary to safeguard the sacred liberties which, etc.

Such are the country and people upon whom we have expended a great deal of effusive praise of late, and whom we have espoused as "noble fellow-republicans" as against "British monarchists." To the plain person it would seem that so far as we have any interest in this matter at all, it is on the side of England, since once the territory in dispute became English we could trade in it, live in it, exploit its reputed gold mines on precisely the same terms as Englishmen. While it remains Venezuelan we can neither trade there nor live there

with any security. Our trade relations with Venezuela, as one may judge from the little fact cited just now, have time and again been subject to embarrassment and injustice, requiring the interposition of our Government. Yet such is the force of this portentous "Monroe Doctrine" that the President champions the cause of these precious cut-throats at the risk of a frightful war with a people who are our best customers and with whom in reality we have no sort of quarrel—and the nation supports him to the last man, and votes millions with one voice to prepare for the conflict.

I know that behind the merits of this particular case there is said to stand a larger question. It is claimed that should England gain in this squabble with Venezuela, should the marsh-land in dispute be seized by her, her power would be so increased in South America as to endanger the security of our national institutions in North America. This is quite seriously put forward as the rock on which the Monroe Doctrine stands.

Surely there must be some mistake. For over a hundred and thirty years Great Britain has possessed more land on this continent than we have—not a thousand miles away near the equator, but here, at our doors. Her possessions stretch away from the Great Lakes to the unknown North. Her frontier runs along by ours for over three thousand miles. And during that time of contiguity we have grown from feeble distracted colonies into the greatest republic of the world. For three gener-

ations we have had no trouble with our neighbours; they have never in the least threatened our institutions nor our republicanism. Up to the present it has never occurred to the patriot to claim that this enormous territory on our border—greater than the whole of Europe—was any danger to us. But suddenly we declare that if England increases by so much as a dozen leagues a little swampy colony in South America—a colony which does not contain as many white men as one would find in a fair-sized American village—the very existence of this republic is threatened.

The fact is, we have no interests whatever in the settlement of this quarrel. And where we have no interests, we have no rights for interference. As Edward J. Phelps, an American who should compel the respect of every American, says, with an emphasis which is all the more extraordinary coming from an ex-ambassador, “Till some man can stand forth, and inform us how we are to be injured by the adjustment of that Venezuelan boundary line, I shall venture respectfully to assert that it is a controversy we have no right to meddle with.”

And yet what has been the action of the President, an action supported in the name of patriotism and the Monroe Doctrine? By a message to Congress we are informed that he has taken this dispute in hand; that his proposal to the British Government that an arbitration should take place between that country and Venezuela to determine the question had been assented to in part, but in

part declined for special reasons courteously stated, and that thereupon without further discussion the President had decided to ascertain the line by an *ex parte* commission of his own appointment, and to compel Great Britain to accept the result. It was not even claimed that the United States had the slightest interest, present or future, in the settlement of the question, or any especial alliance or connection with Venezuela. Nor was it claimed (if that could have made any difference) that Great Britain had taken a step, or uttered a word, which showed a disposition to encroach upon the rights of Venezuela, or to bring any force to bear upon her adjustment of the dispute. Neither was it made to appear even that she was in the wrong in her contention as to the true location of the line, since that question was admitted to be involved in such obscurity that a learned commission of jurists and scholars was necessary to discover by laborious investigation whether she was right or not—an inquiry which promises to involve many months, possibly years, of labour. Edward J. Phelps well resumes the American position thus:

It was simply assumed that because the boundary in dispute was in this hemisphere, the United States had the right to dictate arbitration between the parties as the proper method of ascertaining its location, and, if that was refused, to define the line for herself, and to enforce its adoption. This extraordinary conclusion was asserted for the first time against a friendly

nation, not as a proposition open to discussion to which its attention and reply were invited, but as an ultimatum announced to begin with. And it was addressed, not to that nation itself, through the ordinary channels of diplomatic intercourse, but to a co-ordinate branch of our own government, and thence through the newspapers to the world at large.

And yet, no act in all President Cleveland's political career has been so popular as this; none has so stirred the great heart of the people, or so opened the flood gates of patriotic emotion. Concerning this act, his political opponents, on pain of being classed with the enemies of their country, are silent. Patriots will not permit criticism. But where does the Monroe Doctrine come in? Surely this new faith, which we are all to hold as sacred, as the safeguard of our nationality, is not the preposterous assumption to which Mr. Phelps has referred. Surely it has some basis and sanction other than this. To fight a great war with all its infinite and unseen possibility of mischief over such a matter as this South American boundary is to attain the burlesque. There must be something more than this for it to have become part of the American theory of government. Can *no* one tell us what it is?

JANUARY 1897

It is now just a year since I wrote at some length concerning the Monroe Doctrine and America's

foreign relations generally. In that year public opinion has moved so far and changed so vastly, that slow-moving folk—among whom, it seems, I must class myself—have become a little bewildered. At the beginning of last year the whole country, or at least the patriotic newspapers and statesmen and clergymen, were absolutely persuaded that America must annihilate Great Britain, or “float a dead whale on the ocean,” to quote Senator Hawley’s thrilling words of that time. For doubting this much, or rather for desiring reasons for thus sallying forth upon the destruction of England, some critics have handled me pretty roughly. I was, it appears, “sneering at all that true Americans hold most sacred.” I was “un-American, anti-American;” a man of “timid peace,” who would have this country wedded to a life of “ignoble ease;” one whom the “flag waving in the breeze” altogether failed to inspire. A certain correspondent thought that all true Americans would regard me as “a traitor, for writing such treasonable stuff. . . . Such persons who drag Old Glory in the mud are beneath the notice of true Americans . . . their Anglomaniac drivel is only saved from being treasonable by the fact that it is despicable.”

These criticisms date of course a year back, and the patriot will doubtless recall them with some surprise, because, for the moment, he has forgotten all about the duty to annihilate England. He is after somebody else’s gore for the moment. In-

deed, in the Eastern States, though not out West (we do not abandon our historic sport of tail-twisting so easily) one may evince a certain friendliness towards the erstwhile "enemy" without rendering one's patriotism suspect. Now we have discovered the real villain in the drama. The ogre who is on the look-out to throttle us, and whom we must slay if our liberty and our civilization is not to go down under a tidal wave of Weylerism, is—Spain. And I take it as evidence of the capacity of the American for clear and rapid perception that we were all ignorant of this fact six months since. Not, indeed, until the starting of a journalistic campaign of education did most of us know that we had any particular grievance, or that our national safety was threatened by that singularly distracted and powerless country. As for our capacity for ready sympathy for (foreign) mulattoes, I am frankly astounded. A few weeks since, it was the noble Venezuelans, threatened by the grasping Briton; now it is the noble Cubans "carrying on their sublime and deathless struggle for liberty," as the *Examiner* puts it, against the haughty Spaniard.

I know I shall be told that I am a "timid bloodless mugwump," but, to be quite honest, I have just as much sympathy for those Cuban Washingtons as I have for the noble Opposition party now carrying on a bloody war against cruel tyrants in Costa Rica, San Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, Ecuador, Santo Domingo, Hayti, and half a dozen

other Sambo republics whose names I have for the moment forgotten. In all those countries there is a tyrant as bloody, as cruel, as tyrannical as Weyler himself. He is called the President or the Dictator, as the case may be, and there is a party of perennial revolt, as in Cuba, fighting against him. But our patriots don't care. Nobody proposes that the United States should intervene. Nobody takes the least interest. And we are quite right. Our intervention could only make matters worse—worse, that is, for ourselves—and, un-American and anti-American as I am certain to be called for it, I deem the interests of seventy million Americans of greater import than those of some half million or million and a half copper-coloured gentry now cutting one another's throats in the distressful Isle of Cuba. More especially so since I am perfectly persuaded that the Cubans, following faithfully the example of Spanish-America generally, will, as a republic, be no better off than they have been heretofore as a colony of Spain. Indeed, when one compares the normal condition of Cuba under Spain to the normal condition of "free" San Salvador, I am inclined to think that the advantage, the immense advantage, lies with Cuba.

This, I know, is rank treason, but I am encouraged to talk it because my treason of three months back has now become, at least in the Eastern States, respectable patriotism. When I wrote a year ago, no one could say a word for England save on pain of outlawry. Now the

patriots are singing her praises, because she is supposed to be taking our side in the Cuban business. How do I know but that six months hence, when we shall have found another dog to chaw, these same patriots may not be singing the praises of Spain? I think this the more likely in that our sudden and perfervid advocacy of the Cubans is hardly explained by the reasons usually and publicly adduced. I do not desire to impute motives to such elevated moralists as the patriots, or to question their sincerity; but I am inclined to think that the Cuban Civil War might go on for a century, as similar wars have gone on for a century in Central America, without our being disturbed or taking any particular notice, but for the fact that our "manifest destiny" men have had their eye on Cuba for a generation. The island lies so temptingly within the sphere of our immediate destiny. It is true, of course, that we are only thinking of the poor concentrados, of spreading freedom and beneficent rule. I do not doubt for a minute the sincerity of Archbishop Ireland when he says that Americans are anxious to give their lives "to the pure and high-born ambition to succour their fellow-men." But also I cannot forget how the slave-holding Southerners used exactly this language sixty years since, when it became a question of acquiring new slave-holding territory. At that date, when the real object was to extend slavery, we were told that war was made upon Mexico because the United States was anxious to extend

the sovereignty of "the flag of freedom." Do you know the original author of the phrase "manifest destiny"? It was the slave-holding Caleb Cushing. No people were so great at "manifest destiny" as the slave-holders, a fact of which any reader of the *Biglow Papers* may readily convince himself. Parson Wilbur was a great deal more severe on it than I should ever think of being:

All this big talk of our destinies
Is half of it ignorance, t'other half rum.

I am quite sure that no such insinuation could be made against our bellicose clergy to-day. At the time of the war against Mexico, a war in which the desire to extend slave territory played the dominating part, so worthy a man as Edward Everett could talk of

the duty devolved upon us by Providence to carry the republican institutions which our fathers achieved with all the organized institutions of an enlightened community, institutions of religion, law, education, charity, art, and all the thousand graces of the highest culture, beyond the Missouri, beyond the Sierra Nevada, perhaps in time around the circuit of the Antilles, perhaps to the Archipelagoes of the Central Pacific.

It is curious, therefore, that just at this time we should be talking of manifest destiny when we are proclaiming to the world our sacred disinterestedness in going to the aid of Cuba. But one occa-

sionally gets flashes of the under feeling. You have seen Senator John R. Wilson's recent pronouncement: "I would have Cuba if I could. In fact I think we should annex in some way or other all the countries on this hemisphere. War is a good thing." Senator Frye—what doughty patriots all these Senators are!—follows in a like strain: "I should annex Cuba by conquest," says he, "simply because we want it." These statesmen are singularly honest, and I prefer their doctrines to those of the highfalutin folk who talk about the "will of Providence," "America's great mission," and make Almighty God an ally of the Republican party generally. Senator Frye, dispensing with these heavenly sanctions, is preferable: Annex Cuba "because we want it." No need to invoke immortal destiny.

My earlier critic, since he too has taken the Almighty into partnership, will, I fear, be more angry with me than ever. But how do I know that he does not completely share the views of Senators Frye and Wilson as to the ultimate destinies of Cuba? And I say this because he quotes with approval President Cleveland's injunction to the Princeton students to "support your country when she is right, and I am not sure you ought not to support her when she is wrong." How do I know that Mr. Kyle does not deem our action towards Spain wrong, but that he supports it in public because he is determined to vindicate his country "right or wrong"? As a matter of fact,

Mr. Kyle is the last person in the world who has a shadow of right to appeal to any moral standard. He says in effect that he would still support the United States, however wrong she might be; he would, in fact, argue that wrong was right, and then he has the consummate impudence to say that my "lecturing" is immoral. He repudiates altogether the moral law in questions of international politics, and then calls Providence to witness that I am an immoral person and a perverter of youth, or words to that effect. Under the circumstances his reference to "superior airs" needs no comment of any sort.

The position with regard to Spain has become dangerous simply because patriots of Mr. Kyle's stamp are beginning to set the tone of our national feeling. They shout louder than other folk. They hector and browbeat as "traitors" all who disagree with them, so that reflection and civilized argument become impossible. We are face to face with a curious phenomenon which is difficult to explain. It would seem that the nation is set upon warfare of some sort. For months we have been spoiling for a scrap. A few weeks since it was Venezuela. The danger was averted by the extraordinary submission of England. To-day it is Cuba, and if that danger can be overcome we shall find some other thing over which to quarrel and assert our greatness to-morrow. Our newspapers, statesmen, public men, and clergy even, are talking to us of the advantages of warfare—

not war with any one particular nation or for any particular purpose, but just warfare generally. These wiseacres are suddenly discovering that without periodical blood-letting we must certainly decay. Theodore Roosevelt has enunciated a precious doctrine of the "strenuous life," according to which, unless we fight frequently, we shall die from "ignoble ease."

We must play a great part in the world, and especially . . . perform those deeds of blood and valour which above everything else bring national renown. . . . Our army and navy have never been built up as they should be built up. . . . The navy and army are the sword and shield which this nation must carry. . . . We do not admire the man of timid peace. In this world the nation that has trained itself to a career of unwarlike and isolated ease is bound to go down in the end before other nations which have not lost the manly and adventurous qualities.

Since when has this become the "American doctrine"? Certain it is that all our traditions are founded upon very different groundwork. For two hundred and fifty years—because I take it that the principles of Puritanism are the best elements in the American character—we have held to a diametrically opposed ideal. We have somehow had an idea that the superiority of this country to the Old World lay in our freedom from the burden of militarism, from the mischief of the military ideal. Have all our great teachers been nursing

a delusion? Have we to confess that the principles which have been a beacon-light for two hundred and fifty years are all wrong? Mr. Roosevelt apparently thinks so.

But does history, American or other, support him? Are the military nations the prosperous and virile ones? Turkey is the most militarized nation in Europe; England the least. Which order of principles seems to have worked out the best? And on this continent has the progress been to the unwarlike and unadventurous Yankee or to the Spanish-Americans already referred to—the peoples who have had a ceaseless training in warfare and should possess in abundance “the manly and adventurous qualities”?

Nor can it be said that the authorities are altogether on Mr. Roosevelt’s side. Herbert Spencer has for some time—about sixty years that is—enjoyed something of a reputation as a sociologist. He is supposed to know something of the operation of social laws, of the development of man and society, and the relations of one to the other. He may not, perhaps, be the equal of Mr. Roosevelt on those matters, but he has at least this in his favour: that while Mr. Roosevelt was wielding his terrible wooden sword in the nursery, while Mr. Roosevelt was indeed as yet unborn, Herbert Spencer’s name was pronounced with respect by men of learning the world over. How does this veteran specialist’s opinion agree with that of Mr. Roosevelt, who deems that the “unwarlike

nation is bound in the end to go down"? Spencer says:

Social progress is to be achieved, not by systems of education, not by the preaching of a religion, but only by cessation from antagonisms. Advance to higher forms of man and society depends on the decline of militancy and the growth of industrialism.

The diminution of militarism is not by Spencer reckoned one element of progress, but the sole one. In view of this, too, one reads with interest the following from the wise young man who provides the political instruction for the readers of the Chicago *Inter-ocean*:

Those dear old ladies, who are afraid of this country becoming a military nation, may set their minds at rest. It has become one, and no American, except those who rather like to see it kicked by the European monarchies and its flag insulted, will regret the fact.

It is true that the simple parade of authoritative names does not suffice to silence an argument. But my complaint is that neither Mr. Roosevelt nor the war-mongering parsons so much as notice the weighty arguments brought by Spencer; they fail altogether to deal with considerations which thoughtful men the world over have esteemed as fatally condemning the military ideal. And until these warriors do adduce some reply to the arguments for peace, I shall assume that they are ignorant of them, or can find no reply to them.

Do not think that I am alone in foreshadowing

these dangers of militarism, or that only cranks, who can be pooh-poohed down, share these views. In a recent *North American* appears an article in which our growing tendency to warfare is ably and significantly sketched. The author, Mr. R. N. Shaler, says:

Those persons who are accustomed to observe the movements of public opinion have had occasion to note of late a curious tide which is setting our nation towards warfare. Although by our happy isolation from the field of European rivalries and by the traditions of our forefathers, ours is the one great state of the world which seems to be appointed for the offices of peace, we appear to be driven by a blind impulse into modes of thought and action concerning our neighbours that will, if unchecked, bring us to contests of arms. A trifling fracas with Chili, a mere police court case; an insurrection in Cuba; a matter of fishing in Newfoundland; of sealing in Alaska, or the confused questions of a wilderness boundary in South America, each and all serve to set the dogs of war baying. These questions may be settled by the judicious conduct of a few men who are in actual control of our foreign relations, and others as they arise may be thus arranged; but by the next turn of the political wheel we may lose this protection and find in the high places men who, like the others, have eaten of the insane root, and who will welcome the opportunity for this nation to enter, as these madmen phrase it, "on a larger sphere of action."

In his address the other day at the Arbitration Conference in Washington, Carl Schurz said:

To judge from the utterance of some men having the public ear, we are constantly threatened by the evil designs of rival or secretly hostile powers that are eagerly watching every chance to humiliate our self-esteem, to insult our flag, to balk our policies, to harass our commerce, and even to threaten our very independence, and putting us in imminent danger of discomfiture of all sorts, unless we stand with sword in hand in sleepless watch, and cover the seas with warships, and picket the islands of every ocean with garrisoned outposts, and surround ourselves far and near with impregnable fortresses.

President Eliot, of Harvard University, at this same conference, was still more emphatic and still more significant. Referring to the Venezuelan incident, he said:

We had then one great surprise. . . . We thought that the separation of the executive and legislative functions in our country had one great advantage on which we could rely, namely, that when executive propositions of a grave and serious nature were laid before the legislative branches, the legislative branch might be depended upon to give consideration and procure delay. We have been painfully surprised to learn by the actual fact that that reliance is not well founded. Moreover, we have seen a new phenomenon in our country, and perhaps in the world, namely, the greatly increased inflammability of a multitudinous population in consequence of the development of the telegraph and the daily press.

President Eliot then went on to declare, with the courage which should endear him to every Amer-

ican who wishes well of his country, that our patriotism is but a bastard European production at best.

We have seen during the last few years, in both political parties, and perhaps as much in the one as the other, the importation from Europe of an idea, a policy absolutely new amongst us, absolutely repugnant to all American public experience—an importation from the aristocratic and military nations of Europe. I refer, of course, to this modern American notion called "jingoism," a detestable word, gentlemen, used in naming a detestable thing. The term is of English origin and not from the best side of English politics, but from the worst—from the politics of Palmerston and Disraeli and not of Gladstone. It is the most abject copy conceivable of a pernicious foreign ideal, and yet some of my friends endeavour to pass it off upon the American people as patriotic Americanism.

. . . Can anything be more offensive to the sober-minded, industrious, laborious classes of American society than this doctrine of jingoism, this chip-on-the-shoulder attitude, this attitude of a ruffian and a bully? This is just what jingoism means, coupled with a brutal and despotic militarism which naturally exists in countries where the government has been despotic or aristocratic, and where there has always been an enormous military class. The teaching of this doctrine by our press and some of our public men is one of the reasons why this conference has gathered now.

But surely the very worst feature of the "inflammability of a multitudinous population" to which

President Eliot referred, the feature which has in it the most danger, is that the men to whom we have a right to look for keeping uppermost the sober second thought of the nation, the better class of our public men and our clergy, seem the very readiest to add fuel to the flame. Nothing has been more extraordinary during the last few months than the servility with which our pulpit has kow-towed to the worst passions of the multitude. I could reproduce here—were I not already running to too great a length—sermons which in their vague warlike mysticism were fitter in the mouths of Dervishes than of Christian men. And these incitements to strife only occur when the feeling of the people is already warlike. When we are clothed and in our right minds the clergy coo as gently as any sucking dove. It is an unpleasant thing to say, but does not this inevitably suggest the reflection that the clergy are more anxious to preach what is popular than what is right? Reflect on this incontrovertible fact: When in December last the relations with England were most strained, when it was touch and go as to whether we should have a war with England upon our hands, did not the daily press treat us to sermons from eminent divines, in which the wrongs this country has suffered at the hands of Great Britain were eloquently set forth? Yet now, when the danger has passed and it has become more the thing to talk of arbitration, the clergy are telling us of all the reasons for being good friends with England.

Surely it would have been better to set forth those claims of friendship when we were in danger of forgetting them, rather than now when there is not the least danger. But the clergy did not. Think of the action of the chaplain of the Senate, who in the midst of the Venezuelan madness could pray that this country should be "quick to resent insults." Forgetting every injunction of his faith this minister of the Prince of Peace could cover the worst of jingoism with the sanction of Christianity. I would wager my last dollar that when we come to discuss the arbitration treaty, this doughty cleric will inform the Almighty upon the benefits of peace.

It is true that this moral poltroonery—the desire to be on the side of the big crowds—is not confined to the parsons, but one is justified in expecting better things of them. When they lead the way, it is not surprising that the politicians follow. These latter are indeed almost preferable, since they make little secret of being guided in their opinions by what constitutes "good politics." The attitude of the politicians in our recent war fever—I mean at the height of the war fever—is referred to with engaging frankness by Congressman Elliott of South Carolina, in the March *North American*. After stating that the Republicans suspected the President somewhat of precipitating the question upon Congress by his aggressive message, for the purpose of bolstering up the waning fortunes of his party, and were determined

not to be outdone by him in patriotic fervour, while the Democrats naturally felt that it would never do for them to block the course of a Democratic President, he goes on to say:

Undoubtedly within a very few hours afterwards, when it had been seen what irreparable injury had been wrought by the danger of war, many a member of the House wished he had had the pluck to do what Mr. Boutelle was so much tempted to do, and call a halt. And this too, especially on the part of those who felt that there could be no greater public calamity than a war between the United States and Great Britain, that it would be a disaster of unspeakable horrors, and who, moreover, felt a great deal of sympathy in the main reason put forward by Lord Salisbury for declining arbitration, that it involved the "transfer of large numbers of British subjects, 'who have for many years enjoyed the settled rule of a British colony, to a nation of different race and language, whose political system is subject to frequent disturbance, and whose institutions as yet too often afford very inadequate protection to life and property,'" a reason which Lord Salisbury suggested would induce the United States to be equally firm in declining to entertain proposals of such a nature. At least I can speak for myself in this regard.

I say that the position of the politician thus described—who would wage war upon a friendly people for refusing to adopt an attitude he himself would refuse to adopt—is in some sense explicable, though certainly not excusable. But why, outside

Congress, do not men have the pluck as Mr. Elliott puts it, to call a halt? That many men of influence feel privately with Mr. Boutelle is certain. It is sufficient to get such men into a fairly confidential mood for them to avow privately that they regard our new-born jingoism as mischievous and ridiculous. Why do they not say so in public? More generally than not they would lose nothing materially by their courage. It seems simply that they are in a blue funk of being found momentarily in the minority, of being called "traitors" by little asses and yellow newspapers. Courage of the prize-ring sort is a cult amongst us, but the courage which will consent to be for a time unpopular, to stand with one's face to the silly flag-wagging mob, to pronounce a word for common-sense and common honesty in times of general dementia, seems all but completely absent.

I am aware that the average American will consider this as altogether too serious a view of the matter. It will be deemed solemn and owlish to object to what is probably but a little harmless excitement. That this talk of war and the parade of the paraphernalia of war adds a zest to politics dull enough for the most part. That it pleases the women folk and gives the boys something to do o' nights. That there is nothing very serious in it at all, and that it will end as the Venezuelan excitement ended—in smoke. And that is why the politicians and the parsons lend themselves to it. The country is "all right," and rich enough to

spend a little money on gold lace and excitement if it wants to.

If history has any lessons at all, no fallacy is more dangerous than this. No man can watch the movements of opinion in this country without seeing that this war talk which we start with a light heart soon becomes serious. Nothing is more fatal to the sense of humour and proportion than this patriotism of flags and war-drums. It is true that we avoided war with England at the time of the Venezuelan business, but only because she adopted an attitude which no other country would have adopted. France would not have done it; nor Germany; nor will Spain. The Spanish “pudor” will make it absolutely impossible. And even if we do manage to avoid conflict with Spain, we shall get it with some other nation, if the humour now upon us lasts. Those people who will not take the trouble, nor incur the *odium patrioticum*, of setting their faces against that humour because it is harmless, are making exactly the sort of error they would make in allowing a child to play with squibs in a powder magazine.

But even if it should never result in war, it is still mischievous, and will cost us dear—is costing us dear. I know that America is supposed to be so rich as to afford any folly, any stupidity. Our newspapers are fond of talking of our boundless wealth, the “per-r-airies stretching from the rock-bound coast o’ Maine to the sunny shores

of the golden Pacific." All this oratory is very attractive, and Americans are very fond of it, but what are the facts?

The last time I heard that phrase about "this sun-kissed land" and the "boundless prairies stretching from the rock-bound coast," and so forth, it was from the lips of a gentleman in a country store, who concluded the oration by asking the loan of a dollar and a half in order to get a sack of flour to take home to his wife, the store-keeper declining further credit on an account which was already four and a half years old. I am not romancing; it is an absolute fact. The farmer in question had for half an hour been indulging in precisely the sort of bamboozle with which our land companies fill their rose-coloured circulars. "The richest country on God Almighty's earth, sir." The man might have stood for the land agent in *Martin Chuzzlewit*; the lineaments of Dickens's picture, drawn sixty years since, were all there, faithful to the last detail. With just this difference: my friend was not a land agent. He did not want to sell me his farm; I don't know why he was filling me up with all this land-agency romance. No one did. It just came natural to him. Now the facts of this patriot's situation is that his farm is mortgaged to the hilt, as also are his team and wagon; his implements he has never paid for; his grocery account is something over four years old; he can never remember the time when he was out of debt; his wife, at thirty-five, is

an old and worn woman; she can never remember the time when she was not overworked, when she had not to get up by daylight, and well before it in winter time, to cook the coarse grub for the family and the occasional hands. The wooden shack in which they live is an oven in summer, a refrigerator in winter. A garden the farm does not possess; no one would have the time to attend to it. The vegetables are bought from the travelling Chinaman, and the wife and her husband have not even the meagre satisfaction of owning the farm upon which for years they have laboured like convicts. And they never will own it. In a couple of years the bank will foreclose, the ramshackle wagon will be loaded with bedding and a frying-pan, and this worn woman with the tired face will follow her husband to some newer territory, where the process will be started all over again *da capo*. "Finest country on God Almighty's earth, sir. A million happy homes, sir, stretchin' from the rock-bound. . . ."

I shall be told that this is an exceptional case; many Americans will, in perfect good faith, call it pure romance, because they are ignorant of the real conditions of their own country. Their knowledge of American farm life is such as they see it from the standpoint of the summer boarder, and such as it is represented by politicians, by land agents, and also, be it said, by the extraordinary self-deceiving twaddle which the farmers themselves have acquired the habit of indulging in. But whether I

am right or wrong, I speak, at least, as one who has gone through the mill, as one who has worked as a labourer upon a score of ranches in California, who has himself ranned, who has passed a goodly period of his life cheek by jowl with farmers and farm hands. Most town-bred Americans, and some who are not town-bred, but remember the farm from a boy's standpoint, speak habitually without the advantage of such an experience, and I will appeal from their usual highfalutin periods to certain undeniable facts. I will take the three counties of California with which I am most familiar: Fresno County, Kern County, and Tulare County. They are fairly representative, and include in their area the fruit-growing, the grain-farming, and cattle-raising interests. Now, if you examine the public records of these counties, as you can easily do, you will find that, striking an average over the whole, ninety-seven per cent. of those farms to which titles have been acquired from the Government are mortgaged in one form or another; if you examine the records of chattel mortgages deposited in the court-houses, you will find that in addition to the mortgages upon the land, nearly half the farmers have also mortgaged their implements or their crops. That is to say that not four farmers in a hundred own their farms. That already is a great fact. The man who year in year out has to find interest for a debt cannot be called independent; but it is the figure of the interest which is even a greater fact. The average is eight

per cent; in some cases it rises even on first mortgages to twelve per cent: one per cent a month. Now, there is no industry in the world, least of all agriculture, which can pay eight and ten and twelve per cent interest upon debt incumbrance. An industry normally characterized by such a thing is not a prosperous one; it is one having something radically wrong with it, for no man will year in year out pay another, twelve per cent interest if his business is profitable. He will keep such princely profits on invested capital for himself. But that is not the whole story. Go into one of the big stores in our country towns, and get the store-keeper to tell you in confidence the real condition of his accounts with his farming customers. You will find that the majority of his accounts have run from three to five years; that the farmers "pay something on account" after harvest, and that only a small minority are for long out of his debt or free from liens which he holds. And those deferred accounts also pay one per cent a month interest.

Now go to the farms. What sort of food do the farmer and his wife eat? What sort of clothes does the wife wear? What sort of leisure do they enjoy? I will tell you. You will go into a hundred farm-houses—into five hundred in this State—before you will find one in which there is a hired girl to help the farmer's wife. The fiction is that we spoil our women and pamper them. I don't know how it is in the towns. In the towns I understand that

the wives of dry-goods clerks can keep their hired girls, but I could name a score of women married to farmers, with property supposed to reach five figures in value, who are accustomed to rise at five, light the fire, cook the grub, clean the house, do the washing, milk the cows, feed the poultry, attend to the children, mend their clothes, cook the midday meal, cook the supper, do the chores, and go to bed at something near midnight. There is not a day-labourer's wife in the city who would not be ashamed to dress so meanly, or who would not refuse the food she eats every day of the year. There are thousands of farmhouses in this State where "meat" means salt pork, "vegetables" potatoes, where beef or mutton is never tasted from one year's end to another. The life of the man is a corresponding one. A capitalist, a man whose property is supposed to be worth thousands of dollars, he pitches hay with the sun a hundred in the shade. In the winter he puts the frost-crusted harness on to his own shivering beasts, feeds and waters them himself. And after ten or fifteen or twenty years of this he gets sold up, and pulls up stakes, to start on a hundred and sixty acres of government land "fenced by a couple o' yaller dogs," but situated happily in "the richest country on God Almighty's earth, sir!"

I know that this sketch will be pooh-poohed as fantastic and exaggerated. But it is the truth; the figures of mortgages, the evidence of our eyes, everything save the florid oratory which we swal-

low as other drunkards swallow gin and morphia supports its truth. Here and there we have a publicist who will tell it. Occasionally you will see it reflected in the agricultural press, while a few shrewd observers like Hamlin Garland have testified to it in their books. I challenge any one who is entitled to speak on the matter by close contact with our farming population to rebut its general truth.

But what has this to do with the Monroe Doctrine, and the conflict with Spain, and with our recent warlike talky-talky? It has everything to do. My contention with regard to our growing militarism was that this country could not afford the luxury. I do not mean that it could not find the money—it could maintain an army of a million men if needs be, as it has done before—but that the condition of things I have described never will be mended, if, instead of busying ourselves with our own people, we get excited over the wrongs of Cubans, and “the fulfilment of our destiny.” We may be sure that if, in a country like ours, a country possessing in abundance everything from which the wealth of the world is created, those who work the hardest get the least; if our tillers of the soil are in effect worse off than the peasants of rocky Switzerland or crowded Holland, and infinitely worse off than the farmers of effete England—if this be the case, there is something radically wrong. It is not natural that our agricultural population should be both poor and over-

worked, debt-ridden and toil-driven. Yet such is the case. Our towns are wealthy, our manufacturers are rich, and get richer every day, but our farmers remain poor. And our farmers are the larger class, at least in the Western sections. They are, or should be, the backbone of our country, the reservoir of its best blood, the keeper of its best traditions. And yet, the nature of our new patriots is such that they are much more interested in the woes of the Cubans than in the hardships of American men and women. The *Examiner* has just been sending out photos of the Cuban women in the Concentration Camps, and our statesmen and our clergy weep over them. Yet I warrant that were I to make a collection of the pale-faced and overworked women of our farms not one of these statesmen or these clergymen would give it a glance. You may call me names, and say that I am no patriot, but to me the men and women that I know, their struggle for the daily bread that is so poor and hard, are of more import than the Cubans and all their causes. Let the Cubans work out their own salvation, and let us give our energies to ours.

But the patriot won't have it. When I see a perfervid young man waving little flags, I know that it is no use talking to him about Americans —about the people say, in Fresno County. You must talk to him of those noble Cubans if he is to show the least interest. And he is like most patriots.

And that is what I mean by saying that we cannot afford this militarism. Not only will it not help us to find what is wrong with our own institutions—with those policies which keep those poor who should be rich, and make richer those who are rich enough—but it will prevent our doing so. The moment that we fight Spain we shall become mixed with the *haute politique*. We shall fight our elections upon questions of prestige in Europe; upon subduing this or that enemy; upon acquiring more empire. The expansionist with his flag and his drum will so interest us that we shall have no inclination to listen to the dull fellow who is talking mere domestic problems. Our taxes will double, but if one object, he is told that he is putting “pocket before patriotism,” and that it is all for the glory of the flag. And, worst of all, that peculiar temper which has blinded our Western population during a generation to its real interests will be immeasurably strengthened by all this warlike adventure.

This temper has led us to prefer indulgence in a sentiment of hostility to the furtherance of our interests. We have been persuaded, and for years we held it as unquestionably true that, as Senator Lodge puts it, if we could do anything to injure England, it was our clear interest to do so. England! The very best customer for our products that exists in the world, a country that takes more of them than all the rest of the world put together. And it is a customer of this proportion that we

are to destroy if possible—the only great foreign market where our beef, and pork, and grain, and fruit, have an absolutely free market! I am absolutely astonished at the strength of the Anglophobia as it exists now, and has for years existed among Western farmers. What grievance have they against England? What injury has she done them? They could not, to save their immortal souls, tell you, but they hate her, and if any politician is especially offensive with regard to her, they will vote for him.

Now, it is evident that this is not a rational temper: that it is not one in which our best interests will receive a quiet and clear-headed consideration. But it is one which the new militarism will foster. England will not necessarily be the object of it, but we shall be taught to distrust and hate the "foreigner," to try and injure him, to create large forces to overawe him. In other words, sentimentality, the sentimentality of suspicion and hostility, the sentimentality of the drum-banging patriot, will influence our policy in the future, as Anglophobia has influenced it in the past. We have recently had a singular illustration of how this noisy sentimentalism of Anglophobia manages to silence sober argument. I referred just this minute to the enormous interest paid by farmers on loans. Not unnaturally this large interest has attracted foreign capital to the State. By the ordinary operation of supply and demand, as foreign capitalists showed their readiness to lend,

the rate of interest showed a tendency to descend, an immense advantage to the farmer. One would have supposed that he would have welcomed this influx of foreign capital, allowing him more easily to develop his land, or in any case to exchange a mortgage of twelve per cent for one at six or seven. But the Californian banks, or the Eastern insurance companies who support them, have presumably too good a thing in loaning money at twelve per cent to allow the market to be cut in that way. In any case, the politicians organized a patriotic howl about the wickedness of foreigners having liens on land in the State. The picture of the bloated British capitalist acquiring the farms of American ranchers was vividly drawn. (It stands to reason, of course, that we cannot borrow foreign money without security, so that mortgages were passing into the hands of foreigners—to the immense benefit of the American who paid the interest.) Of course the appeal was successful. The farmer found the chance of doing an imagined injury to the Britisher irresistible, and a law has been voted by the Assembly which will, to put it at the lowest, hamper the business arrangements by which we make use of foreign capital. And of course the farmer will cheerfully return to paying his twelve per cent.

That is but an instance in which our “patriotism” is paid for in material sacrifice. But why should the sacrifice be all on our side, why should not the bank or the manufacturer also contribute

his quota? He asks us, in the name of patriotism, not to give the foreigner a lien on the land. Well and good. Then let him lend us money at the rate at which the foreigner is content to lend it. But somehow the American capitalist does not see it.

This is but an instance. A much more serious matter connected with our Anglophobia and patriotism of the stump, and one which lies, it is my firm conviction, at the very bottom of the unnaturally hard fight of the farmer for a living, is the question of Protection. I am not going to argue that question *au fond*. I am not going to pretend that Free Trade is, under every circumstance, a wise policy; I am perfectly willing to admit that Protection may be logically defensible, and that we may be wise to adopt it. I only want to point out two incontrovertible facts: (1) That sentimentalism, Anglophobia, "patriotism," play a large rôle in our defence of the policy; (2) that our economic position is the exact reverse to that of the Eastern manufacturer, and that, *a priori*, a policy which benefits him is likely to injure us.

Let me make the first point plain. Think of all the Protectionist articles that you read during the last campaign; think of the attitude of all the Protectionist newspapers. Were they not all Anglophobe, bellicose, truculent, jingo? A fair sample among Western papers is the *Chronicle* of San Francisco. Not a day passes without that paper taking the opportunity to abuse England,

to stimulate the hatred of Americans for that country and for all things British. It realizes perfectly well that Protection is based on a certain amount of hostility to the foreigner, and consequently on the flaunting of our military forces. In my last article on this subject I had occasion to point this out. "Did anyone ever see an American Free Trader who was in favour of forts and fleets?" asks the *Chronicle* in triumph. It opines that the patriotic league will get no help from the Free Trader. For belligerency, for warlike preparations, it says quite frankly that you must go to the Protectionist. And it takes it as proof of "good red blood" (which occasionally, it may be pointed out, runs into boisterous choleric truculence) that this should be so. During the recent campaign the Republicans circulated a campaign pamphlet setting forth how much McKinley was hated in England, and a campaign man told me that he found it very useful. You know the style of the average stump orator on this matter. The moment that he touches upon Free Trade, he will begin to tell you what objectionable people the British are. It is true that during the last campaign he was a little more circumspect in this matter because the Democrats stole his thunder on behalf of Free Silver. They worked Anglophobia against the "British gold bugs" as the Republicans have for years worked it against "British Free Traders." The spectacle of the two great American parties, each accusing the

other of "legislating for the foreigner," or of "being in the pay of Britain," is an amazing and instructive spectacle.

Presumably the politicians know their business. Both sides would not thus appeal to sentiment—the sentiment of national hostilities—unless such appeals were successful. We can only presume, therefore, that the American puts sentiment before business, or mixes sentiment with business. Either is fatal if we desire to keep clear heads on the matter. What we have to consider is, what policy will give us the best price for our crops, and will enable us to buy the most with the money that we get?

What, shorn of all verbiage, are the facts of the fiscal situation so far as it regards us out in the West? This much at least is undeniable: Our staple agricultural products are things the price of which no Protection can raise. We import no wheat, no flour, no beef, no mutton, no poultry, no eggs, no butter, no cheese, no corn, no barley, no oats. Protection can do nothing for us. Consequently when Protection raises prices, it raises the prices only of those things that we buy: the timber for our houses from Canada; the crockery and cutlery we put in them from England; the clothing that we wear from Scotland; the rails upon which our goods are transported to market—everything almost, from the clothes in which we are swaddled when we are born to the lumber of which our coffin is made, is raised in price by

Protection. Nothing that we sell is raised in price. Our incomes are the same. The cost of living is enormously increased. Such is the net result of Protection as it affects the farmer. From this simple statement there is in the end no escape. We have an illusory tariff on raisins which most of us don't grow; on Mexican cattle which it would be to our immense advantage to get cheap in order to fatten with our cheap hay; on wool for the protection of an industry which is the enemy of the man who tills the soil; but for the rest Protection cannot even pretend to do anything for us. All it can do is to increase the cost of everything we buy, and so cut down our incomes fifteen, twenty, and thirty per cent; increase our banking rate by making the cost of farm development greater, to assail generally the farmers' solvency, and impair seriously the buying capacity of our best customers.

That such an arrangement suits the Eastern manufacturer who sells us our clothing, our machinery, and the thousand and one things necessary for daily life other than our food, I fully believe. That we should make a certain sacrifice to develop American manufactures, to render our industries diverse, is an arguable proposition. But that we should do this, not to a small extent and as a compromise, but to an almost illimitable extent, and under the impression that we are getting rich in the process, must be to all who dispassionately consider it a matter for unmeasured amazement. Nothing seems to disturb our serene

infatuation with this singular arrangement. The Eastern manufacturers get enormously wealthy; as company concerns they pay outrageous dividends; their originators generally become millionaires, having started as the office-cleaner. Not a few of them exercise most illegitimate influence in legislatures and courts, yet the farmer, the lean, hungry caricature of "Judge," dressed in cotton jeans and obliged to get his flour on credit, is asked to pay the piper: and does so with a jingo whoop about "sockin' it to the Britisher," and "giving the lion's tail a twist." The poorest industry in this country is taxed, taxed to its eye teeth, to feed the richest, and the victim regards it as a fair arrangement, a "patriotic" one. He is so satisfied to leave it all to the Easterner, that he has not even taken the trouble to have his interests properly represented. There is not a manufacturing interest that is not strongly organized politically with lobbyists and all the machinery of "representation" in Congress. The iron men, the steel men, the tinplate men, the sugar men, the lumber men, the window-sash men, the glass-blowing men, the baby-carriage men, down to those desiring protection against the pauper coffins of Europe, are all represented in the lobbies, and are careful to have the ears of chairmen of committees. The farmers alone—the men upon whose industry the country has been built up, its backbone from the beginning, the men who should come first—these alone have no chairmen of com-

mittees in their pocket. All they can do in the way of organization is an association that excites the hilarity of the smallest ward boss. No, we are content to leave it all to the dear, good manufacturers, who will tell us what is really the "American doctrine."

But this is a side issue. From the original proposition, namely, that Protection adds nothing to our incomes while it increases the price of everything we buy, there is no getting away. The Protectionist does not even pretend or attempt to meet it. I have listened to scores of debates, public and private, and never once has this point been fairly met. Always in the end does the Protectionist get away to the "European invasion," and "Europe getting rich at America's expense." It suffices for him to show that so many thousand cotton-weavers of Lancashire have been ruined, or that our imports are decreasing, to have presumably gained his point, oblivious of the fact that, however this may benefit the manufacturer, the farmer pays: he pays more for his cotton but gets no more for his wheat. It is likely that he will get less since those Lancashire cotton-weavers will perforce buy the less. Dependent to an enormous extent upon a rich England for his market, the American farmer will be hugely pleased when the Protectionist shows him that McKinley is ruining British industry. If the Free Trader be persistent, the Protectionist will silence him—at least in public—by some insinuation of Anglo-

mania, of being "no American," of preferring Britain to his own country, and being told to remember Bunker Hill. From patriotism there is no appeal.

Yet, nevertheless, may we ask, what have the sins of Great Britain in Ireland, the objectionable accent or behaviour of the British tourist, the fooleries of our Anglomaniacs, to do with the price of wheat? Is it quite serious, when we are talking of crops and prices, for one party to the argument to imitate the accent of the "blawsted Britisher," and to say that you are "so English, dontcher-know"? Yet I have never listened to a campaign speech in which these silly tricks have not been introduced. And they always succeed. The good farmers sitting round are for the most part hugely pleased, accept it all as a serious argument. I have seen closely and cogently reasoned argument in favour of Free Trade replied to by the remark, "Aw yaas! So English, yer know. Is it rainin' in Lunnon?" and the listeners have for the most part regarded this sally with huge satisfaction—a complete and full answer to everything which could be said in favour of "British" Free Trade.

In the face of this you tell me that Anglophobia is a harmless foible. I seriously maintain that, by reason of it, the Western farmer has been bamboozled for two generations. Whatever be the merits of the question, he has never considered them. It is sufficient with him that Free Trade is the "British policy," and in consequence wrong.

The causeless animosity over-rides all other considerations. And when to this primitive tribal enmity is added the windy bombast about this "sun-kissed land," and the "thousand happy homes" (all mortgaged), the burlesque is complete. Burlesque? I know of nothing more pathetic than the spectacle of a man burdened with toil, with debt, poorly fed, poorly clad, his wife awearied with the monotony of petty drudgery, and his children anaemic, enthralled by a political oratory which ignores his debts, ignores his poverty, his toil, and is concerned only to inflame his hatred of a people ten thousand miles away, to tickle a bootless vainglory about the wide "per-r-airies, stretching from the rock-bound coast of Maine to the sunny shores of the golden Pacific." Ordinarily I resent—as a farmer myself—the ill-concealed contempt of the town American for the "hayseed," the facile caricatures of *Judge* and *Puck*. But when I witness the spectacle I have just described, upon my soul, I think he deserves everything in that way that he gets.

If it be true, as I honestly believe that it is true, that this hostility and vainglory have so influenced our judgment of the right fiscal policy as to induce a wrong decision, how immeasurable has been the cost of this sentimentalism! Think of all the lives that have been made the harder, of the constitutions that have been shattered, of the women made prematurely old, of the houses that are the meaner, of the children that are neglected,

of the homes that are less easy, for the sake of doing something which will displease the British or startle Europe. Was I wrong in saying that we cannot afford this militarism, this blatant desire to impress the foreigner with "our epperlettes and feathers"? Is not this too high a price to pay for it all?

We have seen how eloquent some of our moral preceptors—including some clergymen—can become concerning the dangers of long-continued peace. Might not Mr. Roosevelt and the rest occasionally vary these themes with one concerning the danger—the cost—of hate? I know that certain of our patriots would, like the *Chronicle*, pour infinite scorn upon introducing the "economic principles of the Sermon on the Mount" into a political discussion. But there is, nevertheless, an economic side to the moral law. If men cannot violate it, save to their cost, it is certain that nations cannot. And when we charge Englishmen of to-day with historical offences for which they are no more morally responsible than for the crimes of Nero, or make war on Spain for offences which are no concern of ours—offences which, when committed by others than Spain, or by ourselves, leave us unmoved—we do an injustice for which we shall sooner or later pay in full. When we nurse a desire to humiliate others, to parade, like the savage, our big muscles and our big body, when our pride becomes vainglory, the debauch will not be indulged without penalty. Unless all history has deceived us, unless the story of a hundred

nations has been devised for our deception, that "Destiny," so dear to the patriot's heart, shall exact the full tale for all our passion, our vainglory and unreasonableness. And the innocent shall pay with the guilty—for the guilty it may be—"to the third and fourth generation."

These articles are not reprinted with any idea of throwing doubt upon the sincerity of our present desire for peace and our condemnation of the Prussian doctrine; but because if we are to help rid the world of that doctrine and set up a world-state based upon international co-operation, we must first of all set our own house in order—clear our own minds of such misconceptions and false theories as caused the aberrations dealt with in these reprinted papers. For it is only thus that we shall have clearly before us a reasoned basis for that World-Society which I believe it to be our destiny to take the lead in creating.

In what way these poisonous ideas which have led even ourselves astray in the past and which have now plunged Europe into the present disastrous struggle, can be destroyed, so clearing the way for organized co-operation, is the subject of the third part of this book.

PART III

CAN ARMS ALONE DESTROY PRUSSIANISM?

CHAPTER I

CAN ARMS ALONE DESTROY PRUSSIANISM ?

"A war against war"—What does the annihilation of Germany mean?—Can sixty-five millions be killed off?—The partition of Germany—How it would Prussianize Europe—How Germany became Prussianized—The reaction of a Prussianized Europe upon America—The military indestructibility of modern peoples—The mutability of alliances—What should follow the defeat of Germany?—How Prussianism can be destroyed—The real basis of the society of nations—The rôle of America in organizing that society.

AT the beginning of Part II of this book I have given a good deal of evidence to show how universally in Britain this war is regarded as having been caused by the prevalence of a false doctrine, which constitutes a menace to the peace of the world and must be destroyed in order to obtain security and to be freed from the burdens of militarism for which that doctrine is responsible; and how largely this idea is accepted in America. It is apparent from the evidence I have quoted that in the minds of an immense number of educated people this war is justified by the fact of being a "war against war," in having as its object the destruction of the Prussian idols

of brute force and militarism. The Allies will go to Berlin, as the *London Times* tells us, to insist "that the worship of war shall cease," and in order that the Germans may once more turn to Luther and to Goethe, and renounce Nietzsche, Treitschke, and Bernhardi. It has, for the British, indeed, become almost the war of pacifists, while progressive reformers, idealists, socialists, have in great numbers supported it on similar grounds. Mr. Blatchford, the British Socialist, sees in the war a new ally for Socialism, while his colleague, Mr. Neil Lyons, tells us that it is "the best fight for Socialism that has ever been waged anywhere or anywhen." Professor Gilbert Murray is convinced that this war will mark the liberalization of Russian institutions; for while the defeat of the autocracy in Germany is to liberate the German people, the victory of the autocracy in Russia is to liberate the Russian people, a view which is also shared by Mr. H. G. Wells and Mr. C. Hagberg Wright, who both write that "this war has made Russia definitely liberal by linking her almost indissolubly with the Western liberal Powers."

Such, then, is for the moment the all but universal view: the military defeat of Germany will of itself destroy the old fallacies and sophisms, the old passions and ugly temper produced by the evil doctrines of militarism, the belief in force, the reign of bureaucracy. All this will disappear from Europe, and we shall have peace and security for some generations at least, if the Allies do but

"beat Germany to her knees." Indeed, the British people have come in their minds to make those evils synonymous with the German State: destroy the German State, and you have destroyed these things. And this idea is very widely reflected in the expressions of American public opinion. Indeed Professor Hale of Chicago University has even pleaded that the United States should join the Allies in the war so that they may help to replace the system of aggression by a system of international law.

Now, I want to suggest that such a belief is both unsound and dangerous; that its prevalence may prove disastrous to the very results which the British people hope to accomplish by this war and which we wish to see accomplished; that, indeed, if it is not corrected, it may absolutely defeat these results; that while it is true that they must secure at any cost the victory of the Allies, mere military victory will not of itself bring about that better and safer society which we all hope for, and which is the justification of this war; that the attainment of that object will depend not alone upon the defeat of Germany, but upon the kind of peace and settlement that follows such defeat, and the energy with which they insist upon the right kind of reconstruction after the war, and see that in their own policy and conduct they avoid the fallacies and errors of their enemy; that if they neglect this half of their task, the other half—the war itself, its infinite suffering and sacrifice—will be barren, and

will render still more remote the achievement of the splendid aims and aspirations which sanctify it in the minds of the British people. And since it is probable that American opinion will have a great influence upon the terms of peace, and we shall certainly be affected, it is essential also that we should get into our own minds a clear idea of what the position will be, and of the manner in which the great aims for the triumph of which we hope can be accomplished.

Let us, at the risk of some repetition, get the position quite clear. It is essential to the best interests of Europe and mankind that the Allies should win, and that Prussian military autocracy should realize its helplessness as against its united neighbours. It is quite certain, moreover, that the British nation is going through with this war, and that it is going to win, at whatever cost. There is not the faintest risk of the nation wavering on that point. But there is a very grave risk that the other essential to what it desires to accomplish by the war may be overlooked; and that risk will be greatly increased if this other essential is overlooked by ourselves and is not urged by us upon the Allies. And it is for that reason that it is important to urge this fact—that a victory for the Allies will not of itself render the future peace of Europe secure; will not achieve any of these things in the direction of destroying militarism in Europe which are suggested in these very optimistic expressions of opinion I have quoted; that, unless victory is

accompanied by political wisdom on their part, the crushing of Germany may leave Europe in a worse condition than before the war, expose the world to its renewal at no distant date, fasten the shackles of militarism more firmly than ever upon the long-suffering peoples of Europe; and expose us to a repetition of the losses and dislocation of financial and industrial life which we are now experiencing.

If that futility is to be avoided, the doggedness of the British people in this war must be intelligent instead of unintelligent; they must fight not blindly, but with a clear vision of what we want; they must know what this war is about, and how its objects will be achieved, and with firm resolution not to share the errors and the faults of their enemies, not to be led away from the high aims with which it started, into the low aims of even an excusable vengeance, with a determination not to "lose their tempers and call it patriotism"; and we on our side must be at least equally clear, in our perception of these ends and the manner of achieving them.

It is probable that few things have been so fruitful in the creation of political error and false ideas as words or phrases or illustrations which, used in the first instance because they are picturesque or rhetorical, but not even pretending to be an exact statement of facts, are in the end taken as meaning exactly what they say or represent. Economists like Professor Cannan have shown us, for instance,

how the employment of military terms with reference to international trade, and other economists how the habit of talking of "France" or the "United States" as doing so much trade, as though they were commercial corporations actually carrying on business (oblivious of the fact that France and America as nations or governments do no international trade at all), has given rise to essentially false ideas in economics. In the same way political writers have shown that to talk of nations "owning" a territory has given rise to other false ideas. So in the present juncture British journalists talk picturesquely of "beating Germany to her knees" and "annihilating" her, of "wiping her from the map," of "smashing her." What precisely do these resounding phrases mean? What, for instance, does the "destruction" of Germany mean? "Germany" comprises sixty-five millions of people. Is it proposed to slit all their throats? Will the Allies have "destroyed" them because they have beaten their armies? Suppose that the Allies kill or permanently disable in this war a million German soldiers (which will be a very large proportion), there will still remain to this population of sixty-five millions some five millions of fighting men. They cannot be "destroyed"; they cannot be massacred; they cannot be distributed as prisoners of war among the Allies to be maintained as a permanent charge; they cannot even be expelled from Germany.

It has been definitely suggested in several

quarters that while, of course, the Allies cannot annihilate Germany in the sense of destroying her population or even the men who have fought in her army, they can break up the German Empire by partitioning it as Poland was partitioned in the past. It is suggested that France and Belgium are between them to have all Germany up the Rhine, Schleswig-Holstein is to be given back to the Danes, Russia is to have other Baltic provinces and East Prussia, Switzerland is to be enlarged, and so forth.

Even though such a policy is not very much supported in Britain, it may conceivably be pushed by one or more of the Continental Allies, and it is important, therefore, to see what it involves, to examine the sort of Europe such a settlement would produce—whether it would be that liberalized one freed from the doctrine of force, which the authorities I have quoted foretell. First, there would, of course, be, as the result of this “partitioning” of Germany *à la Pologne*, not one Government holding down conquered provinces, but four or five. Now, a Government that is holding down unwilling provinces cannot be a democratic Government. It will have within its borders two degrees of representative government, two degrees of freedom, two degrees of democracy, for the reason that it will not be able to grant to a hostile, resentful, and conquered people the same freedom to express its wishes through its votes, or even through the medium of the press, that it grants to its own

people, properly speaking. Very many speak of this war as giving the prospect of liberalizing Russia, as enabling the Western Allies to induce Russia to accept some of the parliamentary principles for which they stand; but if Russia annexes German provinces, it is quite certain that she will not give them freedom to express their views either through representative institutions or the ordinary machinery of a free people—popular meeting and demonstration, a free press, and so forth. Because naturally a conquered province would at once use this freedom for the purpose of an agitation in favour of separation or autonomy, and this, of course, the conquering Government could not tolerate. Provinces which are in this way conquered by the sword would have to be held by the sword. The very fact of having within her borders a hostile element would compel the victorious conquering country to remain military in its make-up, and maintain the machinery of political repression. And in a lesser degree the same sort of thing would be taking place in France. If the France of the future were to include, as has been suggested, all the left bank of the Rhine, certain of those provinces, German since the earliest dawn of history, would not readily accept the sway of their hereditary enemies. They, too, would have to be held by the sword, and to do that the victor must retain the sword. France, too, would have to set up the ugly machinery of repression; she could not tolerate separatist agitation in her new conquests.

There would be laws against meetings, laws possibly against the use of German speech, and in France there would be two orders of citizens.¹ From being a homogeneous people living under the same law for all, France would become like Russia, and, like the pathetic empire of Austria which has gone

¹ And, of course, such efforts at repression would fail. The fact that it is no longer possible as the result of military victory to dispossess a people of its material possessions makes it more and more difficult to push home military force with the old ruthlessness for the purpose of imposing an alien language or law. British experience in the attempt at Anglicizing provinces like Quebec or Ireland, German experience with the Alsatians, Russian with the Finns, show that where economic considerations render it necessary to leave a people in possession of their means of livelihood, military force is as a matter of simple fact reduced to futility in these matters. I have summarized the matter in the synopsis of *The Great Illusion* as follows: "The forces which have brought about the economic futility of military power have also rendered it futile as a means of enforcing a nation's moral ideals or imposing its social institutions upon a conquered people. Germany could not turn Canada or Australia into a German colony—*i.e.*, stamp out their language, law, literature, traditions, etc.—by 'capturing' them. The necessary security in their material possessions enjoyed by the inhabitants of such conquered provinces, quick intercommunication by a cheap press, widely-read literature, enable even small communities to become articulate and effectively defend their special social or moral possessions, even when military conquest has been complete. The fight for ideals can no longer take the form of fight between nations, because the lines of division on moral questions are within the nations themselves and intersect the political frontiers. There is no modern State which is completely Catholic or Protestant, or liberal or autocratic, or aristocratic or democratic, or socialist or individualist; the moral and spiritual struggles of the modern world go on as between citizens of the same State in unconscious intellectual co-operation with corresponding groups in other States not as between the public powers of rival States."

to pieces, an artificial creation possessing different races, different languages, different laws, one group dominating, another subservient; she also would be maintaining a system based not upon consent, but upon her ability to compel unwilling populations to submit to her rule, so that the net outcome of this war, to destroy militarism and Prussianism, would be to render liberal France more militarized than ever, to turn France into a kind of Prussia, and to Prussianize still further the great military empire of Russia.

Such, then, would be the outcome of a war entered upon for the liberalization of Europe; the vindication of the principle of nationality, the ending of the rule of the sword, the destruction of the philosophy of conquest, and of the holding down of people by sheer might; for the ending of military castes, of government based on brute force and armament. Having entered upon this war as a crusade to end those things, the Allies finish it by breaking up a great nationality, by handing over provinces without their consent to alien rulers whom they detest, and—as a necessary and inevitable consequence—create several military autocracies, so as to enable the conquering Allies to hold their conquered provinces in subjugation. We should have in Europe not one Alsace-Lorraine—which has been sufficient of itself to keep alive during nearly half a century resentment and bitterness which have been a large factor, perhaps the dominating one, in creating the present catas-

trophe—but several. Yet Alsace was, after all, a German-speaking province, bound by a thousand years of history to the German group, its union to France having been itself an act of conquest two centuries since. If annexation to the German Empire even under those conditions was an act of ruthless tyranny and oppression, as we believe it to have been, what shall be said of the transfer of German-speaking provinces to a Muscovite Empire, of the transfer of great free cities and ancient republics to the domination of the Russian bureaucracy, the Czar and the Grand-Dukes?

Is this to be the end of the “War of Liberation”? Is the Holy War against the Devil’s Doctrine of Prussianism to end by the Allies actually committing the very crime which they accuse Germany of desiring to commit: of forcing their rule and civilization upon unwilling neighbours? Are they going to end this war by themselves becoming converted to the Prussian doctrine? And is this an end which will be viewed with satisfaction by the great democratic community of the United States?

When they actually tackle the problem, I do not suppose that the Western Governments would tolerate for a moment the transfer of a genuinely German province to Russian rule. Not only, however, is such an outcome of the war airily discussed in Britain itself, but there is a very real danger that the British may be dragged by their Allies—and their Allies include, of course, Russia, Servia, Montenegro, and Japan—into a settlement

upon principles in which they as a free and democratic people do not believe and which to us would be still more repellent. That this danger is not chimerical is proved by a sign or two which have already been given, of the sort of settlement which Russia, for instance, desires. The *Novoe Vremya*, a Russian paper which is pretty freely used by the Russian Government as a vehicle of official communications, has already shown very considerable irritation at what it supposes to be Great Britain's reticence in preparing for the partitioning of the German Empire. The military critic of the *London Times*, who will not be accused of undue democratic prejudice, comments on this as follows:

The *Novoe Vremya* took our statesmen to task the other day for aiming only at the capture or the destruction of the German Navy and the humbling of German militarism. We ought, it seems, to aim higher—namely, at the crushing of Germany for good and all. In a great war between Allies, the criticism of one friendly Power by another is best suspended, for if we begin telling each other what we ought to do we shall not be so well prepared to pull together. We are all doing our best, fighting our own corners, and none of us wants to be told his business. If the *Novoe Vremya* will look into the matter, it will observe that to crush German militarism, and to make an end of the system which has burdened and oppressed Europe for so long, will give us all that we can legitimately desire. To crush the Germans as a whole, we must either kill them all or occupy their countries per-

manently, and we do not want to substitute one tyranny for another. Nor, we can be sure, does Russia. We have to draw the teeth of this Prussian monster, to humble a military caste, and to leave Prussia herself at the peace with the constitution which she has so long sought in vain. In these reasonable aims we shall sooner or later have large sections of the German people with us, and our ends can then be more quickly attained. But to kill or everlasting to police a nation of sixty millions of people is an extravagant proposition, and in war one must aim at what is attainable, and not the reverse. This is a military as well as a political question. We must not impose upon strategy an impossible task, for if we do we may be unable to achieve aims which are both practicable and desirable.¹

One may reply, of course, that the Russians and the French are not like the Germans, that it is not in their nature to show the ruthlessness, the brutality, and the stupidity, that the Prussians have shown, and that they represent a different moral force to the Germans. But, as I have shown in a preceding chapter, the most obvious facts of the case cannot ascribe the crimes of the Germans to their race. For a very long time they stood, as a whole, as the least aggressive people in Europe—idealistic, so little nationalist or military that Goethe could not bring himself to be disturbed even by the Napoleonic invasion of his country.

¹ *London Times*, September 24, 1914.

There was a Germany that for centuries in Europe meant, as even British newspapers in war-time admit,

cradle-songs and fairy-stories, and Christmas in old moonlit towns, and a queer simple tenderness always childish and musical; with philosophers who could forget the world in thought like children at play, and musicians who could laugh suddenly like children through all their profundities of sound. The Germans of the past were always children even when they were old and fat and learned; and the world loved, while it laughed at, the contrast between their power and their childishness. All other nations had some wickedness in them, but they kept a kind of innocence that made them the musicians of the world.¹

Such was the old Germany; it is not the Germany of to-day, but that Germany was of the same race, of the same blood, as the evil Germany that we now know. And this revolution, this transformation, which has turned a great country from something beautiful into something ugly, from something good into something evil, is the work of an idea, of a false doctrine, and the effect of the institutions which have been the outgrowth of that false doctrine.

Those institutions are the legacy of victory. The old Germany was a Germany of small self-governing States, of small political power. The new Germany is a "great" Germany, with a new

¹ *London Times*, Literary Supplement, October 8, 1914.

ideal and spirit which comes of victory and military and political power, of the reshaping of political and social institutions which the retention of conquered territory demands: its militarization, regimentation, centralization, and unchallenged authority; the cultivation of the spirit of domination, the desire to justify and to frame a philosophy to buttress it. Someone has spoken of the war which made "Germany great and Germans small."

But why, when people talk of partitioning Germany among the conquering Allies, should they expect the causes which have worked such havoc with this people should work differently in the case of other European States? Have the races that inhabit them—remoter from the Anglo-Saxons than the German—some fundamental moral quality not possessed by the Teutonic or Anglo-Saxon stock, which will enable them to resist those evils which flow from the fatal glamour of political greatness and military conquest? Why should we suppose that these causes, which have worked so disastrously in the case of older Germany, should have any very different effect in the case of a triumphant and conquest-holding Russia and France? And if that happened, Prussianism and its philosophy would not have been destroyed; it would merely have been transferred from one capital to another or to others. Do British writers desire, when they talk airily of giving France all Germany up to the Rhine, to revive the French

spirit which marked the France of Louis XIV, which for nearly two hundred years kept Britain in constant fear, and involved a long and bitter struggle worse, even, than that which is now being waged against Germany? Do they wish to revive once more that spectre which was laid but yesterday—the possible menace of a Russia, at present rudimentary and but partially civilized, but growing vastly in area and in numbers, to their position both in Asia and in Europe? If the most elementary wisdom guides British statesmanship, there will be no “partitioning” of Germany à *a Pologne*.

Nor is this a question which concerns merely the nations of Europe. As I have shown in Part I of this book, our connection with Europe, economic, political, and intellectual has become so close that a highly militarized Europe cannot but react upon America. The effects of such a policy as that which I have indicated would be not merely to prolong in Europe the period of unrest and of armament competition; it would involve dear money and restricted markets for our industries. And it would almost certainly lead to an agitation on the part of the big armament people among ourselves which would draw us too into the vortex of militarism and injure almost irreparably the development of our own social and economic life.

Suggestions which have a much greater air of feasibility are that after the transfer o Alsace-Lorraine to France, or the creation in these pro-

vinces of an autonomous State like Luxemburg, and the retrocession of Schleswig-Holstein to Denmark, the incorporation of German Poland in the reconstituted Polish kingdom, the neutralization or internationalization of the Kiel Canal, the transfer of all the German colonies to Britain, and the destruction of her fleet, the German Empire would then be so weakened that she could not, for many generations at least, especially in view of the dismemberment of her ally Austria, threaten again the peace of Europe. Or if that should not suffice, the dethronement of the Kaiser and some possible bargain with the Southern German States would resolve the existing German Empire into a "geographical expression," which it was until half a century ago.

Now, there is much in this programme that is feasible and desirable, if it were accompanied by some guarantee of real autonomy in the case of a reconstituted Poland, and the whole arrangement supplemented by the formation of a European League or Federation or Council of Nations, or better still, a World Federation in which America should take her rightful place; and into which the German States should come on equal terms with the other European States, so that Germans would have some guarantee that the preponderant military power of their rivals would not be used in attempts to destroy their nationality, or to place them in a position in which their commerce and industry would be carried on with a handicap, and

their work of national organization checked and hampered by foreign influences and jealousies. If, on the other hand, military and political power is used, for instance, to reduce their armament, while that of Russia, say, or of France, is allowed to grow unchecked; if Germany is placed under the tutelage of a Power like Russia, which she regards as non-European, or of France, her historic enemy, such use of force will be resisted, and, if history teaches any lessons at all, successfully resisted. If, indeed, the settlement is imposed on her from without, instead of being arranged with her co-operation and consent, it will not endure, and none of those results in the direction of a better, more stable and secure, less military and force-worshipping Europe which were to flow from German defeat can for a moment be expected to result from it. And I have shown that for us the defeat of these aspirations would have a very real and very serious significance. We cannot afford, on the ground of our own most vital interests, to see them defeated.

I want to suggest that this failure of our expectations is certain if the Allies, like the Prussians before them, base their settlement upon sheer military might, disregarding the consent or desires or co-operation of the Germans, in view of the well-demonstrated fact that the sheer military subservience in those conditions of a people like the Germans can only be temporary, because (*a*) of the recuperative capacity shown by such conquered

States in the past, and (b) of the extreme mutability of alliances—it being a possibly temporary alliance which gives the preponderance of power against them.

The merely temporary effect upon a virile people of the destruction of their armies and political machinery, the artificial and unreal character of the apparent “wiping off the map” that follows, has been dramatically demonstrated in the case of Germany within the memory of the fathers of men still living. In the first few years of the nineteenth century Prussia was annihilated as a military force. The army was destroyed at Jena and Auerstadt, and the whole country was overrun by the French. By the Peace of Tilsit, Prussia was deprived of all territory west of the Elbe and all her Polish provinces, of the southern part of West Prussia, of Dantzig, thus losing nearly half her population and area; the French army remained in occupation until heavy contributions demanded by France were paid and by the subsequent treaty the Prussian army was limited to not more than 42,000 men, and she was forbidden to create a militia. She was broken, apparently, so completely that even some five years later she was compelled to furnish, at Napoleon’s command, a contingent for the invasion of Russia. The German States were weakened and divided by all the statecraft that Napoleon could employ. He played upon their mutual jealousies, brought some of them into alliance with himself, created a buffer State of Westphalia,

Frenchified many of the German Courts, endowed them with the Code Napoleon. Germany seemed so shattered that she was not even a "geographical expression." It seemed, indeed, as though the very soul of the people had been crushed, and that the moral resistance to the invader had been stamped out, for, as one writer has said, it was the peculiar feature of the Germany which Napoleon overran, that her greatest men were either indifferent, like Goethe, or else gave a certain welcome to the ideas which the French invaders represented. Yet with this unpromising material the workmen of the German national renaissance laboured to such good purpose that within a little more than five years of the humiliation of the Peace of Tilsit, the last French army in Germany had been destroyed, and it was thanks to the very condition imposed by Napoleon, with the object of limiting her forces, that Prussia was able finally to take the major part in the destruction of the Napoleonic, and in the restoration of the German, Empire.¹ It was from the crushing of Prussia after Jena that dates the revival of German

¹ By the convention which followed the Peace of Tilsit, the Prussian army was limited to 42,000 men. Scharnhorst kept to the terms of this convention, and at no time was the army more than 42,000 men; but he saw to it that each year or two they were a different 42,000, so that when Prussia's opportunity came, after the failure of Napoleon's Russian campaign, she was able to call up a quarter of a million trained men, and became by her energy and power the most formidable of the Continental members of the alliance which broke Napoleon.

national consciousness and the desire for German unity.

Now take the case of France in 1870. The German armies, drawn from States which within the memory of men then living had been mere appanages of Napoleon, which as a matter of fact had furnished some of the soldiers of his armies, had crushed the armies of Louis Napoleon. Not merely was France prostrated, her territory in the occupation of German soldiers, the French Empire overthrown and replaced by an unstable republic, but frightful civil conflicts like the Commune had divided France against herself. So distraught, indeed, was she that Bismarck had almost to create a French Government with which to treat at all. What was at the time an immense indemnity had been imposed upon her, and it was generally believed that not for generations could she become a considerable military or political factor in Europe again. Her increase of population was feeble, tending to stagnation; her political institutions were unstable; she was torn by internal dissensions; and yet, as we know, within five years of the conclusion of peace France had already sufficiently recuperated to become a cause of anxiety to Bismarck, who believed that the work of "destruction" would have to be begun all over again. And if one goes back to earlier centuries, to the France of Louis XIV., and her recovery after her defeat in the War of the Austrian Succession, to the incredible exhaustion of Prussia in wars like

the Thirty Years' War, when her population was cut in half, or the Seven Years' War, it is the same story: a virile people cannot be "wiped from the map." Their ideals, good or bad, cannot be destroyed by armies.

There are, moreover, one or two additional factors to be kept in mind. The marvellous renaissance of France after 1871 has become a commonplace; and yet this France, which is once more challenging her old enemy, is a France of stationary population, not having, because not needing, the technical industrial capacity which marks certain other peoples, like ourselves and the Germans. The German population is not stationary; it is increasing at the rate of very nearly a million a year; and if the result of this war is to attenuate something of the luxury and materialism which has marked modern Germany, that rate of population increase, will not diminish, but rather be accelerated, for it is the people of simple life that are the people of large families. It is altogether likely that the highly artificial Austrian Empire (itself the work of the sword, not the product of natural growth), embracing so many different races and nationalities, will be politically rearranged. The result of that will be to give to German Austria an identity of aim and aspiration with the other German States, so that, however the frontiers may be rectified and whatever shuffling may take place, this solid fact will remain, that there will be in Central Europe seventy-five or eighty millions

speaking German, and nursing, if their nationality is temporarily overpowered, the dream of reviving it when the opportunity shall occur.

And there is one more fact: as I have already hinted, the elements which distinguish one people from another both in its good and bad qualities are the things of the mind. Someone has asked, "What is it that makes the difference between the kind of society that existed in the State of Illinois five hundred years ago, and the kind of society that exists there to-day?" The Red Indian had the same soil and air and water, the same bodily vigour as, or better bodily vigour than, that possessed by us to-day; all the raw materials of a complex civilization were there as much five hundred years ago as now. The one thing which marks the difference between the modern American and the Red Indian is just the difference of knowledge and ideas, the accumulated experience and the secret of the management of matter. Given that, given this knowledge of the manipulation of the raw materials of Nature, and a completely new society is readily created. You may go into American cities, of which fifteen years ago not one stone stood upon another, but which have all the machinery of civilization—the factories, the railroads, the tram-lines, telephones, telegraphs, newspapers, electric light, schools, warmed houses—that one can find in New York or in Paris. It is merely accumulated knowledge which enables all these things to be created in a desert within a

decade. Now, that fact means this, that given this accumulated knowledge and this technical capacity, the recuperation of a people from the destruction of war will be much more rapid in our day than it has been in the past. And that technical capacity, that special knowledge, the Germans possess to a very high degree; they have, indeed, been called the Americans of Europe. If we can imagine the machinery of civilization destroyed, their factories pulled down, and the railroads torn up (things which will not happen to any very great degree), even so, within a very few years it would all be restored once more, and we should have to reckon with this fact of seventy-five million Germans manufacturing, trading, teaching, organizing, scheming as before.

I come to the other group of factors which I have enumerated above, showing the impossibility permanently of suppressing by sheer force of arms a national ambition, good or bad, and that is the mutability of the alliances by which alone such a result can be achieved.

In the Balkan War we had manifested two extraordinary political phenomena that are particularly suggestive in this connection. The first Balkan War was won by a group of separate States, not linked by any public formal political bond, but thrown together by one common fear, resentment, or ambition: the desire to wrest members of their race from Turkish tyranny. When the Balkan League started upon the war against

Turkey, everyone prophesied that their jealousies and the difficulty of military co-operation would throw the advantage on the side of Turkey. Events falsified this prophecy. The Balkan League astonished the world by its successes against the very highly militarized power of Turkey. But immediately the war was over and this military success achieved, dissensions arose among the allies over the division of the spoils; and the first Balkan War was succeeded by a second Balkan War, in which the members of the Balkan League fought against one another, and the final settlement was such as to satisfy none of the parties.¹

Now, at the bottom of all the European system of alliances—notably those embodying the principle of the balance of power—is the assumption that the superior military force of one country can and will be used to its own advantage and to the disadvantage of weaker Powers. This, it is urged, implies the need for establishing a balance, an equilibrium, so that neither can challenge the other.

But it is obvious that in the degree to which there is a belief in the advantages, moral or material, of conquest, the desire for the domination of someone else, there will always be a tendency for the individual member, when he sees a chance by the rearrangement of parties, to exchange the politically unprogressive condition of equilibrium

¹ An eminent American who has recently travelled from one end of the Balkans to the other says that the prevailing remark everywhere is that *rien n'est fini*.

for the progressive and expanding condition of victory over others. Or, to put it differently, so long as nations believe (as they do believe) that there is advantage as well as safety in being stronger than others, there will always be an impulse so to rearrange the groupings that the obvious advantage of strength lies with them and against the rival, whether that rival be a group or a nation. Military power in any case is a thing very difficult to estimate; an apparently weaker group or nation has often proved, in fact, to be the stronger, so that there is a desire on the part of each side to give the benefit of the doubt to itself, and we come to believe that the way to secure peace is, in the phrase of Mr. Churchill, the British First Lord of the Admiralty, "to be so much stronger than your enemy that he will not dare to attack you." But the other side also thinks that, and each cannot be stronger than the other. Thus the natural and latent effort to be strongest is obviously fatal to any "balance." Neither side, in fact, desires a balance; each desires to have the balance tilted in its favour. This sets up a perpetual tendency to rearrangements, regroupings, and reshufflings in these international alliances, sometimes taking place with extraordinary and startling rapidity, as in the case of the Balkan States. It is already illustrated in the present war—Italy has broken away from a formal alliance that everyone supposed would range her on the German side. There is at least a possibility that

she may finally come down upon the Anglo-Franco-Russian side. You have Japan, which little more than a decade since was fighting bitterly against Russia, to-day ranged upon the side of Russia. The position of Russia is even still more startling. In the struggles of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries Britain was always on the side of Russia; then for two generations Britishers were taught that any increase of the power of Russia was a particularly dangerous menace. That once more, was a decade ago suddenly changed, and the British are now fighting to increase both relatively and absolutely the power of a country which their last war upon the Continent was fought to check. The war before that, which they fought upon the Continent, was fought in alliance with Germans against the power of France. As to the Austrians, whom they are now fighting, they were for many years their faithful allies. So it is very nearly true to say of all the combatants respectively, that they have no enemy to-day that was not, historically speaking, quite recently an ally, and not an ally to-day that was not in the recent past an enemy.

These combinations, therefore, are not, never have been, and never can be, permanent. If history, even quite recent history, has any meaning at all, the next ten or fifteen or twenty years will be bound to see among these nine combatants now in the field, rearrangements and permutations out of which the crushed and suppressed Germany that

is to follow the war—a Germany which will embrace, nevertheless, seventy-five million of the same race, highly efficient, highly educated, trained for co-ordination and common action—will be bound sooner or later to find her chance.

Let us summarize the conclusions of some of the queries that we have put.

The annihilation of Germany is a meaningless phrase. You cannot annihilate sixty-five or seventy-five million people. They will remain, the men who have built their homes and the men who have fought their battles will still be there. You cannot divide them up between France and Russia save at the cost of making those two States highly militarized, undemocratic, and oppressive Powers. If you broke up these seventy-five millions into separate States, there is no reason why, if a Balkan League could be formed and fight with success, a German League could not do likewise. Those diplomatic combinations by which the German States of the future are to be kept in subjugation cannot be counted upon for permanence and stability—such combinations never have been, and in their nature cannot be, permanent or immutable.

For this reason Prussianism will never be destroyed by a mere military victory of one group over another. If the war is to begin and end with the defeat of the German armies and the subjugation of the German State, the result will be either to transfer Prussianism and all that it represents in

the way of militarism from one capital to another or to others; or to create a situation in which the struggle for military domination on the part of the German people will break out afresh in another form; or else to achieve both these results: to revive the military ambitions of France, to stimulate those of Russia, and so to recast those of Germany as to make them material for future explosions.

The expectation that you can cure Germans of Prussianism, that you can drive a false doctrine from their minds merely by overpowering their armies and invading their country, is not only very false philosophy, but it happens to be, curiously enough, the characteristically Prussian philosophy; it is Prussianism pure and simple, and falls into the very fallacy which makes Prussianism so stupid and evil a thing.

Let me put the matter very definitely: I submit—

(1) That because we are right when we say that Prussianism is a false doctrine, a mischievous fallacy, an evil state of mind and temper, we are wrong when we think that the military defeat of an army can destroy it, since to do so is to ask that a man shall abandon his belief because a stronger man has struck him, or a larger army beaten his; it is to assume that beliefs depend not on the mind, but on the operation of material things—the heavier artillery or better cavalry, material force in fact.

I submit also (2) that belief in a false doctrine

can only be corrected by recognition of its fallacy; that the false doctrine of Prussianism—the belief in the value of military power, the desire for political domination—is not confined to Northern Germany, but in greater or lesser degree infects all the great Powers of Europe and is largely held even among ourselves.

(3) That a better World-Society, therefore, depends not only—perhaps not mainly—upon the military defeat of one particular nation, but upon a general recognition that the struggle for political power which all nations have pursued when opportunity offered is a barren and evil thing; that the attainment of such power adds neither to the moral nor material welfare of those who achieve it; and that if ever the Western World is to be truly civilized, we must honestly and sincerely abandon this struggle, and all the shoddy conceptions of pride and glory and patriotism with which it is bound up, in favour of the co-operation of all for the security and welfare of all. The society of nations must be based, as all other civilized societies are based, upon the agreement of partners co-operating to a common end, and in the circumstances the lead in this new conception must be given by ourselves and by the victorious Allies. Finally, I submit that upon the sincerity and pertinacity with which this aim is followed by us and by them, upon the genuineness of *our* disbelief in Prussianism, will the nature of the future depend.

All these propositions have been supported of late in somewhat unexpected quarters. The *London Times* says:

If it be true that "every man in the German Empire believes sincerely and honestly to-day that the war is one of self-defence against the hostile encroachments of Russia, France, and England," "every man" must be disillusioned. Not until the German people has been compelled to perceive this struggle in its true light can there be a prospect of lasting peace for the world.

Well, that of course is exactly what I desire to urge: there will be no peace in Europe until the Germans are convinced that Russia, France, and Britain do not desire and do not intend to encroach upon their Fatherland. The question is, How shall they be convinced of that? Some British writers are saying, "By dismembering their Fatherland." Will that convince them that they are not threatened and do not need to revive their armaments?

There are many, of course, who urge that the main business is to convince them that they cannot encroach upon the countries of others; that what they think beyond that, does not matter much to their neighbours. Well, I submit with the *Times* that it is very important indeed what opinion Germans form as to the motives and objects of their enemies.

The British people have decided and we are disposed to agree with them that the Prussian military

party desired and plotted this war for the purpose of subduing France, challenging the power of Britain, and making Germany the dominant State of the world. That is possibly a true view, but it is not the explanation of the war which the military party have given to the German people. To the German people they represent this war as one of defence, and at the present moment the assumption cited by the *Times* is certainly true: sixty million Germans are absolutely persuaded that they are fighting this war in defence of their Fatherland, to save their nationality from destruction. It is not a question of whether they are right or wrong; that is undoubtedly what the overwhelming mass of Germans sincerely and honestly believe. The attitude of many to the military party has changed since the outbreak of the war. Before the war, when they were told by the Prussian military party that Germany needed far larger armaments, great sections in Germany did not believe them. The Social Democrats, for instance, which number one-third of the entire voters of the Empire, strenuously opposed the agitation of the German Navy League and Army League, and accused the Prussian military party of exaggeration or deception when that party urged that the country was in danger from its neighbours. But now the anti-militarist party in Germany, when they see their country or their colonies about to be invaded by five enemy nations, are wondering whether after all the Prussians were not right in

asking for larger armaments. If Germany is beaten, the Prussians will be able to say: "If you had given us all that we asked for in the way of armaments, we should not have been beaten." Thus there are very many millions of Germans who, distrusting and detesting the Prussians before the war, are now disposed to say, "Perhaps after all the Prussians were right to be prepared and to have this big and efficient military machine." Do you suppose the Germans will be less disposed to say that, if Germany is broken up and its territory, or any considerable portion of it, passes under alien government?

It is one of the outstanding characteristics of Prussian stupidity to assume that other people will be affected by motives which would never influence the conduct of a Prussian. The senseless philosophy of his warfare is based on the assumption that he can terrify the people of an invaded or conquered province out of the determination to defend their country, knowing perfectly well that if he, a Prussian, were defending Prussia, threats of harsh treatment would only make him more determined to resist the invader. If you examine the mistakes in the diplomacy and government of Prussia, you will find that most of them are due to this absolute incapacity of the Prussian to put himself in the other man's shoes, to the general assumption that the Prussian is "different"; that it is ridiculous to suppose that other people whose country he is pleased to invade are like him, and

have an equal tenacity and determination not to yield to bullying and to force.

And yet, when people assume that by "smashing" Germany, they are going to discredit militarism or induce the German to abandon his effort to remain a great military power, are they adopting any other than the Prussian way of reasoning? Let me put a definite case.

There are in Great Britain a considerable number of people who for fifteen years have been urging that a much larger army than she has heretofore possessed was necessary for her defence, and that, if she could not get it otherwise, she ought to resort to compulsion. Now, the views of those military advocates have not been adopted. But suppose the British were beaten in this war, that their country were overrun by Germans and Austrians, that their Empire were broken up. Would the effect of that be to make national service less or more likely? Would a German invasion cause them to reduce their armaments in other respects, and to render them less anxious to be strong in the future? You know, of course, that it would have the exactly contrary effect. Why do you expect, therefore, that if the circumstances were reversed Germany would act differently?

Even though Germans succeeded somehow in preventing the British raising an army, would that in any way alter their conviction that to raise an army is what they ought to do if they could? If their Empire were broken up, and their colonies

passed under German rule, does any Briton really think all the five nations of the British Empire would sit down and accept that as the last word, that they would not plot and scheme and dream and contrive and teach the old ideals to their children, and make them love the old memories and pray every day for their revival? Would they ever abandon hope that that revival and renaissance would take place?

Again, why, therefore, should we expect that other people would act differently?

Indeed, the case is stronger than I have put it. Suppose that the British Empire, broken up in the twentieth century, had only a hundred years before been broken up utterly, and yet had pieced itself together again, stronger and mightier than ever, would there be a Briton alive who would not know that, sooner or later, his chance would come, and that he would re-establish his Empire again, as his fathers did before him?

Again, while there are many Americans who believe that a great increase of our naval and military armaments is necessary, and also many who are honestly opposed to that increase, do you believe that if an attempt were made by any conceivable combination of foreign powers to impose a limitation of armaments upon us by force, we should consent to such a limitation? Would not those who were in favour of big armaments redouble their efforts? And would not many of those who had opposed them feel compelled to

change sides, and to join, however reluctantly, in the demand for great naval and military preparations, rather than acquiesce in a policy dictated to us by foreigners?

Need we necessarily conclude, therefore, that the complete defeat of Germany in this war is unnecessary or undesirable in the interests of the peace of the world? Not the least in the world. It is probably now true that there can be no permanent peace in Europe until Germany is defeated, but what I have urged throughout this book is that the defeat of Germany alone will not give us permanent peace; and that only by bold and constructive work along the lines I have indicated, involving the abandonment of false political doctrine by ourselves and the Allies, as well as by Germany, can we prevent this war from becoming the seed of future wars.

That conclusion is not in the least invalidated—indeed it is strengthened—even if we take the view that this war arises out of an attempt on the part of Germany to impose her rule upon Europe. We are told that Germany is fighting this war for the mastery of Europe as against the Slav; it is a struggle as to whether Slav or Teuton shall dominate the world. Whether the culprit in this case be German or Russian, there is only one thing which can permanently end it, and that is for both alike to realize that this thing for which they struggle is a futile, empty, and evil thing even when attained. If Germany could conquer all Europe,

not a single one of the millions of men and women who make up Germany would be one whit the better morally or materially. They would in all human probability be morally and materially the worse. The men and women of the great States—of the Austrias, the Russias, and the Germanys—do not lead happier or better lives by reason of such “greatness” than do the Swiss or Dutch or Scandinavians. This political power, bought at such infinite price, does not add any mortal thing morally or materially of value to the lives of those who purchase it so dearly. It is true that the United States is a great power, but the prosperity of our people is not due to the naval or military force, actual or potential, which we wield, but to the natural resources of the country and the industry and intelligence of its inhabitants, and to the fact that our circumstances have enabled us to steer clear on the whole, of that strife for political and military power in which the Empires of Europe have believed greatness to consist.

It is the illusion as to the value of this thing for which the nations struggle, that we must dispel. So long as we nurse the worship of this idea of political “greatness”—and such a worship is not a German any more than it is a French or British or American idea, it is world-wide—we must expect the worship to take the form of these ignoble wars. It is this worship—of which we are all guilty—which is the true Prussianism, and which must be destroyed.

That result cannot be achieved by any purely mechanical means. It involves what all human progress involves, a correction of ideas. It must be approached through the mind. We must realize that certain beliefs that we have held in the past are unsound, and we must be prepared, in order to vindicate the better creed, to take, if need be, certain risks, less risk than that involved in the armed camp of the past, infinitely less, but still some risk. We have seen that the plan of the rivalry of armaments, the plan of each being more prepared for war, of being stronger than anyone else, has miserably failed. A plan based on universal distrust cannot give a decent human society. We shall have to try more honestly and more sincerely and with more persistence than we have tried before to agree together for our common good, and instead of having one group facing another group, three nations facing three nations and acting in rivalry, it must be all the great nations of the civilized world acting in common for our common good. And we in America must recognize that we cannot stand aside from the development of civilized society, that our interests are bound up inextricably with those of the other members of that society; and that our interest as well as our duty, lies in contributing our share to its organization, and the improvement of the ideas on which it is based.

In the last resort human society does not and cannot rest upon force. When at an election the

Republicans vote the Democrats out of power, what assurance have they that the Democrats will surrender that power? You say the army, and navy? But it is the existing Democratic Government that commands the army and navy that holds all the instruments of power. There is no assurance that the Democrats will just step down and surrender the instruments of power to their rivals, save the agreement, the convention; and if that agreement were not abided by, the Republicans would raise an army of rebellion and turn the Democrats out, just as in certain South American republics. And they, of course, would hold power until the Democrats had raised an army, and so you would have the sort of thing that prevails in Venezuela and the other countries where revolutions succeed one another every six months. It is not the existence of our army which prevents that, because countries like Venezuela have more soldiers in proportion to the number of the population than any others. The only thing which prevents it, is the general faith that each reposes in the other playing the game. A similar convention must be extended to the international field, and until we get a general recognition of the need for action by that method between nations, Prussianism will never die. The only hope for its defeat resides in the triumph of a truer and better political doctrine, the realization that struggle for military ascendancy must be abandoned, not by one party alone, but by all alike. That international anarch-

ism, the belief that there is no society of nations, must be abandoned for a frank recognition of the obvious fact that the nations do form a society, and these principles which all recognize as the sole hope of the maintenance of civilization within the nations must also be applied as the only hope for the maintenance of civilized intercourse between nations.

Just lately there has been given impressive evidence that even orthodox diplomatists, when the brink of tragedy reveals the realities beneath the superficialities of conventional statecraft, recognized the need for this new spirit and bolder method.

It will be remembered that, in the years preceding the war, British diplomacy had given its adherence to the principle of the Balance of Power—of throwing its weight on the side of one group as against another group which was presumed to be hostile to it. If such a system was designed to keep the peace, it has obviously and pathetically failed. The preceding pages give a hint of why, by virtue of its very nature, such a policy must fail. When, in the tragic days at the end of July, its failure became evident, Sir Edward Grey, at the eleventh hour and fifty-ninth minute, made a desperate and despairing effort hurriedly to formulate a policy which should be based on the opposite principle of the Concert, or European League. In a dispatch he says:

If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan Crisis, and Germany having a corresponding object our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals; but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite *rapprochement* between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.

It will be noted that in the previous crisis—that arising out of the Balkan War—Sir Edward Grey had abandoned the principle of the Balance of Power, and worked towards a European agreement. We may take it, therefore, that his influence may now be definitely won to this latter principle. One can only regret that the principle of the Balance of Power, having been abandoned in the Balkan crisis, was ever revived. For, as the events show, it is not at the last stroke of the clock, at the edge of the precipice, when all the disastrous forces of conflict have already gained a terrible momentum, that they can be stopped, and a new and revolutionary policy framed to cope

with them. But after the war is over peace must be so arranged that it will be possible to revive that plan, and pursue it sincerely, resolutely, and patiently. And we in America must throw the whole of our influence, which will be greater after the war than it has ever been before, upon the side of world co-operation and organization. Meanwhile, and as a last word, it is necessary to point out that, though it is essential to realize that the mere military victory of the Allies will not solve the old troubles, that victory is none the less necessary for their solution, and nothing that I have written here is in the slightest degree in conflict with insistence upon that great need. While the doctrine of Prussianism cannot be destroyed by arms alone neither can it be destroyed if Prussian arms are victorious.

Let me try to make the position clear by an historical analogy, on which I have already touched. The ideals of the Catholic Church were at one period of the history of Europe "protected" and promoted by military force. That is to say, Catholic groups or States attempted to smash Protestant groups or States in the interests of Catholicism, and to some extent, at least, the converse was true of Protestant groups or States. Each attempt was rightly resisted by the other party. The evil was not in either ideal; the evil was in the attempt to impose that ideal by force upon others, a proposition to which any Catholic or Protestant to-day will thoroughly agree. A

good Catholic would to-day be as ready to die for his faith on the battlefield as were his forbears. But there are many good Catholics who would fight on the side of Protestants if we could imagine a Catholic group attempting to impose Catholicism by force. When Protestants were attacked in the sixteenth century, they very rightly defended themselves; but when, after victory, they made the mistake of attempting to smash Catholicism by the very same means which the Catholics had been using against them, they did nothing but perpetuate the wars of religion. Those wars ceased, not by one party finally overcoming and crushing the other, and making Europe completely Protestant or completely Catholic, but by both parties agreeing not to attempt to enforce their respective faith by the power of the sword. It was not the Catholic faith which created the wars of religion; it was the belief in the right to impose one's faith by force upon others. So in our day, it is not the German national faith, the *Deutschtum*, the belief that the German national ideal is best for the German—it is not that belief that is a danger to the world, it is the belief that that German national ideal is the best for all other people, and that the Germans have a right to impose it by the force of their armies. It is that belief alone which can be destroyed by armies. The Allies must show that they do not intend to be brought under German rule, or have German ideals imposed upon them; and, having demonstrated that, the

Allies must show that they, in their turn, have no intention of imposing their ideals or their rule or their dominance upon German peoples. The Allies must show after this war that they do not desire to be the masters of the German peoples or States, but their partners and associates in a Europe which "none shall dominate, but which all shall share."

If the settlement is to be along these lines, if we are to get, as the result of this war, a better state of things in which the idea of public right shall replace the rule of force, and the peaceful development of industry and civilization shall be exempt from the burden of armament competition and the interruption and dislocation caused by war, the United States must realize its responsibilities and play its part. We must recognize that we are vitally interested in the problems of the reconstruction which is to follow the war, and we must use all the influence we possess—it is immense—to ensure that this reconstruction shall take place upon the right lines. It must be our part to insist upon the only principles by which Prussianism can really be destroyed, and we must be prepared to come into the organized society of the future and to lend it the sanction, not necessarily or preferably of our military force, but of those weapons of moral and economic pressure which we can wield with peculiar effect. In this way America will not only confer a lasting blessing upon mankind,—the blessing of

a secure and permanent peace,—but will establish herself as the leader of the New World-State in which all hope of human progress is now centred.

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W. M. Hughes, Acting Premier of Australia, in a letter to the "Sydney Telegraph."

"It is a great book, a glorious book to read. It is a book pregnant with the brightest promise to the future of civilized man. Peace—not the timid, shrinking figure of The Hague, cowering under the sinister shadow of six million bayonets—appears at length as an ideal possible of realization in our own time."

Sir George Reid, Australian High Commissioner in London (Sphinx Club Banquet, May 5, 1911).

"I regard the author of this book as having rendered one of the greatest services ever rendered by the writer of a book to the human race. Well, I will be very cautious indeed—one of the greatest services which any author has rendered during the past hundred years."

FRANCE AND BELGIUM.

M. Anatole France in "The English Review," August, 1913.

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"La Petite République" (M. Henri Turot), 17 Décembre, 1910.

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"Revue Bleu," Mai, 1911.

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M. Jean Jaurès, during debate in French Chamber of Deputies, January 13, 1911; see *Journal Officiel*, 14 Janvier, 1911.

"Il a paru, il y a peu de temps, un livre anglais de M. Norman Angell, 'La Grande Illusion,' qui a produit un grand effet en Angleterre. Dans les quelques jours que j'ai passés de l'autre côté du détroit, j'ai vu, dans les réunions populaires, toutes les fois qu'il était fait mention de ce livre, les applaudissements éclater."

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"*Der Turmer*" (Stuttgart).

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"*Königsberger Allgemeine Zeitung.*"

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Professor Karl von Bar, the authority on International and Criminal Law, Privy Councillor, etc.

"Particularly do I agree with the author in these two points: (1) That in the present condition of organized society the attempt of one nation to destroy the commerce or industry of another must damage the victor more perhaps than the vanquished; and (2) that physical force is a constantly diminishing factor in human affairs. The rising generation seems to be realizing this more and more."

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